King v. Greenblatt, s. 95-1812

• Decision Date: 08 September 1997
• Docket Number: Nos. 95-1812,97-1278,97-1021 and 97-1057,95-1813,96-1649,s. 95-1812
• Citation: 127 F.3d 190
• Parties: Mitchell G. KING, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Milton GREENBLATT, M.D., Commission of the Department of Mental Health for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, et al., Defendants, Appellees. Class of 48 + 1 and Donald Pearson, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants. Harold G. WILLIAMS, M.D., Commission of the Department of Mental Health for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Michael LESIAK, et al., Defendants, Appellees. Norman Knight, Plaintiff, Appellant. Harold G. WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Michael LESIAK, et al., Defendants, Appellees. Sherman Miller, Patton Flannery, David M. Martel, Edward Nadeau, Michael Woodward, Edward Gallagher, James LeBlanc and Philip Pizzo, Appellants. Mitchell G. KING, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Milton GREENBLATT, M.D., Commission of the Department of Mental Health for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, et al., Defendants, Appellees. Class of 48 + 1 and Donald Pearson, et al. and Sherman Miller, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants. Harold G. WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Michael LESIAK, et al., Defendants, Appellees. Sherman Miller, David M. Martel, Edward Nadeau, Michael Woodward, Edward Gallagher and James LeBlanc, Appellants. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 190

127 F.3d 190

Mitchell G. KING, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Milton GREENBLATT, M.D., Commission of the Department of

Mental Health for the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

Class of 48 + 1 and Donald Pearson, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants.

Harold G. WILLIAMS, M.D., Commission of the Department of

Mental Health for the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Michael LESIAK, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

Norman Knight, Plaintiff, Appellant.

Harold G. WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Michael LESIAK, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

Sherman Miller, Patton Flannery, David M. Martel, Edward

Nadeau, Michael Woodward, Edward Gallagher, James

LeBlanc and Philip Pizzo, Appellants.

Mitchell G. KING, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Milton GREENBLATT, M.D., Commission of the Department of

Mental Health for the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

Class of 48 + 1 and Donald Pearson, et al. and Sherman

Miller, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants.

Harold G. WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Michael LESIAK, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

Sherman Miller, David M. Martel, Edward Nadeau, Michael

Woodward, Edward Gallagher and James LeBlanc, Appellants.

Nos. 95-1812, 97-1278, 95-1813, 96-1649, 97-1021 and 97-1057.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard Sept. 8, 1997.

Decided Oct. 10, 1997.

Anthony A. Scibelli, Boston, MA, with whom Robert D. Keefe, David R. Geiger, Jeffrey S. Follett, Charles Donelan, Boston, MA, and Jonathan I. Handler, Boston, MA, were on brief, for appellants Class of 48 + 1 and Donald Pearson and Sherman Miller, et al.

Jeffrey S. Follett with whom David R. Geiger, Boston, MA, was on brief, for appellants Pearson, et al.

Charles Donelan, Boston, MA, for appellants Sherman Miller, et al.

William L. Pardee, Assistant Attorney General, Boston, MA, with whom Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Boston, MA, Leo Sorokin, Assistant Attorney General, were on brief, for appellees.

James R. Pingeon, Boston, MA, and Beth Eisenberg on brief, for the Center for Public Representation, amicus curiae.

Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, COFFIN and CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judges.

COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge.

This case arises out of consent decrees entered in two institutional reform litigations, King v. Greenblatt and Williams v. Lesiak, and implicates Supreme Court caselaw addressing the circumstances under which such decrees may be modified. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992). In 1972 then civilly committed patients of the Massachusetts Treatment Center for Sexually Dangerous Persons ("Center") brought constitutional challenges to the conditions of confinement and the adequacy of treatment at the Center. After finding that conditions violated the Constitution, the district court in 1974 entered two consent decrees in King (the "Original King " decree and, one week later, the "Supplemental" decree) and one consent decree in Williams. ¹

In 1996, in the orders now on appeal, the district court modified all three decrees. It relied on our decision in King v. Greenblatt, 52 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1995), where we found that Rufo's requirement of a significant change in fact or law was met as to five provisions of the Original King and Williams decrees by a new Massachusetts statute, 1993 Mass. Acts ch. 489, which transferred jurisdiction over those in plaintiffs' position from the Department of Mental Health ("DMH") to the Department of Corrections ("DOC"). We made no finding, however, as to the Supplemental decree.

In this appeal, appellants pursue a number of issues stemming from changes to the decrees. As to the Original King and Williams decrees, we are satisfied with the adequacy of the record to enable us to decide the appeal. As for the district court's rationale for modifying the Supplemental decree, however, it is our view that the change in law we identified does not, alone, justify modification of the Supplemental decree under Rufo. We therefore remand without further delay to the district court for a hearing and findings concerning whether a significant change in fact or law has occurred with respect to the specific issues covered by the Supplemental decree. We reserve jurisdiction over the appeal, and will consider all issues together after the district court submits its findings to us.

I.

We begin by briefly sketching the legal backdrop for the appeal, and outlining the litigation history of the case. In section II we discuss why we believe the district court erred in approving modification of the Supplemental decree.

The principles that guide us were set out in Rufo, which established the standard for evaluating proposed modifications to a consent decree "that arguably relates to the vindication of a constitutional right." Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383 n. 7, 112 S.Ct. at 760 n. 7. Under Rufo, a party seeking modification of a consent decree has the burden of meeting two requirements. The party "may meet its initial burden by showing ... a significant change either in factual conditions or in law." Id. at 384, 112 S.Ct. at 760. "If the moving party meets this standard, the court should consider whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance." ² Id. Thus, the question of whether a modification is suitably tailored will not come into play unless the burden of demonstrating a significant change in factual conditions or law has been carried. Our analysis here concerns only whether the requisite initial showing of significant change in fact or law was made as to the Supplemental decree. This analysis requires a review of the case history directly relevant to the modification of the Supplemental decree. ³

The first five provisions of the 1974 Original King and Williams consent decrees contained parallel language prohibiting the Department of Corrections from making treatment decisions at the Center, allowing DOC governance only as to custodial personnel, placing primary responsibility and authority in the Department of Mental Health, and emphasizing that patients should have the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the purposes of commitment. These provisions tracked the language of then Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123A, § 2, which authorized DMH governance of patients and treatment at the Center. ⁴

The Supplemental decree addressed King's specific complaints concerning use of isolation at the Center. In addition to requiring that sequestered patients be afforded minimum standards of due process and human decency, the Supplemental decree stated,

Defendants shall not use or permit the use of solitary confinement at the Treatment Center at Massachusetts Correctional Institute, Bridgewater, for the purpose of discipline or punishment, disciplinary and punitive procedures having no place in the care and treatment of civilly committed patients. ⁵

In 1994 the Massachusetts state legislature amended chapter 123A with 1993 Mass. Acts ch. 489. Section 2 of chapter 489 provides, "[t]he commissioner of correction shall maintain subject to the jurisdiction of the department of correction a treatment program or branch thereof at a correctional institution for the care, custody, treatment and rehabilitation of persons [ad]judicated as being sexually dangerous." The law thus shifted jurisdiction from DMH to DOC.

Responding to the change in law, defendants sought to modify the Original King and Williams decrees, specifically the first five provisions of the decrees and a sixth provision setting forth a time schedule for DMH to implement requirements of the decrees. They argued that the passage of chapter 489 constituted "a significant change in circumstances warrant[ing] revision of the decree," in satisfaction of Rufo. Judge Mazzone denied the motion to modify, citing in part lack of information and recommending that DOC submit specific details and information concerning its proposed treatment plans.

The defendants appealed the denial to this court. While that appeal was pending, the defendants filed a renewed motion to modify, seeking the same modifications and, for the first time, modification of the Supplemental consent decree. They requested that the court replace the Supplemental decree's language "for the purpose of discipline or punishment, disciplinary and punitive procedures having no place in the care and treatment of civilly committed patients" with "for the purpose of punishing residents for the acts underlying their commitment." The proposed change thus barred punitive sequestration only for the conduct that triggered commitment, permitting its use for acts occurring during the patient's stay at the Center. As grounds for altering the Supplemental decree, defendants stated, "This modification will permit the implementation of a system of behavior management at the Treatment Center, and will further the goals of the cognitive treatment program by helping residents to take responsibility for their actions."

In support of their renewed motion to modify, defendants submitted a lengthy plan for administration and management of the Center ("Plan"). The Plan sets forth policies for management and staffing, clinical treatment, educational and vocational treatment, behavior management, resident management operations, community access, and integration of the Center with the prison's program for sex offenders.

About six months later, while the renewed motion to modify was pending before the district court, we issued our decision in King, 52 F.3d 1. We found that chapter 489 amounted to a significant change in law with respect to the first five provisions of the Original King and Williams decrees. Modification of those decrees therefore was permissible under Rufo. Id. at 5-6. However, because Rufo also requires that any "proposed modification be suitably tailored to the changed...