King v. McAllister Bros., Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 January 1987 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 86-0148-BH. |
| Parties | Edward L. KING, Plaintiff, v. McALLISTER BROTHERS, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
Richard F. Pate, Mobile, Ala., for plaintiff.
Joseph M. Allen, Jr., Thomas S. Rue, Mobile, Ala., for defendants.
This cause is before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficiency of service of process. Plaintiff, Edward L. King, was employed as the captain of the tug GAVIOTA, which was allegedly owned, operated, chartered, managed, or controlled by the defendants. Defendants include McAllister Brothers, Inc., McAllister Towing and Transportation Company, Panama Tug Services, and Petroterminal de Panama, S.A., all of which are foreign corporations. On June 3, 1984, plaintiff was injured when he fell from a ladder on the GAVIOTA, purportedly suffering severe and permanent injuries to his left leg. The injury occurred in the territorial waters of Panama. Plaintiff brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, seeking relief under the Jones Act and general maritime law. Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the action, pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for lack of personal jurisdiction and for insufficiency of service of process.
Personal jurisdiction in diversity cases normally turns on whether the defendants have sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state to satisfy the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); Terry v. Raymond International, Inc., 658 F.2d 398, 401 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928, 102 S.Ct. 1975, 72 L.Ed.2d 443 (1982). See generally, 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1075 (1969). Amenability to a federal court's jurisdiction in federal question cases, however, is governed by the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Handley v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 732 F.2d 1265, 1271 (6th Cir.1984); Lapeyrouse v. Texaco, Inc., 693 F.2d 581, 585 (5th Cir. 1982); Burstein v. State Bar of California, 693 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir.1982); DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 283 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085, 102 S.Ct. 642, 70 L.Ed.2d 620 (1981); Hartley v. Sioux City and New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 379 F.2d 354, 356 (3d Cir.1967). Nevertheless, most courts in federal question cases have continued to apply fourteenth amendment standards by analogy and have required the existence of minimum contacts with the states in which the district courts were sitting. See, e.g., Handley, 732 F.2d at 1272; DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1269-72 (5th Cir.1983); Lapeyrouse, 693 F.2d at 586-89; Burstein, 693 F.2d at 517-23; Terry, 658 F.2d at 403; DeJames, 654 F.2d at 284; Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 212 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1954); Colon v. Gulf Trading Co., 609 F.Supp. 1469 (D. Puerto Rico 1985); Vest v. Waring, 565 F.Supp. 674, 694 (N.D.Ga. 1983); Gutierrez v. Raymond International, Inc., 484 F.Supp. 241 (S.D.Tex. 1979).
The Fifth Circuit has held that, when service of process in a federal question case is made pursuant to state law through Rule 4(e) or 4(d)(7)1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal court can exercise jurisdiction only if a state court in that state could have exercised jurisdiction. DeMelo, 711 F.2d at 1269; Burstein, 693 F.2d at 517. In other words, fourteenth amendment due process standards must be applied and minimum contacts must be found with the state in which the federal court is sitting.
The minimum contacts requirement must be met regardless of which provision of Rule 4 is utilized to serve process. The Burstein court noted that Rule 4(e) was designed to provide for service on parties who are not residents of the forum state, and that Rule 4(e), by negative implication, precludes the use of the provisions of Rule 4(d) to serve nonresident parties. Burstein, 693 F.2d at 514-15. Rule 4(e) requires that service under state law be made "under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule." Since a state court's jurisdiction would be limited by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, a federal court relying on state rules for service of process through Rule 4(e) must be subject to the same limitations. Burstein, 693 F.2d at 514.
The DeMelo court concluded that Rule 4(d)(7) might provide an alternative method of service of process on nonresident defendants. DeMelo, 711 F.2d at 1267-68. The court also concluded, however, that the "under the circumstances" requirement of Rule 4(e) could not be circumvented by relying on Rule 4(d)(7). Id. Thus, minimum contacts with the forum state are necessary when service of process on nonresident defendants is being made under state rules through Rule 4(d)(7).
Finally, Rule 4(d)(3) cannot be used to circumvent the requirements of Rule 4(e). Rule 4(d)(3) provides for service on corporations and partnerships. The court in DeJames held that Rule 4(d)(3) can be used only when service is affected within the territorial limits of the forum state. DeJames, 654 F.2d at 287. Additionally, it is generally held that Rule 4(d)(3) cannot be used by federal courts to establish a federal standard of amenability to suit independent of Rule 4(d)(7). See Arrowsmith v. United Press International, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir.1963). See generally 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, at 305-10.
The plaintiff argues that, because fifth amendment due process standards apply in federal question cases, minimum contacts should be measured against the United States rather than the state in which the district court is sitting. A number of courts have adopted this theory, which is generally referred to as the "aggregate contacts" theory. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir.1981); Texas Trading v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 314 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148, 102 S.Ct. 1012, 71 L.Ed.2d 301 (1982); Clement v. Pehar, 575 F.Supp. 436, 438 (N.D.Ga.1983); Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 560 F.Supp. 869, 870 (E.D. Pa.1983); Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F.Supp. 287, 290 (D.Conn.1975); Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F.Supp. 354, 357 (W.D.Mich.1973); Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F.Supp. 381, 390 (S.D.Ohio 1967); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1237-39 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893, 102 S.Ct. 388, 70 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). See generally 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, § 1075 at 177-79 (West Supp.1985). Some of these cases, however, can be distinguished insofar as they involve federal statutes that authorize nationwide service of process. See Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d at 253 (Federal Trade Commission Act); Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 308 (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Clement, 575 F.Supp. at 438 (RICO). Moreover, as demonstrated earlier, most courts have required minimum contacts with the forum state in federal question cases, particularly those where nationwide service of process is not authorized by statute and service is obtained pursuant to state statutes. This trend is especially true of cases involving maritime suits. See, e.g., Handley, 732 F.2d at 1272 (Jones Act); DeMelo, 711 F.2d at 1269-72 (LHWCA); Lapeyrouse, 693 F.2d at 586-89 (OCSLA, LHWCA, Jones Act, general maritime); Terry, 658 F.2d at 403 (Jones Act); DeJames, 654 F.2d at 284 (general maritime); Colon, 609 F.Supp. at 1469 (Jones Act); Gutierrez, 484 F.Supp. at 241 (Jones Act, Death on the High Seas Act); Scott v. Middle East Airlines Co., S.A., 240 F.Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y.1965) (Death on the High Seas Act). This Court intends to follow this general trend in the absence of directions to the contrary from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
Admittedly, it seems odd to allow a fourteenth amendment due process standard that is normally applicable to the states to restrict the jurisdiction of federal courts in federal question cases. In a case quite similar to the present action, however, the Third Circuit addressed this problem as follows:
The New Jersey long-arm rule is intended to extend as far as is constitutionally permissible. In enacting its long-arm rule, the state of New Jersey is limited by the due process constraints of the fourteenth amendment. Therefore, we believe that a nonresident defendant's amenability to suit in the District of New Jersey must be judged by fourteenth amendment standards. We recognize that this creates an anomalous situation because it results in a federal court in a nondiversity case being limited by the due process restrictions imposed on the states by the fourteenth amendment as opposed to those imposed on the federal government by the fifth amendment. However, it would be equally anomalous to utilize a state long-arm rule to authorize service of process on a defendant in a manner that the state body enacting the rule could not constitutionally authorize. The anomaly of a federal court being limited by the requirements of the fourteenth amendment in a nondiversity case where service must be made pursuant to a state long-arm rule could be easily rectified by congressional authorization of nationwide service of process for admiralty cases. It is not within our province to create such authorization.
DeJames, 654 F.2d at 284. This Court agrees with the Third Circuit's analysis of this situation. Therefore, in the case at bar, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants are amenable to suit in Alabama before this Court can assume jurisdiction over them in this action.
Defendants McAllister Brothers, Inc. and McAllister Towing and Transportation, Inc. were served by certified mail pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil...
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