Kimble v. Georgia Pacific Corp., CIV.A.00-744-D.

• Decision Date: 07 November 2002
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.00-744-D.,CIV.A.00-744-D.
• Citation: 245 F.Supp.2d 862
• Parties: Kimberly KIMBLE v. GEORGIA PACIFIC CORPORATION
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana

245 F.Supp.2d 862

Kimberly KIMBLE v. GEORGIA PACIFIC CORPORATION

No. CIV.A.00-744-D.

United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana.

November 7, 2002.

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Dan Michael Scheuermann, Baton Rouge, LA, for plaintiff.

Cynthia M. Chemay, Melanie Moreland Hartmann, Carolyn S. Parmenter, Kean, Miller, Hawthorne, D'Armond, McCowan & Jarman, Baton Rouge, LA, Rayne Rasty, George-Pacific Depy., Atlanta, GA, for defendant.

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BRADY, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment (doc. 25) filed by Georgia Pacific Corporation ("Defendant Corporation"). Kimberly Kimble ("Plaintiff) filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment, to which Defendant Corporation filed a reply brief. There is no need for oral argument. Subject matter jurisdiction in this Court exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

I. PROCEDURAL POSTURE, FATUAL BACKGROUND, AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Plaintiff brings this lawsuit alleging the following: (1) a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; (2) violations of Article I §§ 3, 4, and 5 of the Louisiana State Constitution; (3) a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a); (4) sex discrimination under federal Title VII and Louisiana Employment Discrimination laws; and (5) a violation the Equal Pay Act. Plaintiff also alleges unlawful retaliation under federal Title VII and Louisiana Employment Discrimination Laws. Of these, only the claims relating to: (4) sex discrimination under federal Title VII and Louisiana Employment Discrimination laws; (5) the Equal Pay Act, and unlawful retaliation under federal Title VII and Louisiana Employment Discrimination laws will be discussed at length. Plaintiffs apparent abandonment of her claims pertaining to: (1) a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution;¹ (2) a violation of Article I §§ 3, 4, and 5 of the Louisiana State Constitution; ²

and (3) a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)³ by her failure to respond to Defendant Corporation's summary judgment argument⁴ persuades this Court to grant Defendant Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment on these claims without detailed explanation.

The submissions of the parties, considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, establish the following undisputed material facts for the purposes of Defendant's summary judgment motion.

Plaintiff began working for Defendant Corporation in August of 1985. In March of 1998, Plaintiff was permanently transferred to the position of Production Scheduler in the Scheduler Department. The Production Scheduler position in the Scheduler Department is an exempt position that requires making the determinations regarding the scheduling of sheeter machines to maximize production.

As of November 1999, Plaintiffs coworkers included Holly Lipscomb, Libby Palmer, and Greg Stephens. Greg Stephens began working for Defendant Corporation in 1985, and had been employed as a scheduler for over 6 years as of November 1999. At that time, Greg Stephens earned considerably more than Plaintiff. The available evidence suggests that this pay disparity is due to the fact that Greg Stevens had more experience with complex machinery, more experience as a Scheduler, and broader job duties than Plaintiff.

On or about November 24, 1998, Defendant Corporation notified Plaintiff that she was required to attend a meeting on November 27, 1998. Over the next two days, Defendant Corporation reminded Plaintiff about the mandatory November 27 meeting. Plaintiff indicated that she would attempt to attend the meeting, providing that she could obtain a babysitter. Plaintiff was ultimately unable to obtain a babysitter, and although she made arrangements to be available by telephone and represented by a co-worker at the meeting, Plaintiff did not attend the November 27, 1998 meeting. Defendant Corporation therefore suspended Plaintiff for one week without pay effective December 7, 1998, claiming that Plaintiffs failure to attend the November 27, 1998 meeting was insubordination. Plaintiff admits that she never directly told her supervisor that she would not attend the meeting, and that it is reasonable for Defendant Corporation to schedule meetings and require employees to attend meetings.

Following the one-week suspension, Plaintiff allegedly informed more than one co-worker that she could get the time back that she spent on suspension without pay by using a connection that she had at her doctor's office to obtain sick leave documentation.⁵ Plaintiffs co-workers informed Defendant Corporation regarding Plaintiffs alleged statements.

In December 1998, the annual review process was ongoing. The available evidence reflects that Defendant Corporation was generally pleased with Plaintiffs on the job performance until the end of the 1998 review cycle. On or about December 8, 1998, a document was created in the human resources department that indicated Plaintiffs performance rating for the year was a "2." A performance rating of "2" indicates that an employee is meeting minimum job requirements. When the performance rating was finalized is somewhat unclear.

Plaintiff may have attempted to contact Defendant Corporation's internal Equal Employment Opportunity office ("internal EEO office") as early as December 7, 1998, however she was unable to lodge a complaint regarding her suspension resulting from the November 27, 1998 meeting until December 11, 1998. At that time, Plaintiff complained that she felt the suspension was unfair and that she was being discriminated against because of her sex.⁶

On January 11, 1999, Defendant Corporation informed Plaintiff of her 1998 annual performance rating of "2" and awarded her a 1% pay raise. Four days later, on January 15, 1999, Plaintiff again contacted Defendant Corporation's internal EEO office and lodged a complaint regarding her 1998 annual performance rating, alleging that the low rating was retaliation for her December 11, 1998 internal EEO office complaint.

In March of 1999, Defendant Corporation informed Plaintiff that a secondary review of her performance would take place in July of 1999 to determine whether her performance had improved. Consistent with Defendant Corporation's procedures, Plaintiff would be eligible for a pay raise if Plaintiffs performance had improved at that time. Defendant Corporation ultimately determined that Plaintiff had not sufficiently improved and thus, Plaintiff did not receive a pay raise in July of 1999. One month later, Plaintiff was asked to reschedule previously approved vacation days for August 5 and August 6, 1999 due to a conflict in staffing needs. Plaintiff complied with this request.

Plaintiff was absent from work for the period October 18, 1999 through October 22, 1999. Upon returning to work, Plaintiff submitted documentation ("the note") from Dr. Rhodes purportedly excusing her absence to Defendant Corporation. Defendant Corporation was suspicious of the note, as the handwriting thereon resembled the Plaintiffs, and attempted to verify the note's authenticity with Dr. Rhodes. Dr. Rhodes did not respond to Defendant Corporation's requests. Defendant Corporation then submitted the note to a handwriting expert along with samples of Plaintiffs handwriting for verification. The expert concluded that the note in question was written by the Plaintiff, and submitted a report with this conclusion to Defendant Corporation on November 17 1999.⁷ Plaintiff does not dispute that falsification of documents is a reasonable ground for termination of employment and has not identified any similarly situated individual who was not fired after submitting a falsified document to Defendant Corporation.

Plaintiff admits to engaging in inappropriate conduct on November 15, 1999 when she was overheard yelling obscenities in the office. Although Plaintiff admits that her behavior was inappropriate, she testified in her deposition that such behavior was not uncommon amongst her co-workers and that she would act the same way today. On November 22, 1999, Defendant Corporation terminated Plaintiffs employment in light of the November 15, 1999 incident and its belief that the note for her absences October 18, 1999 through October 22,1999 was forged.

Following Plaintiffs termination, Holly Lipscomb, a female, took over Plaintiffs job duties and was given a promotion. On November 29, 1999, Plaintiff initiated a complaint of employment discrimination with the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights. One month later, on December 29, 1999, Plaintiff filed a complaint ("the Charge") with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The Charge contains allegations that Plaintiff was retaliated against from January 18, 1999 until November 22, 1999 due to her filing of complaints alleging sex discrimination and retaliation with Defendant Corporation's internal EEO office. The retaliatory acts Plaintiff alleged were: (1) her unsatisfactory performance evaluation in 1998 with a minimal salary increase, (2) a July 1999 failure to receive a pay increase; and (3) her November 1999 termination. Plaintiff received a right to sue notice from the EEOC on July 19, 2000 and commenced this lawsuit on October 5, 2000.

In moving for summary judgment, Defendant Corporation asserts that: (1) the sex discrimination claims are time barred under federal Title VII and Louisiana state Employment Discrimination laws because the events/acts complained of occurred more than 300 days before the filing of the Charge, or alternatively, Plaintiffs failure to exhaust administrative remedies with regard to the Title VII sex discrimination claim⁸ by including the specifics of sex discrimination in her Charge deprives this Court of jurisdiction to hear the claim; (2) even if the sex discrimination claim was not time barred and Plaintiff had exhausted the requisite administrative remedies, Plai...