Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio

• Decision Date: 05 August 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-3399.,03-3399.
• Citation: Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004)
• Parties: Jimmie L. SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF SALEM, OHIO, Thomas Eastek, Walter Greenamyer, Brooke Zellers, Larry D. DeJane, James A. Armeni, Joseph Julian, and Harry Dugan, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

378 F.3d 566

Jimmie L. SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.CITY OF SALEM, OHIO, Thomas Eastek, Walter Greenamyer, Brooke Zellers, Larry D. DeJane, James A. Armeni, Joseph Julian, and Harry Dugan, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 03-3399.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: March 19, 2004.

Decided and Filed August 5, 2004.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Economus, J.

Randi A. Barnabee(briefed), Deborah A. Smith & Company, Northfield, OH, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Aretta K. Bernard(briefed), Roetzel & Andress, Akron, OH, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before COLE and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; SCHWARZER, Senior District Judge.^*

AMENDED OPINION

COLE, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-AppellantJimmie L. Smith appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio dismissing his claims against his employer, Defendant-AppellantCity of Salem, Ohio, and various City officials, and granting judgment on the pleadings to Defendants, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).Smith, who considers himself a transsexual and has been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder, alleged that Defendants discriminated against him in his employment on the basis of sex.He asserted claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and42 U.S.C. § 1983.The district court dismissed those claims pursuant to Rule 12(c).Smith also asserted state law claims for invasion of privacy and civil conspiracy; the district court dismissed those claims as well, having declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over them.

For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.BACKGROUND

In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), we construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept the complaint's factual inferences as true.Ziegler v. IBP Hog Market, Inc.,249 F.3d 509, 511-12(6th Cir.2001).The following facts are drawn from Smith's complaint.

Smith is — and has been, at all times relevant to this action — employed by the city of Salem, Ohio, as a lieutenant in the Salem Fire Department(the "Fire Department").Prior to the events surrounding this action, Smith worked for the Fire Department for seven years without any negative incidents.Smith — biologically and by birth a male — is a transsexual and has been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder ("GID"), which the American Psychiatric Association characterizes as a disjunction between an individual's sexual organs and sexual identity.American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 576-582 (4th ed.2000).After being diagnosed with GID, Smith began "expressing a more feminine appearance on a full-time basis" — including at work — in accordance with international medical protocols for treating GID.Soon thereafter, Smith's co-workers began questioning him about his appearance and commenting that his appearance and mannerisms were not "masculine enough."As a result, Smith notified his immediate supervisor, DefendantThomas Eastek, about his GID diagnosis and treatment.He also informed Eastek of the likelihood that his treatment would eventually include complete physical transformation from male to female.Smith had approached Eastek in order to answer any questions Eastek might have concerning his appearance and manner and so that Eastek could address Smith's co-workers' comments and inquiries.Smith specifically asked Eastek, and Eastek promised, not to divulge the substance of their conversation to any of his superiors, particularly to DefendantWalter Greenamyer, Chief of the Fire Department.In short order, however, Eastek told Greenamyer about Smith's behavior and his GID.

Greenamyer then met with DefendantC. Brooke Zellers, the Law Director for the City of Salem, with the intention of using Smith's transsexualism and its manifestations as a basis for terminating his employment.On April 18, 2001, Greenamyer and Zellers arranged a meeting of the City's executive body to discuss Smith and devise a plan for terminating his employment.The executive body included DefendantsLarry D. DeJane, Salem's mayor; James A. Armeni, Salem's auditor; and Joseph S. Julian, Salem's service director.Also present was Salem Safety Director Henry L. Willard, now deceased, who was never a named defendant in this action.

Although Ohio Revised Code § 121.22(G) — which sets forth the state procedures pursuant to which Ohio municipal officials may meet to take employment action against a municipal employee — provides that officials "may hold an executive session to consider the appointment, employment dismissal, discipline, promotion, demotion, or compensation of a public employee only after a majority of a quorum of the public body determines, by a roll call vote, to hold an executive session and only at a regular or special meeting for the sole purpose of [considering such matters]," the City did not abide by these procedures at the April 18, 2001 meeting.

During the meeting, Greenamyer, DeJane, and Zellers agreed to arrange for the Salem Civil Service Commission to require Smith to undergo three separate psychological evaluations with physicians of the City's choosing.They hoped that Smith would either resign or refuse to comply.If he refused to comply, Defendants reasoned, they could terminate Smith's employment on the ground of insubordination.Willard, who remained silent during the meeting, telephoned Smith afterwards to inform him of the plan, calling Defendants' scheme a "witch hunt."

Two days after the meeting, on April 20, 2001, Smith's counsel telephoned DeJane to advise him of Smith's legal representation and the potential legal ramifications for the City if it followed through on the plan devised by Defendants during the April 18 meeting.On April 22, 2001, Smith received his "right to sue" letter from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission("EEOC").Four days after that, on April 26, 2001, Greenamyer suspended Smith for one twenty-four hour shift, based on his alleged infraction of a City and/or Fire Department policy.

At a subsequent hearing before the Salem Civil Service Commission(the "Commission") regarding his suspension, Smith contended that the suspension was a result of selective enforcement in retaliation for his having obtained legal representation in response to Defendants' plan to terminate his employment because of his transsexualism and its manifestations.At the hearing, Smith sought to elicit testimony from witnesses regarding the meeting of April 18, 2001, but the City objected and the Commission's chairman, DefendantHarry Dugan, refused to allow any testimony regarding the meeting, despite the fact that Ohio Administrative Code § 124-9-11 permitted Smith to introduce evidence of disparate treatment and selective enforcement in his hearing before the Commission.

The Commission ultimately upheld Smith's suspension.Smith appealed to the Columbiana County Court of Common Pleas, which reversed the suspension, finding that "[b]ecause the regulation [that Smith was alleged to have violated] was not effective[,][Smith] could not be charged with violation of it."

Smith then filed suit in the federal district court.In his complaint, he asserted Title VII claims of sex discrimination and retaliation, along with claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims of invasion of privacy and civil conspiracy.In a Memorandum Opinion and Order dated February 26, 2003, the district court dismissed the federal claims and granted judgment on the pleadings to Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).The district judge also dismissed the state law claims without prejudice, having declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

II.ANALYSIS

On appeal, Smith contends that the district court erred in holding that: (1)he failed to state a claim of sex stereotyping; (2)Title VII protection is unavailable to transsexuals; (3) even if he had stated a claim of sex stereotyping, he failed to demonstrate that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4)he failed to state a claim based on the deprivation of a constitutional or federal statutory right, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(c).Grindstaff v. Green,133 F.3d 416, 421(6th Cir.1998).A motion for judgment on the pleadings shall be granted only where, construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accepting all of its factual allegations as true, the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claims that would entitle him to relief.Id.(citation omitted).

A.Title VII

The parties disagree over two issues pertaining to Smith's Title VII claims: (1) whether Smith properly alleged a claim of sex stereotyping, in violation of the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268(1989); and (2) whether Smith alleged that he suffered an adverse employment action.

Defendants do not challenge Smith's complaint with respect to any of the other elements necessary to establish discrimination and retaliation claims pursuant to Title VII.In any event, we affirmatively find that Smith has made out a prima facie case for both claims.To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII, Smith must show that: (1)he is a member of a protected class; (2)he suffered an adverse employment action; (3)he was qualified for the position in question; and (4)he was treated differently from similarly situated individuals outside of his protected class.Perry v. McGinnis,209 F.3d 597, 601(6th Cir.2000).Smith is a member of a protected class....