King v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 07 March 1941
• Citation: 285 Ky. 654
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
• Parties: King v. Commonwealth.

Page 654

285 Ky. 654

King v. Commonwealth.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

March 7, 1941.

1. Homicide. — Evidence held not to warrant conviction of voluntary manslaughter on theory that defendant refused to render assistance or procure medical aid for person whom he had shot in defense of his father, or to permit others to procure such aid.

2. Homicide. — Where defendant admitted fatal shooting but claimed that he had shot in defense of his father, instructions presupposing defendant's innocence of murder and of voluntary manslaughter as defined in previous instructions, but requiring a finding that defendant had unlawfully injured victim and directing conviction of murder if defendant willfully, feloniously and with malice aforethought conspired to prevent victim from receiving proper medical attention, or of voluntary manslaughter if defendant was guilty of such neglect unlawfully, willfully but without malice, were meaningless and erroneous.

3. Homicide. — Where defendant admitted fatal shooting but claimed that he had shot in defense of his father, verdict finding defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and reciting that it was rendered under instruction which presupposed innocence of murder and voluntary manslaughter as defined in previous instructions, but which required unlawful shooting as condition precedent to guilt, was a finding that shooting was not unlawful, precluding conviction under such instruction.

4. Homicide. — Where shooting was intentional, neither voluntary manslaughter resulting from gross negligence or wanton recklessness, nor involuntary manslaughter resulting from ordinary negligence, was involved, and defendant would have been guilty of murder or voluntary manslaughter if shooting was unlawful, irrespective of his neglect to furnish attention or medical aid or his refusal to permit others to do so.

5. Criminal Law. — Every one is held to contemplate and to be responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts.

6. Homicide. — If wound was "dangerous," meaning calculated to endanger or destroy life, and death ensued, there is sufficient proof of murder or manslaughter, though it may appear that deceased might have recovered if he had taken proper care of himself or submitted to an operation, or that unskillful or improper treatment aggravated the wound and contributed to death, or that death was immediately caused by an operation necessitated by condition of the wound.

7. Homicide. — If refusal to permit wounded person to obtain aid or medical attention, or to render it where duty to render it exists, is so grossly negligent or reckless as to manifest wanton disregard for human life, rather than a specific intent to bring about death, the offenders may be guilty of voluntary manslaughter, or may be guilty of involuntary manslaughter if such acts or omissions were the result of ordinary negligence.

8. Homicide. — Where wound is unlawfully and intentionally inflicted by person charged with refusing to render or permit aid or medical attention, and death results from the refusal or neglect, the crime committed is "murder" or "manslaughter," and refusal to render or permit aid or medical attention should not be made the basis for separate instructions.

Appeal from Whitley Circuit Court.

L.O. Siler for appellant.

W. Owen Keller, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before Flem D. Sampson, Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE TILFORD.

Reversing.

The appellant was separately tried and convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to two years imprisonment under an indictment charging him and his father with the murder of Mitchell Davis, and an instruction informing the jury that although they might find appellant not guilty under Instruction No. 1, relating to murder by shooting with a deadly weapon, or Instruction No. 2, relating to voluntary manslaughter committed in sudden heat and passion, or Instruction No. 5 which will be outlined later, they should nevertheless find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter if the jury believed that he "had unlawfully injured" Davis by shooting and wounding him, and thereafter, in conjunction with his father, had "unlawfully, wilfully but without malice" neglected to provide or refused to permit others to provide "medical attention and care" for Davis "when they knew, or as reasonable prudent men should have known" that Davis' condition "as a result of gunshot wounds, was reasonably calculated to and would produce death if not cared for in a reasonable time and prudent way and in such a manner as was usual and customary for such a wound as was inflicted, in the community"; and that as a result of such failure or neglect the death of Davis "was hastened or accelerated and that he died as a result thereof."

Instruction No. 5 which immediately preceded the instruction under which appellant was convicted was couched in similar language and likewise pre-supposed appellant's innocence of murder as defined in Instruction No. 1, and voluntary manslaughter as defined in Instruction No. 2. It informed the jury that if appellant had "unlawfully" wounded Davis, and, thereafter, appellant and his father had "wilfully and feloniously and with their malice aforethought" entered into a conspiracy to prevent Davis from receiving medical attention and to cause and hasten his death from his injury, "or that they unlawfully, wilfully, feloniously, and with their malice aforethought neglected to care for him or provide medical attention," and that Davis' death "was hastened or accelerated" as a result of the conspiracy, or as a result of the "wilful neglect or wilful failure to provide medical attention," they should find appellant guilty of murder and fix his punishment at death or...