King Kole, Inc. v. Bryant, 33655
| Decision Date | 30 June 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 33655,33655 |
| Parties | KING KOLE, INC., a Florida corporation, Palmiand Fashions, Inc., a Florida corporation, Alix of Miami, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellants, v. Farris BRYANT, Governor of Florida, Tom Adams, Secretary of State, Ray E. Green, Comptroller, Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General, J. Edwin Larson, Treasurer, Thomas D. Bailey, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Doyle E. Conner, Commissioner of Agriculture, as and constituting the State Revenue Commission, and J. Ed Straughn, as Director of the State Revenue Commission, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
David Emanuel, of Forrest & Emanuel, Miami, for appellants.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Sam Spector and Ira Weinstein, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellees.
John R. Barrett, Jack R. Rice, Jr., and Charles K. Allan, Miami, amici curiae.
We have for review by direct appeal a decree of a circuit judge upholding the validity of Ch. 63-527, Laws of Florida, 1963 (Sections 212.50-212.58, Florida Statutes, 1963, F.S.A.).
We must decide whether the title of the Act is sufficient to support a provision taxing 'bathing and swimming suits' and if it is, whether the Act illegally discriminates against the appellants.
The appellants are manufacturers of sportswear including swimming and bathing suits. By Chapter 63-527, supra, the Legislature imposed a privilege tax on the manufacturers of certain recreational equipment, including bathing and swimming suits. The tax was fixed at the rate of 5% of the wholesale selling price of each item. Appellants sought a chancery decree adjudicating the invalidity of the Statute as to the tax on swimming and bathing suits. The chancellor upheld the statute but excluded from its scope garments which are purely decorative. He held the tax collectible on sales of 'purely utilitarian' as well as 'decorative and utilitarian' bathing suits. Appellants seek reversal of the decree which held the statute valid as to 'bathing and swimming suits' generally.
The principal thrust of the assault is two-fold. The appellants claim that: (1) the title is inadequate to meet the requirements of Article III, Section 16, Florida Constitution, F.S.A., and, (2) the Act discriminates against bathing suit manufacturers in favor of manufacturers of other types of recreational apparel.
The title to Chapter 63-527, supra reads in part: 'An Act relating to certain fishing, hunting, camping, swimming and diving equipment; levying a tax upon certain sales, uses and storage thereof; * * *.' (Emphasis added.)
Section 3(3) of the Act defines swimming equipment as 'including * * * bathing and swimming suits * * *.' The same section provides, however, that 'articles of clothing or apparel other than bathing, swimming, or diving suits, shall not be included within this definition.'
Article III, Section 16, Florida Constitution, provides in part:
'Each law enacted in the Legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title, * * *.'
The appellants contend that the title reference to 'swimming and diving equipment' is not sufficiently definitive to warn that bathing and swimming suits will be covered by the taxing provisions of the body of the Act.
Over the years certain guidelines have evolved for testing the sufficiency of titles against the standard prescribed by Article III, Section 16, supra. The primary purpose of the requirements is to prevent 'hodge-poge or log-rolling' legislation. Its object is to avoid surprise or fraud by fairly apprising the Legislature and the public of the subject of the legislation being enacted. State ex rel. Parrish v. Lee, 156 Fla. 578, 23 So.2d 731; State v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, Fla., 80 So.2d 337. The legislature is allowed a wide latitude in the enactment of laws, and the courts will strike down a title only when there is a plain case of violating or ignoring the constitutional requirement. Wright v. Board of Public Instruction, Fla., 48 So.2d 912; Hillsborough County v. Price, Fla.App., 149 So.2d 912. The title is sufficient if it fairly gives such notice as will reasonably lead to inquiry into the body thereof. Florida Power Corp. v. Pinellas Utility Board, Fla., 40 So.2d 350; McCord v. Smith, Fla., 43 So.2d 704. The title need not be an index to the contents. It is not necessary that it delineate in detail the substance of the statute. McCord v. Smith, supra; Kirkland v. Phillips, Fla., 106 So.2d 909.
Recurring to the subject statute, we think the title was sufficiently within the guide-lines above stated. It referred to 'swimming and diving equipment.' The question is--would this reasonably suggest an inquiry by a manufacturer of swimming and bathing suits?
There is no precedent directly on the point. However, the precedents available do hold that statutory references to 'equipment' are broad enough to comprehend such items as apparel, shoes, protective clothing and uniforms. Edkins v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 287 N.Y. 505, 41 N.E.2d 75; Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Zwirtz, 13 Okl. 411, 73 P. 941; Palmer v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 119 Mont. 68, 170 P.2d 768; Steinfeld v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 312 Ky. 614, 229 S.W.2d 319.
Furthermore, in this instance, it is quite clear that the Legislature squarely considered the applicability of Chapter 63-527, supra, to swimming and bathing suits. When the bill was pending before the House of Representatives a motion was made to amend it by striking from Section 3(3), supra, the words 'bathing and swimming suits'. The House rejected the proposal, thereby revealing that this particular item was specifically considered in detail. See, 1963 Journal of the House of Representatives, p. 2685.
We therefore reject the appellants' claim that the title of the Act is fatally...
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