Kinderhill Farm Breeding Associates v. Appel
Decision Date | 21 April 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 77 Civ. 5472 (WCC).,77 Civ. 5472 (WCC). |
Citation | 450 F. Supp. 134 |
Parties | KINDERHILL FARM BREEDING ASSOCIATES, Plaintiff, v. John APPEL, Alexander Vazac, Jr. and Richard F. Lobdell, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Spengler, Carlson, Gubar, Churchill & Brodsky, New York City, for plaintiff; Robert S. Carlson, New York City, of counsel.
Connor, Curran, Connor, Flint & Schram, Chatham, N. Y., for defendants; Theodore Guterman II, Chatham, of counsel.
This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, a New York limited partnership, operates a commercial horse farm in the Town of Chatham, New York; defendants are members of the Town Board of Chatham. In 1975 defendants — who constitute a majority of the Town Board — voted to deny plaintiff a mobile home license, which action plaintiff claims was arbitrary, capricious and malicious and therefore a denial of its rights, privileges and immunities, including its right to due process and equal protection under the Constitution of the United States. Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, F.R. Civ.P. 12(b)(6), on the ground that defendants, as members of the Town Board, perform a legislative function and therefore enjoy absolute immunity from suit, regardless of their motives, under Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951).1
In Tenney, the Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights Act did not eliminate the pre-existing absolute immunity enjoyed by legislators for acts performed within the scope of and during the course of their official duties. Legislators are protected, however, only when "acting in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity," Tenney v. Brandhove, supra at 376, 71 S.Ct. at 788. The Court recognized that a lawmaker may perform acts in his official capacity that are not legislative in nature, emphasizing that "this Court has not hesitated to sustain the rights of private individuals when it found that Congress was acting outside its legislative role." Tenney v. Brandhove, supra at 377, 71 S.Ct. at 788; Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 93 S.Ct. 2018, 36 L.Ed.2d 912 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972); Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865, 877-78 (5th Cir. 1977).
Plaintiff argues that under New York law town boards are given a wide range of executive and administrative, as well as legislative duties, and that the ordinance pursuant to which defendants acted creates what are "typically executive or administrative duties." Thus plaintiff contends that defendants enjoy only a qualified immunity under § 1983. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).
The ordinance in question provides in pertinent part:
Plaintiff finds support for the distinction between administrative and legislative functions and for its characterization of the denial of a license as an "administrative" act primarily in New York case law relating to judicial review of official action under Article 78 of the C.P.L.R. Since legislative enactments are not reviewable under Article 78, the question of whether town board members have acted in a legislative or administrative capacity often arises in the context of such a proceeding. New York courts have consistently held that the grant or denial of a permit is a reviewable administrative function. Rothstein v. County Operating Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 728, 185 N.Y.S.2d 813, 158 N.E.2d 507 (1959); Lerner v. Young, 286 App.Div. 1109, 146 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1955); Cardon v. Cromarty, 221 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup.Ct. Suffolk Co. 1961); Bar Harbour Shopping Center, Inc. v. Andrews, 23 Misc.2d 894, 196 N.Y.S.2d 856, 873-74 (Sup.Ct. Nassau Co. 1959); Copp v. Mead, 194 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (Sup.Ct. Westchester Co. 1956).
Only a handful of federal courts have developed a distinction between legislative and non-legislative activity in defining the liability of municipal officials.
In Shellburne, Inc. v. New Castle County, 293 F.Supp. 237 (D.Del.1968), the court held that the enactment of zoning regulations was a legislative act for which members of a county council enjoyed absolute immunity. A similar result was reached in Shannon Fredericksburg Motor Inn v. Hicks, 434 F.Supp. 803 (E.D.Va.1977) ( ); see also Athanson v. Grasso, 411 F.Supp. 1153, 1160 (D.Conn.1976).
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