Logsdon v. Supreme Lodge of Fraternal Union of America

• Decision Date: 12 April 1904
• Citation: 76 P. 292,34 Wash. 666
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: LOGSDON v. SUPREME LODGE OF FRATERNAL UNION OF AMERICA.

76 P. 292

34 Wash. 666

LOGSDON v. SUPREME LODGE OF FRATERNAL UNION OF AMERICA.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 12, 1904

Appeal from Superior Court, Whatcom County; Jeremiah Neterer, Judge.

Action by Hanne Jensen Logsdon against the Supreme Lodge of the Fraternal Union of America. From a judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Willis B. Herr and Allen & Webster, for appellant.

Virgil Peringer, for respondent.

HADLEY J.

Respondent is the beneficiary named in a fraternal insurance certificate issued by the appellant corporation to one Charles C. Jensen who is now deceased. Payment having been refused, this action was brought to enforce recovery. A demurrer to the complaint was overruled. An affirmative answer thereafter interposed was, on motion, stricken, and the appellant refused to plead further. The court then made findings of facts and conclusions of law, and entered judgment in favor of respondent for $1,012, with interest and costs. This appeal is from the judgment.

No exceptions were taken to the findings of facts, and the assigned errors which are urged relate to the rulings upon the demurrer and motion to strike, and also to the conclusions of law. It is first contended that the court erred in overruling the demurrer to the complaint. The allegations of the complaint, including exhibits attached thereto, are extensive, and it is impracticable to set them forth here in detail. The complaint, however, shows that on the 3d day of September, 1901, the deceased was initiated as a member of New Whatcom Lodge, No. 143, a local and subordinate branch of the appellant corporation; that at said time there was conferred upon him what is called the 'Degree of Fraternity'; that prior to the said date he had paid all admission fees, together with fees for certificate and supreme medical and local physician's examination; that on said date he paid to the secretary of said local lodge $1 to apply on his first assessment, and also 15 cents per capita tax and 25 cents local lodge dues that on the preceding day, September 2, 1901, the benefit certificate was delivered to him, and he accepted the same in writing; that on the 9th day of September, 1902, he died, and prior to his death had paid to the appellant 12 assessments, of $1 each, 12 monthly payments of per capita tax, of 15 cents each, and 12 monthly payments of local lodge dues, of 25 cents each. It is alleged that said 12 payments, aggregating $1.40 each, were made for the 12 consecutive months beginning with September, 1901, and ending with August, 1902. The complaint further shows that the constitution of the appellant corporation provides that each member, when he takes his degree of fraternity and receives his benefit certificate, shall pay to the secretary of his lodge, in addition to one month per capita tax and local dues, one assessment according to his age when applying for membership, which in this instance was $1; that the constitution further provides that each member of the order shall pay one assessment per month according to the rate named in his certificate, which shall be paid to the secretary of the subordinate lodge of which he may be a member on or before the last day of each month, and, if not so paid, the beneficiary certificate shall become null and void. The following further provision of the constitution also appears by the complaint: 'Every member shall be liable for dues as required by his lodge, one assessment and fifteen cents per capita tax for the month in which his benefit certificate was issued or dated by the supreme secretary: provided, the same is issued prior to the twenty-first day of the month, and all certificates issued after the twentieth day of the month the assessment and per capita tax shall be credited to the following month. Said assessment, dues and per capita tax shall be payable at the time of delivery of the benefit certificate or said certificate shall remain null and void and of no effect.'

The principal contention upon the demurrer, and in fact in the whole case, hinges upon the construction that shall be given to the above-quoted extract in its application to the facts of this case. It will be seen from what has been said as to the allegations of the complaint that, if the obligation to make the first payment of assessment and dues did not accrue until the month of September, 1901, then the 12 payments which were afterwards made included the month of August 1902. If the payments should be so applied, it follows that the payment for September, 1902, was payable at any time before the end of that month, and, inasmuch as the member died on the 9th day of September, there was no default. The benefit certificate appears to have been signed by the supreme officers of the appellant corporation, at Denver, Colo., on the 12th day of August, 1901. Inasmuch as the last-mentioned date was in the month of August, and prior to the 21st of said month, appellant contends that, under the above-quoted constitutional provision, the deceased was liable for an assessment for that month. If he was so liable, and if the first payment should be applied to August, 1901, it follows that none of the 12 consecutive payments which were made applied to any month after July, 1902, and the following month of August wholly passed without any payment. It is upon this point that appellant seeks to evade liability and to defeat recovery Emphasis is placed upon the fact that the quoted constitutional provision says that a member shall be liable for the month in which his benefit certificate is 'issued or dated.' It will be observed, however, that a proviso immediately follows to the effect that such liability accrues only when the certificate is 'issued' prior to the 21st day of the month. A certificate cannot be said to be issued when it is merely dated and signed by appellant's officers. It is not issued until it becomes vitalized as the evidence of a binding and mutual obligation. It does not become such until it has been delivered to and accepted by the member. In that particular it is analogouse to a deed which does not become a deed until it is delivered, even...