King v. Grand Chapter of Rhode Island

• Decision Date: 25 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2006-133-Appeal.,2006-133-Appeal.
• Citation: 919 A.2d 991
• Parties: Carolyn L. KING v. GRAND CHAPTER OF RHODE ISLAND ORDER OF the EASTERN STAR et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

919 A.2d 991

Carolyn L. KING v. GRAND CHAPTER OF RHODE ISLAND ORDER OF the EASTERN STAR et al.

No. 2006-133-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 25, 2007.

Stephen E. Breggia, Esq., Providence, for Plaintiff.

Robert J. Quigley, Esq., Providence, for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

Justice FLAHERTY, for the Court.

Should the courts of this state intervene in the affairs of an unincorporated private organization when a lifelong member of that organization says that she has been suspended from membership unjustly? Carolyn L. King (plaintiff or King) sought and was granted a mandatory preliminary injunction ordering the Grand Chapter of Rhode Island, Order of the Eastern Star (defendant or OES) to reinstate her membership in the organization after a justice of the Superior Court found that OES had flouted its internal disciplinary procedures when it suspended her. OES has appealed to this Court; it argues that the judiciary has no place interfering in the internal affairs of a private unincorporated organization. Additionally, the defendant contends that even if this dispute is proper grist for the judicial mill, the trial justice nonetheless abused his discretion when he issued a mandatory preliminary injunction because the circumstances of this case do not meet the heightened standard for such extraordinary relief. This case came before this Court for oral argument on February 27, 2007, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. After hearing the arguments and examining the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown, and we proceed to decide the appeal at this time without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.

I Facts and Procedural History

This story begins with the death of one of the members of the Martha Chapter of OES, a local subordinate chapter.¹ The deceased had been in possession of certain "jewels"² that belonged to the Martha Chapter. In October 2003, the co-executrix of the deceased's estate gave these jewels to King for safekeeping and for return to the Martha Chapter. King, however, did not return them expeditiously.

Indeed, five months passed, and King still possessed the jewels. The Worthy Grand Matron,³ of the Grand Chapter of Rhode Island, along with two other officers of the Grand Chapter, pulled King aside after a meeting of the local Woonsocket Chapter, to which King belonged. The officers expressed their concern that plaintiff still had the jewels. The jewels were returned to the Martha Chapter the next day.

Despite the safe return of the jewels, the Worthy Grand Matron determined that she should pursue disciplinary action against King because she retained possession of the jewels for an impermissibly long period. On April 20, 2004, the Worthy Grand Matron called King to inform her that a meeting of the jurisprudence committee⁴ of the Grand Chapter would be held the next evening and that King's presence was requested. The following day, the Worthy Grand Matron made another phone call to King to remind her of the meeting. Nevertheless, King begged off and did not attend, citing a scheduling conflict with another OES function.

On April 22, 2004, the day after the meeting of the jurisprudence committee, the Worthy Grand Matron sent a letter to plaintiff describing what had taken place at the meeting. The letter said that, as punishment for withholding the jewels, the jurisprudence committee had recommended that King be suspended from OES for a period of six months. It then went on to say that the Worthy Grand Matron had accepted that recommendation. In response, on August 3, 2004, King penned a handwritten letter to the Worthy Grand Matron in which she requested a copy of the charges against her. She also asked that the appeal of her suspension be heard on August 17, 2004, with her lawyer present.

The correspondence battle escalated with a letter to King from the Worthy Grand Matron on August 12, 2004. In that letter, the Worthy Grand Matron indicated that the appeal would not be heard on August 17, but rather on October 9, 2004, during the annual meeting of the Grand Chapter. That letter was quickly followed by an August 23, 2004 letter from the Worthy Grand Matron to inform King that the jurisprudence committee would meet on September 7, 2004, with regard to her suspension and that King's presence was requested.

King attended the meeting of the jurisprudence committee, but, once again, the committee recommended a suspension of six months. That recommendation once again was adopted by the Worthy Grand Matron. And, once again, King followed up with written correspondence. In this undated letter, King characterized her suspension as illegal and she asked for written apologies from, as well as the suspension of, certain other OES officers. The Worthy Grand Matron replied with a letter written September 22, 2004, defending the suspension and refusing to acquiesce to any of King's demands for resolution of the matter. Rather, the Worthy Grand Matron asked that plaintiff agree to end all discussion on the matter and accept reinstatement on October 22, 2004—the conclusion of the initial six-month period of suspension. King was not mollified, however, and she continued to work to reverse her suspension. Apparently, the Worthy Grand Matron did not appreciate King's continuing efforts. Thus, she sent yet another letter on October 6, 2004, informing King that her suspension would continue indefinitely and that her appeal would not be heard.

On March 3, 2005, King responded by filing the complaint that gives rise to this appeal. In her complaint, King requested damages for slander and injunctive relief. As part of her request for injunctive relief, King sought a preliminary injunction that would require OES to reinstate her while the litigation was pending. A hearing was held before a justice of the Superior Court over seven days between May 18, 2005, and August 19, 2005. At the conclusion of the testimony, the hearing justice found that OES had not followed the rules set forth in its constitution for disciplining its members. Furthermore, he found that King had a substantial interest in maintaining her membership with OES because it had been a major part of her life during her nearly four decades as a member. Thus, he determined that a preliminary injunction was warranted to reinstate King. OES timely appealed.⁵

II Standard of Review

A hearing justice's decision to issue a preliminary injunction is reviewed by this Court for abuse of discretion. Richmond Realty, Inc. v. Town of Richmond, 644 A.2d 831, 832 (R.I.1994). "The primary factors a trial justice must consider in granting a preliminary injunction are a showing of irreparable harm to plaintiff, plaintiff's substantial likelihood of success on the merits, balancing the parties['] interests, and preserving the status quo." Paolissi v. Fleming, 602 A.2d 551, 551 (R.I.1992) (mem.). When a preliminary injunction is mandatory in nature in—that it commands action from a party rather than preventing action—a stricter rule applies and such injunctions should be issued only upon a showing of "very clear" right and "great urgency." Giacomini v. Bevilacqua, 118 R.I. 63, 65, 372 A.2d 66, 67 (1977) (quoting Smart v. Boston Wire Stitcher Co., 50 R.I. 409, 415, 148 A. 803, 805 (1930)).

III Analysis

As we see it, our review here is twofold. First we must determine whether the circumstances warrant judicial intervention into the affairs of an unincorporated private organization. Then, if the answer to that inquiry is affirmative, we must determine whether the hearing justice properly applied the standard for issuing a mandatory preliminary injunction. Our analysis leads us to conclude that the hearing justice was correct when he determined that this matter was properly before the court. However, because we hold that the hearing justice did not make a finding of great urgency—as required for the issuance of a mandatory preliminary injunction—it is our opinion that the mandatory preliminary injunction must be vacated and the case should be remanded for trial.

A Judicial Intervention

OES is a private unincorporated organization. Members of the organization are required to pay dues and, in turn, they are allowed to participate in the various social and philanthropic activities of the organization. OES contends that it is beyond the province of the courts to interfere with the internal affairs of a private organization. King, on the other hand, maintains that when an organization either ignores its own rules or applies those rules arbitrarily or capriciously, resulting in harm to one of its members, then the sole recourse is to the courts.

It is well settled that, ordinarily, the courts will not interfere with the internal workings of a voluntary organization as long as such rules are reasonable and consistent with public policy. See, e.g., Gorman v. St. Raphael Academy, 853 A.2d 28, 37 (R.I.2004) ("there should be `no judicial interference with the internal affairs, rules and by-laws of a voluntary association unless their enforcement would be arbitrary, capricious or constitute an abuse of discretion'") (quoting Hebert v. Ventetuolo, 480 A.2d 403, 407 (R.I.1984)); Del Ponte v. Societa Italiana Di M.S. Guglielmo Marconi, 27 R.I. 1, 7, 60 A. 237, 240 (1905) (upholding the decision of a voluntary organization to expel members for violating one of the organization's by-laws because the rule and the application of the rule were reasonable); Levant v. Whitley, 755 A.2d 1036, 1043 (D.C.2000) (acknowledging a "`general rule'" against judicial interference in private voluntary membership associations); N.A.A.C.P. v. Golding, 342 Md. 663, 679 A.2d 554, 558 (1996) ("We note...