Kimberly Zizza & Others 1 v. Others2

• Decision Date: 30 March 2010
• Citation: 456 Mass. 401,923 N.E.2d 1018
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: Kimberly ZIZZA & others 1 v. Scott ZIZZA & others.2

923 N.E.2d 1018

456 Mass. 401

Kimberly ZIZZA & others ¹

v.Scott ZIZZA & others.²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

Argued Dec. 9, 2009.

Decided March 30, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Kimberly A. Zizza for the plaintiffs.

Kenneth A. Cossingham, North And-over, for Plastic Concepts, Inc., & another.

William P. Boland for Scott Zizza.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, CORDY, BOTSFORD, & GANTS, JJ.

BOTSFORD, J.

The statutes comprising the Commonwealth's one-trial system lie at the heart of this case. The plaintiff filed an action in the Superior Court asserting separate claims for equitable relief and money damages. Pursuant to G.L. c. 212, § 3, one of the one-trial system statutes, a Superior Court judge determined that damages on the legal claims were not likely to exceed the threshold amount of $25,000 and dismissed the complaint, notwithstanding the presence of the equity claim that fell squarely within the Superior Court's general equity jurisdiction. We conclude that c. 212, § 3, and the additional one-trial system statutory provisions, vest discretionary authority in a Superior Court judge to follow such a course.

1. Background³ In December of 2008, Kimberly Zizza and her two minor children (referred to collectively as the plaintiff) filed this action in the Superior Court against Scott Zizza, Kimberly Zizza's former husband and the father of the two children; Plastic Concepts, Inc. (Plastic Concepts), Scott Zizza's employer; and Michael Thompson, the principal of Plastic Concepts. The plaintiffs complaint set out a number of different claims, but primarily alleged the breach of an agreement or contract between Kimberly and Scott Zizza relating to child support. In particular, the complaint alleged that in 1999, Scott Zizza agreed in writing that he would pay the plaintiff $262 per week for child support, "and would have such taken from his paycheck by his employer and sent directly to Kimberly Zizza." It further alleged that Scott Zizza and Plastic Concepts complied with this agreement from 1999 onward, but since June, 2008, no weekly paycheck deduction occurred; since September, 2008, Scott Zizza failed both to make regular child support pay-ments and to pay his agreed-on portion of uninsured medical expenses for the children. The complaint's claims for relief included payment of the alleged child support arrearages as well as an order, characterized by the plaintiff as specific performance of the contract, against Scott Zizza and Plastic Concepts, requiring $262 to be deducted from Scott Zizza's weekly pay and given directly to the plaintiff.

On December 31, 2008, Scott Zizza filed an answer to the complaint. He denied the allegations that he failed to make timely child support payments and raised a number of affirmative defenses, including failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, statute of limitations, and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He did not include in the answer a defense of failure to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement of the Superior Court pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(10), as appearing in 450 Mass. 1403 (2008), ⁴ and he did not file before his answer a separate motion to dismiss raising this defense.

On February 20, 2009, Plastic Concepts and Thompson filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. They based their motion on Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), lack of subject matter jurisdiction; rule 12(b)(5), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), insufficiency of service of process; rule 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted; and rule 12(b)(10), failure to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement to proceed in the Superior Court. (See note 4, supra.) Thereafter, on March 13, 2009, Scott Zizza followed suit and also filed a separate motion to dismiss under rules 12(b)(1), (6), and (10).

The plaintiff filed oppositions to both motions to dismiss. With respect to the defense of lack of amount in controversy under rule 12(b)(10), the plaintiff countered that because one type of relief sought in the complaint was specific performance an equitable remedy and because the Superior Court has the general authority to order such equitable relief, jurisdiction in the Superior Court was proper. She also contended that if consideration were given to the arrearages as well as the nonpayment of child support likely to occur in the future (i.e., until the children are "emancipated"), the amount of money damages likely would exceed $25,000. After a hearing, a judge in the Superior Court ordered the complaint dis- missed against all defendants pursuant to rule 12(b)(10), for failure to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement applicable to the Superior Court.⁵

Pursuant to G.L. c. 212, § 3A (c), ⁶ the plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the complaint to a single justice of the Appeals Court. Although the single justice found the damages sought by the plaintiff would be less than $25,000, he also noted that the Superior Court clearly had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs equitable claim for relief; the equitable claim was "material to the alleged contract" at issue; and there was no indication that the equitable claim was made in bad faith. The single justice vacated the order of dismissal. However, because the single justice found that the case involved a "close question" and a "re-cunring issue of significant importance," he reported the matter to a panel of the Appeals Court. Thereafter, we trans ferred the case to this court on our own motion.

2. Discussion, In 2004, the Legislature enacted a one-trial system for civil cases throughout the Commonwealth. St.2004, c. 252. See Sperounes v. Farese, 449 Mass. 800, 802-804, 873 N.E.2d 239 (2007) {Sperounes) (discussing one-trial system statutory background and history). Under the one-trial system, a civil action for money damages filed in the Superior Court may proceed to trial in that court "only if there is no reasonable likelihood that recovery by the plaintiff will be less than or equal to $25,000," G.L. c. 212, § 3, as amended by St.2004, c. 252, § 2⁷; and an action for money damages filed in the District Court or Boston Municipal Court⁸may proceed to trial there "only if there is no reasonable likelihood that recovery by the plaintiff will exceed $25,000. G.L. c. 218, § 19, as amended through St.2004, c. 252, § 5.⁹

With respect to civil actions seeking solely money damages in the District Court, we previously have held that although the $25,000 limitation on damages imposed by G.L. c. 218, § 19, is not jurisdictional, a judge in the District Court must dismiss the case if a defendant timely objects on the ground that the level of anticipated damages will exceed $25,000, and the judge agrees with this assessment. Sperounes, 449 Mass. at 806, 873 N.E.2d 239. Requiring dismissal in this circumstance is consistent with the statutory language that an action may proceed in the District Court "only if there is no reasonable likelihood that damages recovered by the plaintiff will exceed $25,000.¹⁰ Id, at 806-807, 873 N.E.2d 239.

The reasoning of the Sperounes case equally applies to actions commenced in the Superior Court. It therefore follows that, in an action filed in the Superior Court seeking money damages only, if a defendant timely objects ¹¹ under G.L. c. 212, § 3, to the matter proceeding in the Superior Court, the judge, after required notice to and opportunity for written responses from the parties, must dismiss the complaint if satisfied that there is no reasonable likelihood the plaintiff will recover more than $25,000.

In the present case, we agree with the Superior Court judge and the single justice of the Appeals Court that any dam ages awarded to the plaintiff are not likely to exceed $25,000. Possible unpaid amounts of child support in the future may not currently be considered as part of the plaintiffs damages. See, e.g., Larson v. Larson, 30 Mass.App.Ct. 418, 426, 569 N.E.2d 406 (1991) ("later violations [by defendant of monthly payment obligations pursuant to divorce agreement] were not and could not have been raised in the original action because the times for payment had not yet occurred or given rise to any cause of action in favor of [plaintiff]"). See also 4 A. Corbin, Contracts § 956 (1951). It does not necessarily follow, however, that, in accordance with the rationale of Sperounes, the complaint in this case was required to be dismissed because the Superior Court's threshold amount in controversy had not been met. Rather, the presence of the equity claim, falling squarely within the Superior Court's broad equity jurisdiction, see G.L. c. 214, § l, ¹²requires us to examine and apply different proyisions of the one-trial system's statutory scheme than were at issue in Sperounes. But as we did in Sperounes, we do so here with the goal of interpreting the relevant statutory provisions to reflect and carry out the legislative intent behind them. See Sperounes, 449 Mass. at 804, 873 N.E.2d 239.

We have previously stated that the intent or purpose of the one-trial system was to increase the efficacy of trials in the District and Superior Courts over the inefficient remand-removal system that had previously been in effect. See Sperounes, supra at 804-805, 873 N.E.2d 239. See also Ravnikar v. Bogojavlensky, 438 Mass. 627, 634, 782 N.E.2d 508 (2003); Herman v. Home Depot, 436 Mass. 210, 215, 763 N.E.2d 512 (2002). To that end, and in implicit recognition that the Superior Court already possessed jurisdiction over equity claims, the 2004 one-trial system enabling legislation, St.2004, c. 252, § 8, amended G.L. c. 218, § 19C, to give the District Court "the same equitable powers and jurisdiction as is provided for the superior court pursuant to [G.L. c. 214]... for the purpose of the hearing and disposition of... civil actions for money damages under [§]19 of this chapter." See Ravnikar v. Bogojavlenskij, supra (describing...