King, In re

• Decision Date: 04 February 1986
• Docket Number: No. 8510SC602,8510SC602
• Citation: 79 N.C.App. 139,339 S.E.2d 87
• Parties: In re James A. KING, Administrator, C.T.A. of the Estate of Garland C. Norris, Deceased and Trustee of the Trust Under the Will of Garland C. Norris for Mary N. King and Frances Hill Norris, et al., and of the Trust Under the Will of Garland C. Norris for Mary Boldridge Norris.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

Page 87

339 S.E.2d 87

79 N.C.App. 139

In re James A. KING, Administrator, C.T.A. of the Estate of Garland C. Norris, Deceased and Trustee of the Trust Under the Will of Garland C. Norris for Mary N. King and Frances Hill Norris, et al., and of the Trust Under the Will of Garland C. Norris for Mary Boldridge Norris.

No. 8510SC602.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Feb. 4, 1986.

Atty. Gen. Lacy H. Thornburg by Special Deputy Atty. Gen. Reginald L. Watkins, Raleigh, for appellant.

Poyner, Geraghty, Hartsfield & Townsend by N.A. Townsend, Jr., Cecil W. Harrison, Jr. and Robert B. Womble, Raleigh, for appellee.

ARNOLD, Judge.

Appellant contends that the superior court erred in concluding that the costs to be assessed against the estate and the two trusts are governed by G.S. 7A-307(a)(2) as it existed prior to its amendment. Appellant maintains the important factor is that the administration of the estate and of each trust continued after 1 August 1983, the effective date of the amendments. In support of this argument, appellant relies upon the interpretation made by the Administrative Office of the Courts in a memorandum sent to the clerks of the superior courts which in pertinent part provided:

Problems will arise in the determination of charges when the estate has been opened before August 1, 1983, but proceedings in the estate are still pending.... [A]s to estates which were opened prior to August 1, 1983, the old fees should be charged up to, but not including, the first annual accounting.... For the first annual accounting, and for all proceedings thereafter the new schedule of fees and costs would apply. (emphasis in original).

The sole issue presented for review is the interpretation of the term "actions initiated" in the directive stating that the amendments to G.S. 7A-307(a)(2) "shall become effective August 1, 1983, and shall apply to all actions initiated on and after that date." 1983 Session Laws, c. 713, s. 109. Chapter 713 of the 1983 North Carolina Session Laws does not define "actions initiated." Accordingly, we must resort to rules of statutory construction in determining the meaning and effect of these words.

The primary rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature controls the interpretation of a statute. To ascertain this intent the courts should consider the language of the statute, the spirit of the Act and what it sought to accomplish, the change or changes to be made and how these should be effectuated. The statute should be construed contextually and harmonized if possible to avoid absurd or oppressive consequences. Galligan v. Town of Chapel Hill, 276 N.C. 172, 171 S.E.2d 427 (1970).

First, we note that an estate proceeding is technically not an "action" within the meaning of G.S. 1-4 which defines actions as including only criminal and civil actions. Yet, as appellant and appellee concede, the legislature intended that the word "action" include estate proceedings in this limited instance.

Second, the legislature mandated that the amendments, including...