Kimble v. State
| Decision Date | 01 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 2049, Sept. Term, 2017,2049, Sept. Term, 2017 |
| Citation | 242 Md.App. 73,213 A.3d 727 |
| Parties | Jermaine Dancer KIMBLE v. STATE of Maryland |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Argued by: Allison Pierce Brasseaux (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.
Argued by: Cathleen C. Brockmeyer (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
Panel: Nazarian, Arthur, Beachley, JJ.
Nazarian, J. Jermaine Kimble was charged on November 9, 2012 with sexual abuse of a minor and related offenses. His trial was postponed several times, and the Circuit Court for Baltimore County eventually found him incompetent to stand trial.
On November 13, 2017, Mr. Kimble filed a motion to dismiss the charges. He argued that Maryland Code, § 3-107(a) of the Criminal Procedure Article ("CP") requires dismissal when the defendant has been found incompetent to stand trial and more than five years have passed from the date the charges were filed. The circuit court denied Mr. Kimble's motion on the ground that the five-year time period runs from the date of the incompetency finding, not from the date the charges were filed, and that the time period had not yet elapsed. Mr. Kimble appeals, and we affirm.
In June 2014—approximately two years after Mr. Kimble had been charged, and after his trial had been postponed twice while counsel had him evaluated—the circuit court ordered the Department of Health to evaluate his competency to stand trial. Based on the Department's report, the court on September 2, 2014 found Mr. Kimble incompetent to stand trial ("IST"), found him dangerous, and committed him to the custody of the Department.1
At a review hearing on April 3, 2015, the court found that Mr. Kimble remained IST but no longer was dangerous, and the court released him subject to continued treatment. Several months later, the court held another status hearing, and found that Mr. Kimble was still IST and "fully compliant" with his treatment plan.
At Mr. Kimble's annual review hearing on April 1, 2016, the court considered the Department's most recent evaluation and found that Mr. Kimble remained incompetent to stand trial. In the context of scheduling the next status hearing, the parties and the court agreed that it should be set close to the "dismissal date," which all appeared to assume was five years from the date Mr. Kimble was charged:
Approximately a year and a half went by, and on November 13, 2017, Mr. Kimble filed a motion to dismiss. He argued that the five-year time limit set forth in CP § 3-107(a) required the court to dismiss his charges. The court held a hearing on the motion on December 1, 2017, at which the State argued that dismissal was not required. Although five years had passed since the charges were filed, the State argued that the time period begins on the date he was found IST, not the date he was charged, and that the motion should be denied because that time had not yet expired. The court agreed, and denied Mr. Kimble's motion:
THE COURT: Well, I think under the circumstances where the maximum penalty is exceeded by the length of time that the person has been held, that you would, you certainly have a strong argument there. The question is, whether the words when charged mean [ ] are intended to distinguish between a felony or a lesser offense or a capital offense, or if the words when charged are intended to sort of [ ] start the clock on the dismissal of the charges. And I have to say [ ] that it does appear to me that the language is intended to distinguish between a capital offense, a felony and a lesser offense, rather than the date at the time at which [ ] the clock starts to run in terms of the State's ability to maintain the charges against the Defendant. So, I'm going to deny your Motion at this time.
We supply additional facts as necessary below.
The only question before us is whether the circuit court erred in denying Mr. Kimble's motion to dismiss the charges.2 The answer hinges on the resolution of the purely legal question of whether the circuit court correctly interpreted CP § 3-107(a) to mean that the five-year time limit began to run from when Mr. Kimble was found incompetent rather than, as he now argues, the date on which charges were filed. Because the plain language of CP § 3-107(a) is subject to "two or more reasonable alternative interpretations," Deville v. State , 383 Md. 217, 223, 858 A.2d 484 (2004), we find it ambiguous, and resolve that ambiguity by finding that the time limits began running when he was found IST.
Normally, we review a trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss an indictment for abuse of discretion. State v. Lee , 178 Md. App. 478, 484, 943 A.2d 14 (2008). But where, as here, the trial court's decision "involves an interpretation and application of Maryland constitutional, statutory or case law, [we] must determine whether the trial court's conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review." Schisler v. State , 394 Md. 519, 535, 907 A.2d 175 (2006).
The Court of Appeals has "observed many times" that " ‘the paramount goal of statutory interpretation is to identify and effectuate the legislative intent underlying the statute(s) at issue.’ " State v. Ray , 429 Md. 566, 576, 57 A.3d 444 (2012) (" Ray II ") (quoting Derry v. State , 358 Md. 325, 335, 748 A.2d 478 (2000) ). When interpreting a statute, we consider the text first. If we find the language ambiguous, we look to other indicia as well:
In interpreting a statute, a court first considers the statute's language, which the court applies where the statute's language is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute's apparent purpose. Where the statute's language is ambiguous or not clearly consistent with the statute's apparent purpose, the court searches for the General Assembly's intent in other indicia, including the history of the statute or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process, in light of: (1) the structure of the statute; (2) how the statute relates to other laws; (3) the statute's general purpose; and (4) the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions.
Hailes v. State , 442 Md. 488, 495–96, 113 A.3d 608 (2015) (cleaned up).
The version of the statute in effect in 2017, at the time Mr. Kimble filed his motion,3 stated that unless the court finds extraordinary cause to extend the time period, the court shall dismiss felony charges such as these after the expiration of five years or the maximum sentence:
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