Kimbrough v. Estate of Kimbrough

• Decision Date: 20 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2012–CA–02029–SCT.,2012–CA–02029–SCT.
• Citation: 134 So.3d 281
• Parties: Larry L. KIMBROUGH a/k/a Larry Kimbrough, Patricia Kimbrough Hawthorne a/k/a Patricia Hawthorne, Effie Kimbrough Gray and Kinney Lee Malone a/k/a Kenny Kimbrough v. ESTATE OF David “Junior” KIMBROUGH, Deceased, and Mildred Washington.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

134 So.3d 281

Larry L. KIMBROUGH a/k/a Larry Kimbrough, Patricia Kimbrough Hawthorne a/k/a Patricia Hawthorne, Effie Kimbrough Gray and Kinney Lee Malone a/k/a Kenny Kimbrough

v.ESTATE OF David “Junior” KIMBROUGH, Deceased, and Mildred Washington.

No. 2012–CA–02029–SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

March 20, 2014.

William James Dukes, James Lawton Robertson, Jackson, attorneys for appellant.

Carter C. Hitt, Oxford, Gwendolyn Baptist–Hewlett, Southaven, attorneys for appellee.

Before RANDOLPH, P.J., PIERCE and KING, JJ.

PIERCE, Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. David “Junior” Kimbrough passed away on January 17, 1998, leaving his entire estate to his long-time girlfriend, Mildred Washington. Matthew Johnson was named executor of the estate in Kimbrough's Last Will and Testament. Johnson petitioned the court to probate Kimbrough's will on May 21, 1998. The following day, the chancery clerk admitted the will for probate, appointed Johnson executor, and issued letters testamentary. Contestants filed to contest the will on August 18, 1998, and no other entries were filed during the next ten years. In September 2008, an entry of appearance was entered on behalf of four remaining contestants, which was followed by an entry of appearance on behalf of Johnson.

¶ 2. In May 2009, the chancery court denied Executor's Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss, granted Contestants' motion to compel discovery, granted Contestants' motion to remove executor, and appointed the chancery clerk of Marshall County as executor. Washington was issued a summons notifying her of the will contest. Johnson then filed his motion to dismiss alleging a violation of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h), because Washington was served process almost eleven years after the commencement of the action. Washington subsequently filed her motion for ratification and for support of the motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, but it granted a stay of the proceedings pending petition for interlocutory appeal to this Court, which we subsequently denied.

¶ 3. A trial on the matter was held in October 2012. After Contestants rested their case, Proponents (Estate of David “Junior” Kimbrough, deceased, and Mildred Washington) moved the trial court for dismissal, and the chancellor ultimately granted their motion and dismissed the case. Contestants now appeal to this Court on the following issues:

I. Whether Proponents made a prima facie case of a valid will;

II. Whether Contestants made a prima facie case that, before and on July 2, 1997, David “Junior” Kimbrough had a confidential, dependent and reliant relationship with Matthew A. Johnson;

III. Whether Contestants made a prima facie case of suspicious circumstances surrounding the purported Last Will of David “Junior” Kimbrough, deceased;

IV. Whether Contestants made a prima facie (and all but irrefutable) case of Matthew Johnson's conflicting interests and/or bad faith in procuring the purported Last Will of David “Junior” Kimbrough, in which Johnson was named executor, though Proponents bore the burden of proof on that issue by clear and convincing evidence;

V. Whether a will produced by the undue influence of another who acts in bad faith should be upheld, just because the wrongdoer is not a conventional beneficiary under the will, even though the wrongdoer does receive valuable benefits he could never have enjoyed without the will;

VI. Whether the trial judge erred when he granted Proponents' Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) motion to dismiss at the end of Contestants' case;

VII. Whether the trial judge erred when he relied on the testimony of Jennifer Kirk Sanders in granting Proponents' Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss, when she said nothing with Mississippi Rule of Evidence 401 Relevance to the outcome-determinative, confidential-relationship issue;

VIII. Whether the trial judge erred when he failed to hold that, by reason of Contestants' prima facie showing, a presumption of Matthew Johnson's undue influence in procuring the Last Will of David “Junior” Kimbrough arose, which required that the will be set aside unless Proponents produced clear and convincing evidence of (a) Johnson's good faith in procuring the Kimbrough will, (b) Junior Kimbrough's full knowledge and deliberation, and (c) Kimbrough's independent consent and action in making the will; and

IX. All subsidiary issues implicit in one or more of the foregoing issues.

¶ 4. After hearing oral argument on the matter, we will analyze the trial court's ruling based on the following:

Whether the trial judge erred by granting Proponents' Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) motion to dismiss at the end of Contestants' case.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

¶ 5. David “Junior” Kimbrough lived his life in Marshall County, Mississippi, where he learned to play the guitar at a young age and went on to open a juke joint. Kimbrough's music added his own unique sound and style to the traditional rhythm of the blues.¹ Right before his sixty-second birthday, Kimbrough signed a recording contract with Fat Possum Records.

¶ 6. Matthew Johnson, the original executor of Kimbrough's will, is associated with Fat Possum Records, Inc., and Mockingbird Blues Publishing, Ltd. Johnson is a founding member, investor, and officer of these two companies, which are located in Oxford, Mississippi. Over the next five years following Kimbrough's entering into the recording contract, he recorded albums with Fat Possum Records and signed publishing agreements with Mockingbird Blues Publishing. The contracts made between Kimbrough and Mockingbird Blues Publishing effectively gave the publisher or any officer of the company power of attorney over his compositions.

¶ 7. Kimbrough's health began to decline the year before his death as a result of being involved in an automobile accident. That same year, Kimbrough met with Johnson and Bruce Watson, a manager and producer for Fat Possum Records. At their meeting, Kimbrough signed three separate assignments of copyright and his last will and testament.

¶ 8. At trial, testimony supported that Kimbrough could barely read or write, and that he was unable to read, or understand on his own, the contracts that he entered into. Johnson stated that he explained the contracts to Kimbrough before he signed them, but that Kimbrough never had an attorney present with him. Johnson also testified that Kimbrough relied on Johnson to be candid with him regarding their business dealings.

¶ 9. Contestants presented testimony and arguments to support their contention that Kimbrough's relationship with Johnson qualified as a confidential relationship, and that Johnson used their confidential relationship to influence Kimbrough unduly in the signing of his last will and testament. The chancellor ultimately determined that Contestants had failed to meet their burden of proof to raise the presumption that Johnson had influenced Kimbrough unduly. Contestants now appeal the chancellor's grant of Proponents' Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 10. The chancellor's findings regarding undue influence are findings of fact, and this Court will not interfere with those findings “... unless the chancellor abused his or her discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Van Cleave v. Estate of Fairchild, 950 So.2d 1047, 1051 (Miss.Ct.App.2007) (citing Watkins v. Watkins, 142 Miss. 210, 229, 106 So. 753, 755 (1926); Sanderson v. Sanderson, 824 So.2d 623, 625–26 (Miss.2002)).

ANALYSIS

Whether the trial judge erred by granting Proponents' Mississippi Rule Civil Procedure 41(b) motion to dismiss at the end of Contestants' case.

¶ 11. As previously mentioned, Contestants argue that Johnson's and Kimbrough's relationship was confidential, and that Johnson took advantage of their relationship by unduly influencing Kimbrough to leave his entire estate to Mildred Washington in his Last Will and Testament. Contestants further argue that ample evidence was presented to raise a presumption of undue influence; therefore, the chancellor erred in not finding the same, and Proponents should have been required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that undue influence did not occur.

¶ 12. In re Estate of Laughter defines a confidential relationship as “... between two people in which one person is in a position to exercise dominant influence upon the other because of the latter's dependency on the former arising either from weakness of mind or body, or through trust [.]” In re Estate of Laughter, 23 So.3d 1055, 1063 (Miss.2009) (quoting Hendricks v. James, 421 So.2d 1031, 1041 (Miss.1982)). Further, this Court has identified the following seven factors to consider when determining whether a confidential relationship exists:

(1) whether one person has to be taken care of by others, (2) whether one person maintains a close relationship with another, (3) whether one person is provided transportation and has their medical care provided for by another, (4) whether one person maintains joint accounts with another, (5) whether one is physically or mentally weak, (6) whether one is of advanced age or poor health, and (7) whether there exists a power of attorney between the one and another.

Laughter, 23 So.3d at 1063 (citing In re Estate of Holmes, 961 So.2d 674, 680 (Miss.2007) (citing Wright v. Roberts, 797 So.2d 992, 998 (Miss.2001))).

¶ 13. If it is determined that a confidential relationship exists, an abuse of that relationship must be shown for the Contestants to raise a proper presumption of undue influence. Costello v. Hall, 506 So.2d 293, 298 (Miss.1987). The existence of a confidential relationship, standing alone, does not raise a presumption of undue influence. Laughter, 23 So.3d at 1064 (citing Wright, 797 So.2d at 999 (citing Croft v. Alder, 237 Miss. 713, 723–24, 115 So.2d 683, 686 (1959))); see also Matter of Will of Adams, 529 So.2d 611, 615 (Miss.1988); Matter of Will...