Kimberlin v. Lear, 6756

Decision Date07 September 1972
Docket NumberNo. 6756,6756
Citation88 Nev. 492,500 P.2d 1022
PartiesRobert KIMBERLIN and Marie Kimberlin, husband and wife, Appellants, v. William P. LEAR and Reno/Stead Development Co., Respondents.
CourtNevada Supreme Court
OPINION

THOMPSON, Justice.

The district court dismissed this wrongful death action against William P. Lear and Reno/Stead Development Co., two of several joined defendants, for the failure of the plaintiffs to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and found no just reason to delay the entry of appropriate judgments. This appeal followed.

The plaintiffs-appellants are the parents of two children, ages seven and nine, who drowned in a natural body of water on land owned on the day of their accidental deaths by Land Developers, Inc., another defendant against whom this action remains pending. During the Spring of 1969, a dry lake bed, comprising some 56 acres, had become covered with muddy water from the winter's runoff forming a lake two to four feet deep. In August 1968, several holes, about twenty feet square and fifteen feet deep, were dug in the dry lake bed to test the water table. This was done with the knowledge and consent of William P. Lear who then owned the property.

About six days after Mr. Lear had conveyed the property to Land Developers, Inc., the plaintiffs' two children were wading in the lake without permission and drowned in one of the test holes. Their claim for relief is premised solely upon the doctrine of attractive nuisance. No other basis for liability is asserted. 1

This court has neither adopted nor rejected the attractive nuisance doctrine. We have mentioned it. Smith v. Smith-Peterson Co., 56 Nev. 79, 45 P.2d 785, 48 P.2d 760 (1935); Orr Ditch & Water Co. v. Justice Ct., 64 Nev. 138, 178 P.2d 558 (1947). It is best defined in Rest.Torts 2d, Sec. 339 quoted below. 2 Liability may be fastened upon the possessor or occupier of the land if (a) the place where the condition is found is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, (b) the condition is one which the possessor should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of harm to such children, (c) the child, because of his immaturity, either does not discover the condition or does not in fact appreciate the dnager involved and, (d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition must be slight as compared with the risk to children. Prosser, Law of Torts, 368--376 (4th ed. 1971). It is apparent that these preconditions to liability usually involve factual determinations which may not be resolved at the pleading stage of litigation.

In the case at hand, however, the district court apparently was persuaded that the attractive nuisance doctrine could not apply to fix liability upon either William P. Lear or Reno/Stead Development Co., since neither defendant possessed nor occupied the land at the time of the tragic drownings. The possessor was Land Developers, Inc. 3 A vendor of real property who parts with title, possession and control of it ceases to be either an owner or an occupier, and generally, all responsibility for the condition of the land shifts to the purchaser. An exception to this proposition does exist. A vendor is under a duty to disclose to the vendee any concealed conditions known to him which involve an unreasonable danger to the health or safety of those upon the premises and which he may anticipate that the vendee may not discover. The failure to make such disclosure may impose liability upon the vendor for injury resulting from such conditions to others upon the land with the consent of the vendee. Rest.Torts 2d, Sec. 353. 4

Although the plaintiffs-appellants seek refuge in this exception, it cannot avail them since their children were trespassers upon the land of Land Developers, Inc., and were not there present with the consent or in the right of that company. Cf. Belote v. Memphis Development Co., 208 Tenn. 434, 346 S.W.2d 441 (1961); A--F Corporation v. Caporaletti, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 367, 240 F.2d 53 (1957); Derby v. Public Service Co., 100 N.H. 53, 119 A.2d 335 (1955); Southern v. Floyd, 89 Ga.App. 602, 80 S.E.2d 490 (1954); Herzog v. Capital Co., 27 Cal.2d 349, 164 P.2d 8 (1945).

Affirmed.

BATJER and MOWBRAY, JJ., concur.

ZENOFF, Chief Justice, with whom GUNDERSON, Justice, agrees, dissenting:

Appellants assert that Lear created an attractive nuisance and therefore a cause of action is stated. At this stage of the game we believe that Lear should be held to answer because having caused the holes to be drilled he has a responsibility to inform his vendees that they existed.

Apparently, Nevada has not yet adopted the doctrine of attractive nuisance, Smith v. Smith-Peterson Company, 56 Nev. 79, 85, 45 P.2d 785 (1938), but has referred to it is that case and in Orr Ditch & Water Co. v. Justice Ct., 64 Nev. 138, 178 P.2d 558 (1947).

The rule is stated in Restatement of the Law of Torts 2d § 339:

' § 339. Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to Trespassing Children

A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an artifical condition upon the land if

(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and

(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and

(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and

(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children involved, and

(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the children.'

We would adopt the doctrine as stated in the Restatement and join the majority of states. See W. Prosser, Trespassing Children 47 Cal.L.Rev. 426 (1959); Restatement of the Law of Torts 2d Appendix § 339.

Putting aside for the moment the fact that Lear was not the possessor of the land (Restatement of the Law of Torts 2d § 328E), the question as to whether a body of water constitutes an attractive nuisance must be resolved. This court in Orr Ditch, supra, 64 Nev. at 167, 178 P.2d at 572, stated that, 'the mere presence of a body of water, such as a pond, or creek, or a conduit such as a canal or ditch, is held by the great majority of the authorities not to be an attractive nuisance.'

Although this position is followed in many instances (see Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Powers, 206 Okl. 322, 243 P.2d 688 (1952); Mellas v. Lowdermilk, 58 N.M. 363, 271 P.2d 399 (1954); Jones v. Comer, 237 Ark. 500, 374 S.W.2d 465 (1964)), we believe the better rule, developed in California, to be that Restatement § 339 prevents arbitrary categorization based on type of condition involved (see King v. Lennen, 53 Cal.2d 340, 1 Cal.Rptr. 665, 348 P.2d 98 (1959), where a small artificial swimming pool was held to be an attractive nuisance).

The problem with the instant case is that the boys had to wade through a natural lake or pond to find the artificial hole which was dangerous because of its unexpected depth. Annot., Liability of landowner for drowning of child, 8 A.L.R.2d 1254, 1294, § 36 'Holes or ledges under water.'

As stated by the Florida Court of Appeal in Ansin v. Thurston, 98 So.2d 87, 88 (Fla.App.1957), there is an exception to the rule that a pond of water is not an attractive nuisance, viz: '. . . the owner of an artificial body of water is not guilty of actionable negligence on account of drowning therein unless it is constructed so as to constitute a trap or unless there is some unusual element of danger lurking about it not existent in ponds generally.' See also Allen v. William P. McDonald Corporation, 42 So.2d 706 (Fla.1949).

In the instant case, the boys were wading out into a lake on a formerly dry bed with a very even bottom. Suddenly they fell into a large obscured hole. We would note the exception to the general rule provided the other requirements of § 339 are met by proof at trial.

Considering, as we do for purposes of this appeal that facts can be elicited to prove up the requirements of § 339 and the exception heretofore noted, there remains the problem and fact that Lear was not the possessor of the land.

As a general rule, a vendor of land is not subject to liability for physical harm caused by any dangerous condition to his vendee or others while upon the land after the vendee has taken possession, whether natural or artificial, which existed at the time that the vendee took possession. Restatement of Torts 2d § 352; Annot., Liability of vendor or grantor of real estate for personal injury to purchaser on third person due to defective condition of premises, 8 A.L.R.2d 218 (1949), where it is pointed out that under the prevailing rule a vendor is not liable for injuries to the purchaser or third party lawfully there resulting from the existing defective condition of the premises conveyed. All obligations generally cease at the time of sale and transfer of possession. Porter v. Miller, 24 Ill.App.2d 424, 164 N.E.2d 601 (1960); Conway v. Epstein, 49 Ill.App.2d 290, 200 N.E.2d 16 (1964); cf. Wiles v. Assoc. of Commerce of Decatur, 332 Ill.App. 375, 75 N.E.2d 526 (1947), and Copfer v. Golden, 135 Cal.App.2d 623, 288...

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2 cases
  • Village Development Co. v. Filice
    • United States
    • Nevada Supreme Court
    • August 27, 1974
    ...to the vendor which involve an unreasonable danger, and which he may anticipate that the vendee may not discover. Kimberlin v. Lear, 88 Nev. 492, 495, 500 P.2d 1022 (1972). Village Development offered such an instruction couched in language borrowed from Rest., Torts, 2d ed., §§ 351, 353. 2......
  • Blair v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nevada
    • June 9, 1977
    ...Mich. 490, 134 N.W.2d 637 (1965). Moreover, the attractive nuisance doctrine has apparently not been adopted in Nevada. Kimberlin v. Lear, 88 Nev. 492, 494, 500 P.2d 1022 (1972). Even where the doctrine is in force, "the mere presence of a body of water ... is held by the great majority of ......

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