Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 November 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-4195-CV-C-5.,94-4195-CV-C-5.
• Citation: 907 F. Supp. 1309
• Parties: Peggy KIMZEY, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., et al., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

907 F. Supp. 1309

Peggy KIMZEY, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., et al., Defendant.

No. 94-4195-CV-C-5.

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Central Division.

November 17, 1995.

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Carla Holste, Carson & Coil, Jefferson City, MO, for Plaintiff.

E. Wayne Taff, Steven Steinhilber, Sherman, Taff & Bangert, Kansas City, MO, for Defendant.

ORDER

SCOTT O. WRIGHT, Senior District Judge.

Before this Court are defendant Wal-Mart's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, in the alternative, For a New Trial, or in the alternative To Remit the Jury Verdict; plaintiff's Opposition; and defendant's Reply. Based on the following analysis, defendant's Motion For a New Trial is denied, but defendant's Motion to Remit is granted.

Background

On June 28, 1995, after a two-day trial, the jury in the above-named cause returned a verdict for plaintiff on her sexual harassment and constructive discharge claims. Plaintiff was awarded thirty-five thousand dollars and one dollar, respectively. In addition, the jury assessed fifty million in punitive damages against defendant. Defendant filed this motion alleging that several errors were made at trial, and that the punitive damage award was improper.

Analysis

As a preliminary matter, defendant renews its Motion For Judgment as a Matter of Law and sets out over fifty-seven unsupported errors for which relief is requested. This Court finds defendant's complaints to be meritless and therefore will not address them. Instead, this Court will consider the issues fully outlined in defendant's Suggestions in Support of a New Trial.

A new trial should be granted when there has been a "miscarriage of justice." Absent such a finding, the trial court should overrule the motion. White v. Pence, 961 F.2d 776, 780-81 (8th Cir.1992). The authority to grant a new trial is "confided almost entirely to the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court." Id. at 781 (citations omitted).

1. Sexual Harassment Claim

Defendant first argues that a new trial is warranted because the verdict was based on comments and conduct that the plaintiff subjectively believed did not constitute a hostile or abusive work environment. In support, defendant points to plaintiff's deposition testimony that she "enjoyed" the atmosphere at work prior to April 1992, that she was "happy and comfortable" working there, and that she "saw nothing sexually offensive or hostile about the receiving department." (Def's. Trial Ex. 45-47, 49). Therefore, defendant contends, as a threshold matter, plaintiff cannot satisfy the elements necessary to make a hostile work environment claim because she did not subjectively believe at the time of the conduct that her work place was hostile or abusive. Defendant cites Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993), to support its argument.

This Court believes that defendant mischaracterizes Harris. In Harris, the petitioner sued her former employer claiming that the company president's conduct toward her constituted sexual harassment. Harris, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 368. The Court, in clarifying the hostile work environment elements stated, "conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment —an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII's purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation." Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 370. The Court does not rigidly require that a plaintiff form a well-defined, subjective belief of hostility at the exact moment an incident occurs. In fact, the Court stated that "whether an environment is `hostile' or `abusive' can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances." Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 371. One could easily imagine a victim at first not wanting to believe that an employer was engaging in hostile behavior, or even wanting to ignore the situation hoping it was merely a misunderstanding, and then upon reflection or after a series of events determining that she was indeed a victim of harassment.

Beyond Wal-Mart's interpretation of Harris, its argument lacks merit. Plaintiff testified at trial that after the comments and conduct of manager Mike Mais (Mais) and supervisor Bud Brewer (Brewer), she felt "humiliated," "stupid," "degraded," and "offended." She testified that men were treated as friends and with respect while women were treated as inferior. She told the jury that the offensive language and the inappropriate behavior created a hostile work environment. Clearly plaintiff had a subjective belief that she worked in an abusive environment.

In a related complaint, defendant contends that this Court should not have permitted testimony from plaintiff or other witnesses regarding Mais' behavior or comments before April 1992. Wal-Mart again asserts that plaintiff did not have the requisite state of mind at that time to permit the introduction of such evidence, but further argues that the Title VII and Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) statutes of limitations barred use of the testimony.

Since the issue of plaintiff's subjective belief has been decided, this Court will now turn to defendant's statute of limitations argument. Pursuant to Title VII, a plaintiff normally would only be permitted to seek redress for discriminatory behavior that occurred within 300 days of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filing. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Defendant asserts that incidents of discriminatory conduct barred from recovery by the statute of limitations should also have been barred from trial.

The Title VII statutory limitations period, however, is not necessarily a bar to the admissibility of pre-statute acts. See West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 748 (3rd Cir.1995) (acts which bear on the work environment and on the employer's awareness of that environment are relevant), Scott v. Pac. Maritime Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir.1983), Song v. Ives Lab., Inc., No. 86 CIV. 4358, 1990 WL 96768 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 1990) (acts in furtherance of a discriminatory policy should not be viewed in isolation). Time-barred claims can be used as "relevant background" or used to support a continuing violation theory. See United Air Lines Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 1889, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977), Chaffin v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 904 F.2d 1269, 1271 (8th Cir.1990), Abdulrahim v. Glick Co, Inc., 612 F.Supp. 256, 260 (N.D.Ind.1985). In sexual harassment cases, particularly those based on the hostile environment theory, it is reasonable to expect that violations are continuing in nature. In fact, a hostile environment results from acts that continue over time. West, 45 F.3d at 744, 755.

When assessing an ill patient, an internist does not limit the examination to an isolated part of the body or focus narrowly on one complaint. Instead, the internist investigates all patient complaints, examines the body as a whole, and considers the patient's entire medical history before a diagnosis is made. So must a jury examine all relevant aspects of the work environment, including background information, before a judgment on the issue of discrimination can be made. The pre-1992 actions of Mais were directly relevant to plaintiff's hostile environment theory and to her claim that management added to the abusive environment by ignoring her complaints and even participating in discriminatory conduct. No error was committed in admitting this evidence. Similarly, the hostile work environment verdict director instruction was not flawed even though no time frame limitation was included.

Finally, Wal-Mart argues that the testimony of other employees regarding their complaints about management should have been excluded. In general, "evidence of sexual harassment directed at employees other than the plaintiff is relevant to show a hostile work environment." Hall v. Gus Const. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 1010, 1015 (8th Cir.1988) (citations omitted). Defendant particularly takes issue with the testimony of Nola Smith regarding a complaint that she made about a disciplinary form placed in her personnel file and management's reaction. Wal-Mart argues that the complaint had nothing to do with sexual harassment or a hostile working environment. There is no requirement that sexual harassment, to be violative of Title VII, take the form of sexual advances. Id. at 1014. Any harassment or other unequal treatment of an employee that would not occur but for the sex of the employee can be sufficient to show a Title VII violation. Id. Nola Smith, as well as other female employees, testified that women were treated differently from men, and that their concerns were not respected.

Further, counsel for defendant proposed in his opening statement that Wal-Mart had an "open-door" policy for taking complaints. Defendant carried the theme throughout trial that plaintiff failed to take advantage of this policy to voice her harassment complaints. Nola Smith's testimony was relevant to the validity of this policy and ultimately to the validity of defendant's theme. The testimony was properly admitted.

2. Punitive Damage Award

The bulk of defendant's suggestions in support address the validity of the fifty million dollar punitive damage award. Defendant challenges the award, claiming that it fails to satisfy Missouri law and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

A. Threshold for Jury Submission

Wal-Mart first complains that the evidence submitted at trial failed as a matter of law to meet either the Missouri or the Title VII standards for awarding punitive damages because there was no evidence to support the position that Wal-Mart "willfully" or "recklessly" allowed a...