Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P'ship v. Clark

• Citation: 197 L.Ed.2d 806,137 S.Ct. 1421
• Decision Date: 15 May 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16–32.,16–32.
• Parties: KINDRED NURSING CENTERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, dba Winchester Centre for Health and Rehabilitation, nka Fountain Circle Health and Rehabilitation, et al., Petitioners v. Janis E. CLARK et al.
• Court: United States Supreme Court

137 S.Ct. 1421

197 L.Ed.2d 806

KINDRED NURSING CENTERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, dba Winchester Centre for Health and Rehabilitation, nka Fountain Circle Health and Rehabilitation, et al., Petitioners

v.Janis E. CLARK et al.

No. 16–32.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Feb. 22, 2017.

Decided May 15, 2017.

Andrew J. Pincus, Washington, DC, for Petitioners.

Robert E. Salyer, for Respondents.

Andrew J. Pincus, Archis A. Parasharami, Daniel E. Jones, Matthew A. Waring, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioners.

James T. Gilbert, Coy, Gilbert, Shepherd & Wilson, Richmond, KY, Robert E. Salyer, Wilkes & McHugh, P.A., Lexington, KY, Stephen Trzcinski, Wilkes & McHugh, P.A., Philadelphia, PA, for Respondents.

Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or Act) requires courts to place arbitration agreements "on equal footing with all other contracts." DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 463, 465, 193 L.Ed.2d 365 (2015) (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 163 L.Ed.2d 1038 (2006) ); see 9 U.S.C. § 2. In the decision below, the Kentucky Supreme Court declined to give effect to two arbitration agreements executed by individuals holding "powers of attorney"—that is, authorizations to act on behalf of others. According to the court, a general grant of power (even if seemingly comprehensive) does not permit a legal representative to enter into an arbitration agreement for someone else; to form such a contract, the representative must possess specific authority to "waive his principal's fundamental constitutional rights to access the courts [and] to trial by jury." Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman, 478 S.W.3d 306, 327 (2015). Because that rule singles out arbitration agreements for disfavored treatment, we hold that it violates the FAA.

I

Petitioner Kindred Nursing Centers L.P. operates nursing homes and rehabilitation centers. Respondents Beverly Wellner and Janis Clark are the wife and daughter, respectively, of Joe Wellner and Olive Clark, two now-deceased residents of a Kindred nursing home called the Winchester Centre.

At all times relevant to this case, Beverly and Janis each held a power of attorney, designating her as an "attorney-in-fact" (the one for Joe, the other for Olive) and affording her broad authority to manage her family member's affairs. In the Wellner power of attorney, Joe gave Beverly the authority, "in my name, place and stead," to (among other things) "institute legal proceedings" and make "contracts of every nature in relation to both real and personal property." App. 10–11. In the Clark power of attorney, Olive provided Janis with "full power ... to transact, handle, and dispose of all matters affecting me and/or my estate in any possible way," including the power to "draw, make, and sign in my name any and all ... contracts, deeds, or agreements." Id., at 7.

Joe and Olive moved into the Winchester Centre in 2008, with Beverly and Janis using their powers of attorney to complete all necessary paperwork. As part of that process, Beverly and Janis each signed an arbitration agreement with Kindred on behalf of her relative. The two contracts, worded identically, provided that "[a]ny and all claims or controversies arising out of or in any way relating to ... the Resident's stay at the Facility" would be resolved through "binding arbitration" rather than a lawsuit. Id., at 14, 21.

When Joe and Olive died the next year, their estates (represented again by Beverly and Janis) brought separate suits against Kindred in Kentucky state court. The complaints alleged that Kindred had delivered substandard care to Joe and Olive, causing their deaths. Kindred moved to dismiss the cases, arguing that the arbitration agreements Beverly and Janis had signed prohibited bringing their disputes to court. But the trial court denied Kindred's motions, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals agreed that the estates' suits could go forward. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 125a–126a, 137a–138a.

The Kentucky Supreme Court, after consolidating the cases, affirmed those decisions by a divided vote. See 478 S.W.3d, at 313. The court began with the language of the two powers of attorney. The Wellner document, the court stated, did not permit Beverly to enter into an arbitration agreement on Joe's behalf. In the court's view, neither the provision authorizing her to bring legal proceedings nor the one enabling her to make property-related contracts reached quite that distance. See id., at 325–326 ; supra, at 1425. By contrast, the court thought, the Clark power of attorney extended that far and beyond. Under that document, after all, Janis had the capacity to "dispose of all matters" affecting Olive. See supra, at 1425. "Given this extremely broad, universal delegation of authority," the court acknowledged, "it would be impossible to say that entering into [an] arbitration agreement was not covered." 478 S.W.3d, at 327.

And yet, the court went on, both arbitration agreements—Janis's no less than Beverly's—were invalid. That was because a power of attorney could not entitle a representative to enter into an arbitration agreement without specifically saying so. The Kentucky Constitution, the court explained, protects the rights of access to the courts and trial by jury; indeed, the jury guarantee is the sole right the Constitution declares "sacred" and "inviolate." Id., at 328–329. Accordingly, the court held, an agent could deprive her principal of an "adjudication by judge or jury" only if the power of attorney "expressly so provide[d]." Id., at 329. And that clear-statement rule—so said the court—complied with the FAA's demands. True enough that the Act precludes "singl[ing] out arbitration agreements." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). But that was no problem, the court asserted, because its rule would apply not just to those agreements, but also to some other contracts implicating "fundamental constitutional rights." Id., at 328. In the future, for example, the court would bar the holder of a "non-specific" power of attorney from entering into a contract "bind[ing] the principal to personal servitude." Ibid.

Justice Abramson dissented, in an opinion joined by two of her colleagues. In their view, the Kentucky Supreme Court's new clear-statement rule was "clearly not ... applicable to ‘any contract’ but [instead] single[d] out arbitration agreements for disfavored treatment." Id., at 344–345. Accordingly, the dissent concluded, the rule "r[a]n afoul of the FAA." Id., at 353.

We granted certiorari. 580 U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 368, 196 L.Ed.2d 283 (2016).

II

A

The FAA makes arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. That statutory provision establishes an equal-treatment principle: A court may invalidate an arbitration agreement based on "generally applicable contract defenses" like fraud or unconscionability, but not on legal rules that "apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue." AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011). The FAA thus preempts any state rule discriminating on its face against arbitration—for example, a "law prohibit[ing] outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim." Id., at 341, 131 S.Ct. 1740. And not only that: The Act also displaces any rule that covertly accomplishes the same objective by disfavoring contracts that (oh so coincidentally) have the defining features of arbitration agreements. In Concepcion, for example, we described a hypothetical state law declaring unenforceable any contract that "disallow[ed] an ultimate disposition [of a dispute] by a jury." Id., at 342, 131 S.Ct. 1740. Such a law might avoid referring to arbitration by name; but still, we explained, it would "rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as [its] basis"—and thereby violate the FAA. Id., at 341, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493, n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 2520, 96 L.Ed.2d 426 (1987) ).

The Kentucky Supreme Court's clear-statement rule, in just that way, fails to put arbitration agreements on an equal plane with other contracts. By the court's own account, that rule (like the one Concepcion posited) serves to safeguard a person's "right to access the courts and to trial by jury." 478 S.W.3d, at 327 ; see supra, at 1425 – 1426. In ringing terms, the court affirmed the jury right's unsurpassed standing in the State Constitution: The framers, the court explained, recognized "that right and that right alone as a divine God-given right" when they made it "the only thing" that must be " ‘held sacred’ " and " ‘inviolate.’ " 478 S.W.3d, at 328–329 (quoting Ky. Const. § 7 ). So it was that the court required an explicit statement before an attorney-in-fact, even if possessing broad delegated powers, could relinquish that right on another's behalf. See 478 S.W.3d, at 331 ("We say only that an agent's authority to waive his principal's constitutional right to access the courts and to trial by jury must be clearly expressed by the principal"). And so it was that the court did exactly what Concepcion barred: adopt a legal rule hinging on the primary characteristic of an arbitration agreement—namely, a waiver of the right to go to court and receive a jury trial. See 563 U.S., at 341–342, 131 S.Ct. 1740 ; see also 478 S.W.3d, at 353 (Abramson, J., dissenting) (noting that the jury-trial right at the core of "the majority's new rule" is "the one right that just happens to be correlative to the right to arbitrate" (emphasis deleted)). Such a rule is too tailor-made to arbitration agreements—subjecting them, by virtue of their defining trait, to uncommon barriers—to survive the FAA's edict against singling out those contracts for disfavored treatment.¹

And the state court's...