King v. King
| Decision Date | 23 April 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 61972,61972 |
| Citation | 291 N.W.2d 22 |
| Parties | Howard KING and June King, Appellants, v. Royce KING, also known as Royce V. King, and Judith A. King, Appellees. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Edward W. Dailey Law Offices, P. C., Burlington, for appellants.
James M. Adams of Hirsch, Link, Adams, Hoth & Krekel, Burlington, for appellees.
Considered by HARRIS, P. J., and McCORMICK, ALLBEE, McGIVERIN and LARSON, JJ.
This is a family dispute over the ownership of a small farm in Des Moines County, Iowa. The question is whether title was held in trust for the parents of one of the record title holders. The trial court held it was not. On appeal the court of appeals, three to two, reversed the judgment of the trial court. On further review we vacate the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the trial court.
Plaintiffs, Howard and June King, are husband and wife and the parents of the defendant Royce King. In 1949 they purchased the farm in question with the aid of a mortgage. There is evidence that Howard King has suffered recurring mental or emotional difficulties for many years and that he may have been in a depressed state around the time of the conveyances in January 1967. Sometimes, at least, he shows poor judgment in financial matters.
In 1966, with the purchase mortgage still in part outstanding, Howard incurred a substantial second mortgage in order to invest in an oil venture. As they often do, the oil venture went awry and Howard and June were left heavily in debt and unable to obtain further financing. On January 20, 1967, with the encouragement of an officer of the institution holding the first mortgage, Howard and June transferred the farm to June's father, Orrin Bailey, who paid them only $1 but agreed to assume the indebtedness of the farm. On the same day Bailey mortgaged the farm and paid the debts of Howard and June. Bailey told Howard and June that all income from the farm would be applied to pay the debt and that Howard and June would receive no income from the farm until the debt was paid. Bailey made no clear statement regarding what would happen when the debt was paid.
Three days later Bailey conveyed the farm to the defendant Royce King. The deed conveyed title in fee simple absolute. Royce did not make any payment for the farm but did agree to provide a rent-free home for his parents for the rest of their lives and to assume the mortgage debt incurred by Orrin Bailey.
The market value of the farm in January 1967 was $42,000. The mortgage executed by Bailey at the time he took title was in the amount of $20,000. Sometime after these transfers Orrin Bailey died. Royce and his wife Judith have permitted Howard and June to reside free of rent in a house on the farm since 1967 and have paid off the mortgage. During all the subsequent period Royce and his wife have conducted a farming operation on the land which resulted in a net loss. They have subdivided a portion of the farm and have also erected their own personal residence on the farm.
Once the mortgage was paid off Howard and June began to request that title to the portions of the farm not previously subdivided be transferred back to them. Royce and Judith refused to do so. This suit is the result. It alleges that Royce and Judith held title only in trust for the benefit of Howard and June.
Evidence offered by Royce and Judith at trial included a letter written by June sometime after commencement of this action. In this letter June discussed the family quarrel at some length and said:
At the close of plaintiffs' evidence the trial court sustained defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds the plaintiffs had not met their burden to prove existence of a trust. The trial court stated there was no evidence that Royce had been in a position to exercise trust and confidence over his parents in order to benefit himself. The trial court felt that Orrin Bailey had enjoyed the trust and confidence of Howard and June but found no evidence that Bailey exercised this influence for his own benefit.
I. We feel obliged to note again that we disapprove of the practice of moving for or, ordinarily, sustaining a motion to dismiss in an equity case.
We have pointed out that the practice of moving to dismiss an equity case at the close of plaintiff's evidence is not to be commended and is perilous procedure. If a defendant obtains a favorable ruling on his motion he precludes himself from offering testimony and may be defeated upon appeal because he did not produce the evidence which would have saved him. (Authorities.)
Amdor v. Cooney, 241 Iowa 777, 779, 43 N.W.2d 136, 138 (1950).
It is ordinarily in the interests of the parties, of the trial court, and of the appellate court for equity cases to be decided on their merits, at the close of all evidence. The additional time, effort, and expense invested in completing the trial is more than justified. It greatly reduces the likelihood of a retrial.
II. Nevertheless our review here is de novo under Iowa R.App.P. 4 because involuntary dismissal of the action operates as an adjudication on the merits. Iowa R.Civ.P. 217; Employers Mutual Casualty Company v. Hanshaw, 176 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Iowa 1970); Amdor, 241 Iowa at 779, 43 N.W.2d at 138; Coen & Conway v. Scott County Savings Bank, 205 Iowa 483, 486-87, 218 N.W. 325, 326-27 (1928). We give weight to the findings of fact of the trial court but are not bound by them. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(7). In civil cases generally the burden of proof is measured by the test of preponderance of the evidence. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(6).
This case falls under two exceptions, however, which call for a stricter standard of proof. First, under Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(12) this deed, a written instrument affecting real estate, can...
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Simpson v. Kollasch, 05-1410.
...241 Iowa 777, 784, 43 N.W.2d 136, 141 (1950)). This standard is akin to our "clear and convincing evidence" standard. See King v. King, 291 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Iowa 1980) ("Clear and convincing evidence is a standard that lies somewhere between a preponderance of evidence and evidence beyond a r......
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In the Matter of Estate of Lind, No. 9-854/09-0329 (Iowa App. 12/30/2009), 9-854/09-0329.
...N.W.2d 452, 455 (Iowa 2003). The existence of a confidential relationship must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. King v. King, 291 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Iowa 1980). Valgene and Curtis assert the change of beneficiary form on Robert's life insurance was the product of Madonna's undue infl......
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In re Marriage of Hitchcock, No. 8-436/07-1329 (Iowa App. 8/27/2008)
...for modification is de novo, because that dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.946; King v. King, 291 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Iowa 1980). We examine the entire record and adjudicate anew rights on the issues properly presented. In re Marriage of Ales, 592 N.W.2d 698......
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L.G., In Interest of
...and convincing evidence is more than a preponderance of the evidence and less than evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. King v. King, 291 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Iowa 1980). It means that there must be no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of a particular conclusion drawn from the evi......