King v. Lawson
| Decision Date | 27 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | No.: 3:14-CV-500-TAV-HBG,: 3:14-CV-500-TAV-HBG |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
| Parties | BILLIE KING and FELISHA K. MEADOWS, Plaintiffs, v. JASON LAWSON, JASON STOKES, and CITY OF CLINTON, TENNESSEE, Defendants. |
This civil action is before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) [Doc. 3]. Plaintiffs Billie King and Felisha Meadows responded in opposition [Doc. 11], and defendants replied [Doc. 12]. Having considered the pleadings, the parties' arguments, and relevant law, the Court will GRANT defendants' motion.
Plaintiffs' claims stem from a traffic stop in Clinton, Tennessee, on October 28, 2013 [Doc. 1 ¶ 8]. Plaintiff Meadows was driving a 2007 Ford, which "belonged to both" her and plaintiff King, when she was stopped by defendant officers Jason Lawson and Jason Stokes [Id. ¶¶ 8, 10]. Ms. Meadows "was forcibly detained in handcuffs," and as a result of the stop, Officer Lawson seized the vehicle, completed a "notice of property seizure and forfeiture of conveyances," and provided Ms. Meadows with a copy of the notice [Id. ¶¶ 9-12]. Sevenworking days after the seizure, a forfeiture warrant was issued that did not list plaintiff King as a co-owner of the vehicle [Id. ¶¶ 16-18; Doc. 1-3]. The judge found probable cause that plaintiffs' vehicle was used or intended to be used to facilitate the transportation, sale, or receipt of drugs, and ordered that the property be held until the Tennessee Department of Safety could legally dispose of the property [See Doc. 1-3].
Ms. Meadows wrote a letter to the Legal Division of the Department of Safety, "as directed in said seizure," requesting a hearing [Id. ¶ 13]. She stated that she thinks her car was wrongfully seized because she was not charged with anything and nothing related to narcotics was found in her car [Doc. 1-1]. The Department of Safety responded, thirty days after the seizure, advising Ms. Meadows that the department did not have a seizure notice concerning her property and that she would be mailed a petition for hearing once a number is assigned to her case [Doc. 1 ¶ 14; Doc. 1-2].
Each plaintiff thereafter received a letter from the Department of Safety, dated December 16, 2013, that stated, "[a] forfeiture warrant has been issued against property in which you have been identified as having an interest" [Doc. 1-4]. It informed plaintiffs why their vehicle had been seized, and it stated that the vehicle "will be forfeited and subject to public sale or other lawful disposition after thirty (30) days from receipt of this notice unless any claimant to the seized goods shall file . . . a claim in writing stating his interest in the seized goods and requesting a hearing . . . ." [Id.].
Plaintiffs claim these letters were untimely; that their vehicle was eventually released to ORNL Federal Credit Union, who was a lienholder on the vehicle; and that ORNL sold the vehicle and now seeks a deficiency from plaintiffs [Doc. 1 ¶¶ 20-21].And plaintiff Meadows alleges she lost her job because the seized vehicle was her means of transportation to and from work [Id. ¶ 23].
Plaintiffs request compensatory and punitive damages for their losses. They argue the seizure and its aftermath amount to violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fourteenth Amendment's right to due process, the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, and the Tennessee Constitution.
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth a liberal pleading standard. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 576 n.1 (6th Cir. 2004). It requires only "'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but a party's "obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in original) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the complaint contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. In doing so, the Court "construe[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept[s] its allegations as true, and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679 (citation omitted).
In support of their motion to dismiss, defendants make three principal arguments: that due process and § 1983 claims cannot be premised on a state actor's violation of state law; that plaintiffs have not pled how their property was taken for "public use"; and that there is no private right of action for damages under the Tennessee Constitution.
Plaintiffs allege defendants violated Tennessee Code § 40-33-204(b) by applying for a forfeiture warrant seven working days after the seizure, two days after the time allowed, and by not stating with specificity the officer's probable cause for believing that the co-owner of the property knew the property was being used in a manner making itsubject to forfeiture [See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 16-18 ()]. Based on these alleged failures to comply with the Tennessee statute, plaintiffs claim defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and their right of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution [Doc. 1 ¶¶ 26, 31].
But § 1983 is limited to deprivations of federal statutory and constitutional rights, and does not cover official conduct that allegedly violates state law. Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 887 F.2d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 1989). In Huron, for example, the Sixth Circuit held, to the extent the plaintiffs claimed the state defendants negligently failed to follow established state procedures and law, "Daniels would control and it was appropriate to relegate plaintiffs to a remedy under state law." Id. at 714, 716 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986)). In Daniels, the Supreme Court concluded "the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property." 474 U.S. at 328 (emphasis in original).1 Although defendants are a municipality and its police officers, they are state actors within the meaning of § 1983. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) () (emphasis in original); Savage v. City of Pontiac, 743F. Supp. 2d 678, 683 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (). Therefore, there has been no violation of § 1983 or due process here. See Neinast v. Bd. of Trs. of Columbus Metro. Library, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1047-48 (S.D. Ohio 2002) ().
Plaintiffs, moreover, have not pled that Tennessee does not provide an adequate state remedy for improper forfeiture of property. See Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1065-66 (6th Cir. 1983) (); Huron, 887 F.2d at 713-16 (); see also Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 ().
Tennessee provides owners of seized property the opportunity for a hearing prior to final forfeiture. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) () (emphasis in original). Within thirty days ofbeing notified that a forfeiture warrant has issued, any person asserting a claim to the seized property may file a written claim requesting a hearing, and the applicable agency shall, within thirty days, establish a hearing date. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-33-206 to -207. The state has the burden of proof at the hearing with regard to all parties claiming an interest in the property, the case is heard by a...
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