King v. International Lumber Co.

Decision Date19 October 1923
Docket Number23,633
PartiesLILLIE R. KING v. INTERNATIONAL LUMBER COMPANY
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Action in the district court for Beltrami county to recover $187.50 on a lease. The case was tried before Wright, J., who at the close of the testimony denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict and a jury which returned a verdict for the amount demanded. From an order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial defendant appealed. Affirmed.

SYLLABUS

Action for rent triable by jury.

1. An action on a lease for the recovery of rent is triable by jury, and the fact that defendant pleaded a surrender and release, alleged by plaintiff to have been signed in the mistaken belief that it was a receipt for rent, did not entitle defendant to a trial of the case by the court without a jury.

Release avoided because of inequitable conduct of defendant.

2. The evidence warranted the jury in finding that plaintiff's mistake was induced by the inequitable conduct of the defendant or was known to defendant and advantage taken of it, and hence plaintiff might avoid the release.

J. H Brown, for appellant.

Middleton & Middleton, for respondent.

OPINION

LEES, C.

On May 10, 1909, defendant leased from plaintiff the right to make use of the water front of land abutting on the Rainy River, to boom, sort and store logs. The lease was for a term of 15 years, subject to earlier termination at the option of defendant by the giving of notice to plaintiff. The rent was $125 per annum, payable on the tenth day of May in each year of the term. One of plaintiff's children died on April 18, 1919. She was in need of money to bury her child and called at the defendant's office to collect the rent which would be due on the tenth of May next ensuing. She had a conversation with defendant's secretary, and, at its conclusion, received a check for $62.50 and signed a release or surrender of the lease, granting to defendant the right to enter on the land and remove the boom timbers and piling at any time within six months. In January, 1921, she brought this action to recover $187.50, claiming it to be due as the remainder of the rent payable May 10, 1919, and the whole of the rent payable May 10, 1920.

Defendant pleaded the release as a bar to the action. Plaintiff replied, admitting her signature and alleging that she signed in the belief that she was giving a receipt for the amount paid her. When the case was called for trial, the defendant requested that it be tried by the court without a jury. The request was denied, and a jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor for the full amount claimed. Defendant has appealed from an order denying its motion in the alternative for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.

1. Did the court err in denying the request for a trial without a jury? The complaint states a cause of action for the recovery of money only. Whether an action is triable by jury or not is to be determined solely by an examination of the complaint. Dunnell, Minn. Digest and Supplements, § 5229. It would seem, therefore, that the question cannot be answered in accordance with defendant's contention. But it is urged that the answer and reply presented an issue of an equitable nature which was triable by the court and not by a jury. It is familiar law that when a release, procured by fraud, is interposed as a defense to a legal action, the fraud may be shown to avoid its effect without first having the release canceled. The facts pleaded in the reply were in the nature of a confession and avoidance. Plaintiff was not asking for the cancelation of the release. She merely alleged facts which would destroy its effect and defeat the attempt of the defendant to make use of it as a bar to the action. "The authorities unanimously allow fraud touching the execution of a sealed release to be applied as a defense to a plea of release in an action at law on the right released." 34 Cyc. 1068. For these reasons we cannot sustain defendant's first contention.

2. Its second and final contention is that the evidence does not...

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