Kime v. Thompson
| Decision Date | 10 October 1911 |
| Citation | 118 P. 174,60 Or. 183 |
| Parties | KIME et al. v. THOMPSON, County Judge, et al. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Lane County; William Galloway, Judge.
Action by A.W. Kime and others against Helmus W. Thompson, as County Judge, and others. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal. Reversed.
In this suit the plaintiffs are described as citizens, residents, and taxpayers within the corporate limits of the city of Cottage Grove, Lane county, state of Oregon. The defendant Helmus W Thompson is the duly elected, qualified, and acting county judge, and the other defendants are, respectively, the county commissioners, the county clerk, and the county treasurer of that county. As to the first cause of suit, the substance of the complaint is that for some years past the defendants and their predecessors, as such county officers, have pursued the policy of paying all expenses of improving roads and bridges and the like out of the fund of the county derived from taxes levied for general county purposes, refusing to levy a road tax to be set apart as a general road fund applicable only to the highway purposes named, and, unless restrained, these officers will continue such previous policy, all to the irreparable damage of the plaintiffs.
For a second cause of suit, the complaint alleges in substance that at the term of the county court of Lane county, in January 1911, it was the duty of that court to levy a tax of not over 10 mills, to be set apart as a general road fund, and to divide 50 per cent. of the same, when collected, among the several road districts of the county proportionally to the taxable property in each district; but, instead of so doing the court estimated that 4 mills on the dollar of taxable property in the county would be required for highway purposes, and included that amount in the levy for general county purposes, refusing to make any levy expressly for a general road fund, thus making the rate for general county purposes four mills too high, all to the irreparable injury of the plaintiffs.
Again as a third cause of suit, the plaintiffs, after describing themselves as residents and taxpayers within the limits of the incorporated city of Cottage Grove, aver, in substance, that Cottage Grove, by virtue of its charter granted by the Legislative Assembly, is a separate road district, over which the authority of the county court to levy and collect road taxes does not extend. On the contrary, the city alone, within its limits, has sole power to levy and collect road taxes, and to apply them within its own discretion. In this connection, they complain that the action of the county court in refusing to create a general road fund by a tax for that specific purpose, and in paying the highway expenses of the county out of the general fund, amounts to double road taxation upon them and other taxpayers in Cottage Grove, all to their irreparable injury.
The defendants interposed a general demurrer to the complaint, which the circuit court overruled, and as they stood upon their demurrer the court made findings of fact, which are simply a recitation of the complaint, and entered a decree as prayed for, with costs. From this decree, the defendants have appealed.
Woodcock & Smith, Thompson & Hardy, and Potter & Bryson, for appellants.
J.C. Johnson and J.S. Medley, for respondents.
BURNETT, J. (after stating the facts as above).
Inasmuch as the only issue presented was an issue of law, it is not apparent why the court should go to the trouble of making findings of fact and conclusions of law thereupon. Unless there is an issue of fact, it is wholly unnecessary to make findings of fact, as they only serve to impose additional labor on the clerk in entering the record, which they incumber, and add to the expense of a transcript on appeal. They are wholly unnecessary in such cases.
By the terms of L.O.L. § 937, the county court has the authority and powers pertaining to county commissioners to transact county business; among other things: ...
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Columbia River Co. v. Smith
... ... Findings ... of fact are not appropriate or requisite unless there are ... issues of fact to be determined. Kime v. Thompson, ... 60 Or. 183, 118 P. 174. The order of the court overruling the ... demurrer to the complaint aptly disposes of the issue ... ...
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State ex rel. Harth v. Phipps
...that withdraws from that municipality the exemption conveyed to it by the Legislature of this state. While the cases of Kime v. Thompson, 60 Or. 183, 118 P. 174; v. Lane County, 81 Or. 372, 159 P. 73; City of Pendleton v. Umatilla County, 117 Or. 140, 241 P. 979, and City of Astoria v. Corn......
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City of Pendleton v. Umatilla County
...conferred by the statute in these words, "may levy a tax." That statute, containing the words, "may levy a tax," was construed in Kime v. Thompson, supra, Bowers v. Neil, 64 Or. 128 P. 433, and Roney v. Lane County, supra, and because of the words, "may levy a tax," it was held in those cas......
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Oregon City v. Clackamas County
...for the court to make findings of fact and adopt conclusions of law, its doing so was a mere matter of supererogation. Kime v. Thompson, 60 Or. 183, 118 P. 174. That itself does not constitute reversible error. For the reasons assigned herein, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, ......