King v. Greenblatt, s. 95-1812
| Decision Date | 08 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | 97-1278,97-1021 and 97-1057,Nos. 95-1812,95-1813,96-1649,s. 95-1812 |
| Citation | 149 F.3d 9 |
| Parties | Mitchell G. KING, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Milton GREENBLATT, M.D., Commission of the Department of Mental Health for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, et al., Defendants, Appellees. Class of 48 + 1 and Donald Pearson, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants. Harold G. WILLIAMS, M.D., Commission of the Department of Mental Health for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, et al. Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Michael LESIAK, et al., Defendants, Appellees. Norman Knight, Plaintiff, Appellant. Harold G. WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Michael LESIAK, et al., Defendants, Appellees. Sherman Miller, Patton Flannery, David M. Martel, Edward Nadeau, Michael Woodward, Edward Gallagher, James Leblanc and Philip Pizzo, Appellants. Mitchell G. KING, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Milton GREENBLATT, M.D., Commission of the Department of Mental Health for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, et al., Defendants, Appellees. Class of 48 + 1 and Donald Pearson, et al. and Sherman Miller, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants. Harold G. WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Michael LESIAK, et al., Defendants, Appellees. Sherman Miller, David M. Martel, Edward Nadeau, Michael Woodward, Edward Gallagher and James Leblanc, Appellants. . Heard |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Anthony A. Scibelli with whom Robert D. Keefe, David R. Geiger, Jeffrey S. Follett, Charles Donelan, and Jonathan I. Handler were on brief for appellants Class of 48 + 1 and Donald Pearson and Sherman Miller, et al.
Jeffrey S. Follett with whom David R. Geiger was on brief for appellants Pearson, et al.
Charles Donelan for appellants Sherman Miller, et al.
William L. Pardee, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Leo Sorokin, Assistant Attorney General, were on brief for appellees.
James R. Pingeon and Beth Eisenberg on brief for the Center for Public Representation, amicus curiae.
Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, COFFIN and CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judges.
This opinion is a continuation of King v. Greenblatt ("King II "), 127 F.3d 190 (1st Cir.1997), which is the latest judicial discussion in a group of cases dating back to 1972, concerning a resident population of civilly committed sexually dangerous persons in the Treatment Center at the Massachusetts Correctional Institute in Bridgewater, Massachusetts (Center). A reference to prior cases is contained in the opinion just cited. Our present review concerns the proposed modifications, granted by the district court, of two longstanding consent decrees, the Original Decree and the Supplemental Decree.
The Original Decree had provided that the Center would be treated as a facility of the Department of Mental Health (DMH), with primary authority to be exercised by DMH and custodial personnel to be controlled by the Department of Correction (DOC). Patients were to have "the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the purpose of commitment." Both DMH and DOC were to "take steps jointly" to improve physical conditions, carry out a meaningful work program, and have "a system of differing security for different categories of patients" to permit less restrictive conditions for those patients not requiring maximum security.
In an earlier opinion we considered challenges to proposed modifications of that decree. See King v. Greenblatt ("King I "), 52 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1995). We addressed the significance of the recently enacted 1993 Mass Acts. ch. 489, which gave DOC exclusive jurisdiction of the care, treatment, rehabilitation and--an added statutory goal--custody of civilly committed sexually dangerous persons in the Center. We held that this statute met the first prong of Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992) (), but remanded the case to the district court to consider whether the proposed modifications met the second Rufo prong, id. (i.e., whether the modifications were "suitably tailored" to the new law). See King I, 52 F.3d at 7.
Upon remand, the district court found that the proposed modifications to the Original Degree were "suitably tailored" to the new law; the court also determined that the proposed modifications to the Supplemental Decree met both prongs of Rufo as they were "sufficiently related" to the change in state law and "suitably tailored." The case was then appealed to us. We remanded it to the district court to address only issues relevant to the Supplemental Decree, and reserved our "suitable tailoring" review and all other issues relating to the Original Decree.
We recognized that the proposed modifications in the Supplemental Decree went beyond a transfer of exclusive authority to DOC and would effect substantive changes in disciplinary policies, allowing the imposition of sequestration for punishment purposes (except for acts underlying commitment) and deleting a ban on all discipline and punitive procedures in the treatment of inmates civilly committed. See King II, 127 F.3d at 195. We opined that the link between a change in administration and sequestration policy was too tenuous, at least without further development. Id. We also held that neither Chapter 489, "at least without further explanation," nor our speculation, standing alone, that the Massachusetts legislature had apparently accepted a preference for behavior modification over mental health treatment would constitute a "significant change in law" affecting sequestration policy. Id.
We therefore sent back the proposed modifications of the Supplemental Decree to the district court for further consideration, leaving it to the court to decide whether additional factual or opinion evidence was needed. The court has since complied with our directive and, after hearing and submissions, has determined both that the change in control managed by Chapter 489 is a significant change in the law affecting the Supplemental Decree and that the modifications were suitably tailored. We now address this determination and all outstanding issues relating to both decrees.
This litigation, now in its twenty-seventh year, involving half a dozen district judges, magistrate judges, and many conferences, hearings briefings, and appeals, has accomplished much in a troubled and complex field of custody and treatment of institutionalized sexually dangerous persons. During this period, changes have occurred in conditions of confinement and treatment, in the problems confronted, and in the institutional setting. After exhaustive briefings and argument from capable counsel, we conclude that the district court acted sensitively and appropriately in conducting the proceedings below, upholding the proposed modifications of both the Original Decree and the Supplemental Decree, and signaling its readiness to exercise its oversight when occasion warrants. While we cannot expect "closure" of tensions and problems, we may hope for problems of smaller dimension capable of systematic resolution without the necessity of heroic effort.
We first address several issues relating to the Original Decree.
Plaintiffs repeatedly requested the opportunity to engage in discovery and an evidentiary hearing. They sought to discern whether DOC intended to provide "meaningful treatment under the Plan" and whether its treatment plan was consistent with the "least restrictive conditions" requirement of the Original Decree. Plaintiffs proposed accomplishing this by exploring DOC's past behavior, present behavior, and expressions of future intent. Plaintiffs' proposal contemplates interviews with all residents, examination of new procedures, expert testimony interpreting the Plan, investigation of current practices, inquiry into internal memos relating to the Plan and the persons instrumental in formulating it, and depositions of DOC officials and Joint Resource Institute (JRI) personnel responsible for treatment. As much as six months of time would be needed.
The basic response of the court in denying discovery requests was:
It may be that the plan won't work, but the Court of Appeals ... [told me not to] prejudge the plan, but they told me ... I should have a hearing, inquire into the DOC plan, giving significant weight to the local government.
* * * * * *
... [W]hat would DOC do under this plan? And then I should use my judicial oversight, primarily rely on my judicial oversight, to insure that the DOC is complying with the decrees. So it seems to me that that's a very clear blueprint.
This was an accurate precis of our directives "to give significant weight to the views of local government officials" and to "rely primarily on its jurisdictional oversight to ensure DOC's compliance with the decrees." King I, 52 F.3d at 7. Moreover, even absent these directives, a trial court is vested with broad discretion in granting or denying discovery. 8 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2006, at 91 (1994).
The task of the district court, following our directives, was to determine whether DOC, which had been given authority under state law, was likely to manage the Center without doing violence to the substantive portions of the Original Decree. In the words of the Special Master appointed by the court, the inquiry being undertaken was "whether DOC is approaching the control of the institution with a treatment modality."
In support of its proposal for extensive discovery and hearing, plaintiffs relied principally on the extensive procedure which the trial judge adopted on remand in Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Rufo, 844 F.Supp. 31 (D.Mass.1994). But it does not follow from the...
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