King v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Company
Decision Date | 05 October 1908 |
Citation | 114 S.W. 63,133 Mo.App. 612 |
Parties | MATTIE A. KING, Respondent, v. HARTFORD LIFE & ANNUITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court--Hon. Henry L. McCune, Judge.
Judgment affirmed.
Lathrop Morrow, Fox & Moore for appellant.
(1) The admission of the reports of December 31, 1900, and December 31, 1901, as evidence, was error: (a) Because the law does not require that the funds belonging to the different forms of policies, should be separately stated, and the plaintiff failed to show that the funds referred to in said reports pertained only to the single form of policy or contract of insurance in controversy. Reynolds v. Insurance Co., 88 Mo.App. 679. (b) Because the reports are in respect to matters necessarily and by their very nature shifting from day to day; hence as they relate to conditions six months prior and six months subsequent to the time of the default in the payment of the assessment they afford no presumptive evidence of the condition of the particular safety fund pertaining to these policies in question even assuming that the amount of such safety fund is shown by the reports on said dates. Janssen & Freyschlag v. Stone, 60 Mo.App. 402. (c) The report of December 31, 1901, being subsequent to the date of default, was in no event admissible. Schwartz v. Frank, 183 Mo. 447.
Fyke & Snider for respondent.
(1) The statements made by appellant to the insurance department of Missouri were made by requirement of law and were properly admitted in evidence. R. S. 1899, sec. 7880; R. S. 1899, sec 7839; Insurance Society v. King (Ill.), 75 N.E. 166. (2) Under the terms of the contract after the safety fund reached one million dollars all interest accruing thereon, and all additions thereto by payments of new members, was to be distributed to the policy-holders in reduction of their premiums. Insurance Co. v. Shinks (Ky.), 96 S.W. 889. (3) In this case there is no evidence that any assessment has ever been made by the board of directors of the defendant or any other proper authority. The burden is upon defendant to prove that such assessment had been properly and legally made. Earney v. Modern Woodmen of America, 79 Mo.App. 385; Agnew v. A. & W. W., 17 Mo.App. 254; Puschman v. Life & Annuity Co., 92 Mo.App. 640; Stewart v. Grand Lodge (Tenn.), 46 S.W. 579; Hannum v. Waddill, 135 Mo. 153; 2 Bacon, Benefit Societies (3 Ed.), sec. 377, p. 938; Johnson v. Insurance Co., 68 N.W. 299; Lewis v. Benefit Association, 77 Mo.App. 586; Banhazer v. A. O. U. W., 96 S.W. 953; Insurance Co. v. Babbett, 7 Allen (Mass.) 235; Margessen v. Benefit Association (Mass.), 42 N.E. 1132; Larydon v. Same (Mass.), 44 N.E. 266; Benjamin v. Association, 79 P. 517; Logsdon v. Supreme Lodge, 76 P. 292.
Action on two policies of life insurance of one thousand dollars each, issued by defendant to Edward M. King, on February 4, 1882. The beneficiaries named were the children of the assured living at the time of his death and plaintiff was the only child. Mr. King died July 4, 1901, at his home in Appleton City. The two policies were issued at the same time, were identical in form and belonged to what defendant called its "Safety Fund" class. Defendant was incorporated in 1867 under the laws of Connecticut, and was authorized by its charter to write any legal form of life insurance contract. It began business on the "old line" plan and in 1879 added the Safety Fund department as a new feature of its business, and out of that department, issued policies or certificates of membership on what is known as the assessment plan.
It is admitted Mr. King made the payments required to initiate his insurance and that he paid the first ninety assessments levied, the last one of which fell due in March, 1901, but defendant alleges in the answer that he failed to pay the ninety-first assessment which amounted on both policies to $ 13.50, and should have been paid not later than June 5th, and that on account of this default, defendant declared the policies forfeited and afterward declined to pay the loss.
The reply is a general denial. The cause was tried before a jury, verdict and judgment were for plaintiff and defendant appealed.
On the issue of forfeiture, plaintiff contends that the evidence shows, first, that the ninety-first assessment (non-payment of which is admitted) was not ordered to be levied by defendant's board of directors, a step made essential by the contract, and, second, that the levy of the assessment was wholly unnecessary or, at least, excessive, and, therefore, would have been invalid had it been ordered by the directors. The forfeiture clause in the certificate on which defendant relies provides: "The holder of this certificate further agrees and accepts same upon the express condition that if either the monthly dues, assessments, or the payment of $ 10 towards the safety fund as hereinbefore required, are not paid to said company on the day due, then this certificate shall be null and void," etc.
Defendant issued a separate certificate for each $ 1,000 of insurance in the "Safety Fund" class, which certificate called for the payment by the holder of an "admission fee" (agent's commission), another fee of $ 10 as a contribution to a "Safety Fund," and bound the holder to pay $ 3 per annum to the expense fund "on the 1st day of the month after date of issue and at every anniversary thereafter so long as this certificate shall remain in force or by monthly or other pro rata instalments." And also, "to pay said company upon each certificate that shall become a claim, an assessment, in accordance with the table of assessment rates as printed hereon, within 30 days from day on which notice bears date." As to the disposition to be made of the "Safety Fund" fee, the certificate specified:
Important provisions of the contract between defendant and the trustee (The Security Company of Hartford) are as follows: ...
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