King v. Director of Midland County Dept. of Social Services

• Citation: 73 Mich.App. 253,251 N.W.2d 270
• Decision Date: 06 January 1977
• Docket Number: Docket No. 27423
• Parties: Fietta KING et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DIRECTOR OF the MIDLAND COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)

Page 270

251 N.W.2d 270

73 Mich.App. 253

Fietta KING et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

DIRECTOR OF the MIDLAND COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 27423.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Jan. 6, 1977.

Released for Publication March 18, 1977.

Legal Services of Eastern Michigan by Edward J. Hoort, Midland, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Edward G. Durance, Pros. Atty., for defendants-appellees.

Before WALSH, P. J., and ALLEN and CORKIN, ^* JJ.

WALSH, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Midland County Circuit Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and repayment of suspended benefits to eligible recipients of general assistance under the Midland County social welfare program. ¹ They appeal from a judgment denying relief.

The relevant facts are these: The Midland County Board of Commissioners adopted a budget for 1975 which allocated $306,000 to the social services fund. The money was to be spent on direct relief as well as for the administration and maintenance of Pinecrest, a county facility. On September 22, 1975, only $36,000 remained in the fund. The Social Services Department decided to retain $32,000 to continue operating Pinecrest for the remainder of the year and to allocate the remaining $4,000 for emergency medical care. All general assistance payments were suspended as of September 22, 1975. ²

On November 13, 1975, plaintiffs filed suit in Midland County Circuit Court alleging that the Midland County Department of Social Services was required under the Social Welfare Act ³ to provide general assistance to persons in need or to those permanently or temporarily ineligible for categorical assistance and that payments could not be terminated or suspended because the funds appropriated to maintain the general assistance program were insufficient. The trial court held that while the Board of Commissioners is required to appropriate funds to maintain welfare services, the amount of the appropriation is within its discretion, subject to judicial review for abuse.

At issue is the proper interpretation of § 70 of the Social Welfare Act, M.C.L.A. § 400.70; M.S.A. § 16.470, which provides, in relevant part:

"The county board of supervisors shall, within its discretion, make such appropriations as are necessary to maintain the various welfare services within the county, as provided in this act, and to defray the cost of administration of these services."

Plaintiffs contend that § 70, when read in conjunction with the remainder of the Act, mandates that the Board of Commissioners appropriate sufficient funds to maintain the general assistance program, and that general assistance payments cannot be suspended or terminated because the appropriation was insufficient. Defendants admit that they are required under the Act to administer a general welfare program and that the Board of Commissioners is required to appropriate funds for social welfare programs including general assistance. Defendants argue, however, that § 70 places the amount of such appropriations within the Board's discretion.

A statute may be judicially construed if the language used is ambiguous or the statute is susceptible of two or more meanings. Royal Oak School Dist. v. Schulman, 68 Mich.App. 589, 243 N.W.2d 673 (1976). The primary rule of statutory construction is to determine and effectuate the Legislature's intent. Williams v. Secretary of State, 338 Mich. 202, 60 N.W.2d 910 (1953), Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 59 Mich.App. 88, 228 N.W.2d 843 (1975). Toward that end, statutory language should be given a reasonable construction considering the purpose of the statute and the object sought to be accomplished. Schoolcraft County Board of Commissioners v. Schoolcraft Memorial Hospital Board of Trustees, 68 Mich.App. 654, 243 N.W.2d 708 (1976), Royal Oak School Dist. v. Schulman,supra. An act must be read in its entirety and the meaning given to one section arrived at after due consideration of other sections so as to produce, if possible, a harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole. Williams v. Secretary of State, supra, Scholten v. Rhoades, 67 Mich.App. 736, 242 N.W.2d 509 (1976). Statutes are to be construed so as to avoid absurd consequences. Williams v. Secretary of State, supra, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Kurylowicz, 67 Mich.App. 568, 242 N.W.2d 530 (1976).

The preamble to 1939 P.A. 280, which established the Social Welfare Act, lists among the purposes of the Act the protection of the welfare of the people of Michigan and the provision of general relief to poor and unfortunate persons. The Act creates county departments of social services, M.C.L.A. § 400.45(1), M.S.A. § 16.445(1), whose duties are defined in M.C.L.A. § 400.55; M.S.A. § 16.455, which states in part:

"The county department shall administer a public welfare program, as follows:

"(a) To grant general relief . . . to any person domiciled in the county who has a legal settlement in the state." (Emphasis supplied.)

Generally, unless other considerations compel a contrary conclusion, the use of the word "shall" means that the statute is mandatory. Township of Southfield v. Drainage Board for Twelve Towns Relief Drains, 357 Mich. 59, 97 N.W.2d 821 (1959), Lundberg v. Corrections Commission, 57 Mich.App. 327, 225 N.W.2d 752 (1975).

The language of the statute and the stated purpose of the Act leads unalterably to the conclusion that it is mandatory for the county to maintain the general assistance program. Evans v. Department of Social Services, 22 Mich.App. 633, 178 N.W.2d 173 (1970). Indeed the language of § 70 itself is mandatory in form: "The county board of supervisors shall . . . make such appropriations as are necessary to maintain . . . welfare services . . . and to defray the cost of administration of these services."

It is within the context of the mandatory language of § 55, the mandatory language of § 70 and the stated purposes of the Act that we must find meaning for the phrase "within its discretion" with which the Legislature saw fit to qualify the county board of commissioners' duty to appropriate the funds necessary to maintain and administer county social welfare programs.

Considered within that context the qualifying phrase cannot be interpreted to mean, as the defendant contends, that the amount of the required appropriation is completely within the discretion of the board of commissioners. Such an interpretation would render the mandatory language of §§ 55 and 70 meaningless. If the amount of the appropriation was completely within the discretion of the board, the board could relieve itself of its responsibility of maintaining the general assistance program simply by appropriating insufficient funds.

The statute, however, requires that the county maintain the general assistance program, M.C.L.A. § 400.55; M.S.A. § 16.455, and it requires that the county appropriate such funds as are necessary to do so, M.C.L.A. § 400.70; M.S.A. § 16.470. It cannot, therefore, discontinue or suspend payments to qualified recipients of the general assistance program, as it did in this case, because its original appropriation was insufficient. ⁴

Our interpretation of § 70 does not render nugatory the words "within its discretion". Although it is not within the discretion of the board to appropriate less funds than would be sufficient to maintain the mandatory general assistance program, it is within the discretion of the board to determine what appropriation, if any, should be made to provide for discretionary welfare services within the county. For example, M.C.L.A. § 400.55; M.S.A. § 16.455, provides that general relief "may" also be granted to a person who has a legal settlement in the state but no domicile in the county, and in a temporary emergency, general relief "may" also be given to indigents with no settlement in the state. ⁵ M.C.L.A. § 400.49; M.S.A. § 16.449 permits county commissioners to provide a salary to the county director of social services in addition to that provided by the State Civil Service Commission. M.C.L.A. § 400.24; M.S.A. § 16.424 allows the state department to set minimum benefit levels. The county board, however, can, within its discretion, appropriate sufficient funds to provide benefits at higher levels than those set by the state. ⁶ Also within the board's discretion is the amount of money to be spent administering the various programs. M.C.L.A. § 400.70; M.S.A. § 16.470.

From the foregoing we conclude that, although § 70 of the Social Welfare Act permits the board of commissioners to exercise its discretion in determining the amount of the appropriation necessary to maintain and administer county welfare services, it does not permit the board to appropriate less funds than are sufficient to maintain the mandatory general assistance program. ⁷ It follows, therefore, that the Midland County Department of Social Services did not have the right to suspend general assistance payments to eligible recipients as they did in this case.

A writ of mandamus, directing the payment of back benefits for the approximate five week period of suspension, may issue. Lundberg v. Corrections Commission, supra. See Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Sheriff, 391 Mich. 359, 216 N.W.2d 910 (1974).

Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

No costs, a public question.

* LEO W. CORKIN, 29th Judicial Circuit Judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const.1963, art. 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

1 As to the Midland County Department of Social Services plaintiffs sought: (1) a temporary restraining order; and (2) preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining the department from terminating general assistance without notice and hearing and from terminating or refusing general relief for any reason other than those...