King v. Federal Underwriters Exchange, A-720.

Decision Date16 January 1946
Docket NumberNo. A-720.,A-720.
Citation191 S.W.2d 855
CourtTexas Supreme Court
PartiesKING v. FEDERAL UNDERWRITERS EXCHANGE.

Fulmer & Fairchild and R. W. Fairchild, all of Nacogdoches, for petitioner.

W. E. Stone, of Jacksonville, A. J. Thompson, of Nacogdoches, John T. Gano, of Fort Worth, for respondent.

ALEXANDER, Chief Justice.

This is a workman's compensation case. The judgment of the trial court, in favor of the employee, was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals because of alleged improper argument of counsel for the employee.

The argument complained of and the rulings of the trial court thereon are as follows:

(1) "Mr. Fulmer (Counsel for employee): You see the significance of this where you were called on if you would give the same credit to a doctor you didn't know as you would to a local doctor. If you suggested you would pay more attention to Dr. Travis than you would to any other, you would have been stricken off and couldn't [have] served. They build the entire case around prejudice of a local doctor. No doubt all of you have used them. Where is anything to throw in dispute Dr. Denman and Dr. Norton, and if Simp King had the money that Federal Underwriters has some other individual has, he could have brought Dr. Norton or he could have come to Dr. Travis' clinic.

"Mr. Thompson (Attorney for the insurance company): We object to that because it is highly prejudicial and not admissible and out of this record and—

"The Court: The jury won't consider that remark made by counsel about money.

"Mr. Fulmer: The testimony shows that old Simp owes around a thousand dollars and can't work, and, of course, is not able to hire any other doctor and bring here out of his own pocket for evidence and what I had reference to the law permits him to bring it by deposition, and you are to consider it as if Dr. Norton appeared in person."

The statement of counsel that "if Simp King had the money that Federal Underwriters has [or] some other individual has, he could have brought Dr. Norton or he could have come to Dr. Travis' clinic," constituted an improper reference to the comparative wealth of the parties. But it will be noted that the court promptly instructed the jury not to consider this argument, and, under the prior decisions of this Court, the argument complained of what was not so prejudicial or inflammatory in its nature that its harmful effect could not be removed by such instructions. Davis v. Hill, Tex.Com.App., 298 S.W. 526; Safety Casualty Co. v. Wright, 138 Tex. 492, 160 S.W.2d 238, Par. 8. Under these circumstances it will be presumed that the harmful effect of the improper argument was removed by the instructions. Id.; Ramirez v. Acker, 134 Tex. 647, 138 S.W.2d 1054.

The further argument of counsel along the same lines, which was made after the court had sustained the objection to the prior argument, does not appear to have been objected to, and the court was not requested to instruct the jury not to consider same. Under these circumstances no reversible error is presented.

(2) "Mr Fulmer: The Court defines `Total Incapacity.' Disability and incapacity means the same. If you were asked about total, you would think of all of it. I feel the doctors, when you ask them concerning total disability, they have in mind their version of it. I attempted to ask Dr. Smith about that and embody the legal definition and you are under to follow it. I was trying to put that in and Mr. Thompson objected to it. If I had put that in there, how do you know what Dr. Smith would have said? He might have said `yes,' if I had got that in there.

"Mr. Thompson: We object to the speculative evidence. That is clearly inadmissible.

"The Court: The jury won't consider what Dr. Smith's testimony would be."

Clearly the harmful effect, if any, of the argument above referred to was removed by the instructions of ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
43 cases
  • Younger Bros. v. Marino
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • November 21, 1946
    ...under these well settled authorities: Stanland v. Traders & General Ins. Co., Tex.Sup., 195 S.W.2d 118; King v. Federal Underwriters Exchange, Tex.Sup., 191 S.W.2d 855; Texas & New Orleans v. Sturgeon, 142 Tex. 222, 177 S.W.2d 264; Ramirez v. Acker, 134 Tex. 647, 138 S.W.2d 1054; Missouri K......
  • Louisiana & A. Ry. Co. v. Mullins
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • June 16, 1959
    ...Cases, 41-B Tex.Jur., Secs. 222, 235, 239. The argument in this case more properly falls within the rule of King v. Federal Underwriters Exchange, 144 Tex. 531, 191 S.W.2d 855. Brinksmanship in this field has little to recommend it as juries are composed of sensible men and women and they u......
  • Southern Pacific Company v. Hubbard
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • December 12, 1956
    ...much stronger argument of this general character not to be so highly prejudicial as to be incurable are King v. Federal Underwriters Exchange, 144 Tex. 531, 191 S.W.2d 855, 856, and Goforth v. Alvey, 153 Tex. 449, 271 S.W.2d The latter part of the quoted argument, to wit, 'and if there was ......
  • Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Tucker
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • May 26, 1955
    ...view that the argument of counsel does not present reversible error and points 2 and 3 are each overruled. See King v. Federal Underwriters Exchange, 144 Tex. 531, 191 S.W.2d 855; Davis v. Hill, Tex.Com.App., 298 S.W. 526; Fauth v. First National Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 214 S.W.2d 168, no writ ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT