King v. McMahon

• Decision Date: 21 October 1986
• Citation: 186 Cal.App.3d 648,230 Cal.Rptr. 911
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Keith KING, Jr., et al., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Linda McMAHON, Director Department of Social Services, State of California, et al., Defendants and Appellants. A029065.

Page 911

230 Cal.Rptr. 911

186 Cal.App.3d 648

Keith KING, Jr., et al., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Linda McMAHON, Director Department of Social Services, State of California, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

A029065.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

Oct. 21, 1986.

Review Denied Jan. 15, 1987.

Phyllis E. Andelin, Mill Valley, Elizabeth R. Arnold, Contra Costa Legal Services Foundation, Richmond, Tricia Berke Vinson, San Mateo County Legal Aid Soc., Redwood City, for plaintiffs and respondents.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen. Stephanie Wald, Deputy Atty. Gen. San Francisco, for defendants and appellants.

KLINE, Presiding Justice.

The California Department of Social Services (Department) appeals the grant of summary judgment enjoining the denial of state foster care benefits to foster children living with relatives, while granting benefits to foster children living with non-relatives. The court below held that the denial of such benefits deprived plaintiff children of the equal protection of the laws in violation of article I, section 7, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution.

Applying strict scrutiny to the challenged classification, the court determined it was unnecessary to further a compelling state interest. For reasons presently set forth, we determine that strict judicial scrutiny is unwarranted because the classification at issue neither designates a suspect class nor impinges upon a fundamental interest. Further, we find that the classification is rationally calculated to achieve a legitimate state purpose. Consequently,

we conclude that the challenged program comports with the requirements of equal protection.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs-Respondents are children placed in foster care with relatives and denied certain financial benefits by the state, and their related foster parents. In October 1981, plaintiffs, for themselves and on behalf of others similarly situated, sued the Department through its Director in his official capacity. ¹ On May 17, 1984, plaintiffs moved for a peremptory writ and partial summary judgment. On August 14, 1984, the trial court issued its statement of decision finding the state foster care program invalid insofar as it excluded from eligibility foster children placed with related foster parents. On September 4, 1984, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for peremptory writ and partial summary judgment. A timely appeal by the Department followed.

I.

The foster care program is part of the program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") ² authorized in 42 U.S.C., section 601 et seq. ³

The purpose of the AFDC program is to encourage the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives. (42 U.S.C. § 601.) AFDC-FC payments are greater than basic AFDC, upon a recognition that foster children have greater needs and foster care is more costly than care for children in the parental home. (See Ramos v. Montgomery (S.D.Cal.1970) 313 F.Supp. 1179, 1181-1182, affd., 400 U.S. 1003, 91 S.Ct. 572, 27 L.Ed.2d 618.)

California's program for foster care benefits is really two programs: one involving the use of federal funds, the other financed by the state alone. The state defines foster care as "24-hour out-of-home care provided to children whose own families are unable or unwilling to care for them, and who are in need of temporary or long-term substitute parenting." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11400, subd. (e).)

The first of the two foster care programs is the joint federal-state foster care program ("federal program"), partially funded by the federal government and administered by the state. ⁴ To be eligible for foster care benefits under the federal program the child must have been receiving or eligible for "AFDC-FG" (family group) or "AFDC-U" (unemployment) prior to foster care placement. (42 U.S.C. § 672.) In addition, basic eligibility requirements under the federal program mandate that (1) the child be removed from the home of parent or guardian by a judicial determination that continuation in the home would be contrary to the welfare of the child; (2) the placement and care of the child is the responsibility of the state or county welfare agency and (3) the child is in a foster home or institution as a result of the judicial determination. (42 U.S.C. § 672; MPP 45-202.) The federal program, which prescribes payment to relatives equal to that received by non-relatives, is not at issue here.

For foster children who do not meet federal criteria, California has its own foster care program funded entirely by the state. ⁵ To be eligible under the state program, the child must meet all general AFDC requirements (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11250) plus one of the following criteria: (1) the child has been properly relinquished for adoption or a petition to terminate parental rights has been granted; or (2) the child is living with a non-related legal guardian in an approved home; or (3) the child was placed with a non-relative by a court order or under certain written voluntary agreements. Pursuant to the state statute challenged in this case, the child is ineligible for state benefits if placed with foster parents to whom he or she is related. ⁶ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11402, subd. (a), see also, Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 11401, subd. (b)(3); 11402, subds. (b) and (d); 11405; MPP 45-203.21.) The state program allows foster care payments to a child placed with relatives only if the child is otherwise eligible to receive payments under the federal program. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11402, subd. (a).)

State foster care eligibility provisions are much broader than those of the federal program. In other words, despite the denial of benefits to foster children living with relatives, many categories of recipients that would not be covered under any other AFDC program are covered under state AFDC-FC. ⁷

II.

The decision of the federal district court in Youakim v. Miller (N.D.Ill.E.D., 1974) 374 F.Supp. 1204, reversed and remanded, 425 U.S. 231, 96 S.Ct. 1399, 47 L.Ed.2d 701 and the related decision of the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Youakim (1979) 440 U.S. 125, 99 S.Ct. 957, 59 L.Ed.2d 194 are pertinent to our analysis and warrant brief description at the outset. The plaintiffs in Youakim v. Miller, supra, challenged an Illinois statute denying foster care benefits to children living with related foster parents and, as here, claimed a denial of equal protection of the laws. A three judge district court found no equal protection violation as it determined that the statutory classification was subject to the rational basis test and was rationally related to the overall purpose of Illinois' child welfare legislation. (Id., at pp. 1208-1210.) While this decision was being appealed, the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) issued an interpretation of the federal AFDC-FC statutes to the effect that children cared for by related foster parents were meant to be treated no differently from children whose foster parents were unrelated. In light of that administrative interpretation, the United States Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court to consider whether the Illinois statute was inconsistent with the Social Security Act. (See Miller v. Youakim, supra, 440 U.S. 125, 132, 99 S.Ct. 957, 962, 59 L.Ed.2d 194.) When the case eventually returned to the Supreme Court it held the Illinois statute inconsistent with the federal standards for AFDC-FC eligibility set forth in the Social Security Act and the HEW regulations interpreting that Act. (Id., at p. 135, 99 S.Ct. at p. 964.) Due to resolution of the case on this statutory basis it was unnecessary or the Supreme Court to address the equal protection issue.

After the decision in Miller v. Youakim, the California Department of Social Services concluded that the state must extend benefits to children living with relatives if the children were eligible for federal foster care benefits but that state benefits could be denied if the children did not meet the federal eligibility criteria.

By classifying foster children living with relatives as ineligible under the wholly state-financed program (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11402), the California Legislature has mandated the different treatment challenged in this action. In challenging this classification plaintiffs claim that the denial of state benefits to foster children living with relatives is neither necessary to serve a compelling state interest nor rationally based, and thus denies them equal protection of the laws.

III.

"The guarantees of equal protection embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution 'compel[ ] recognition of the proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment.' (Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State of Calif. (1969) 71 Cal.2d 566, 578 [79 Cal.Rptr. 77, 456 P.2d 645] ...; Reed v. Reed (1971) 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 [92 S.Ct. 251, 253-254, 30 L.Ed.2d 225]....) 'This principle, of course, does not preclude the state from drawing any distinctions between different groups of individuals, but does require that, at a minimum, classifications which are created bear a rational relationship to a legitimate public purpose.' (In re King (1971 [1970] ) 3 Cal.3d 226, 232 [90 Cal.Rptr. 15, 474 P.2d 983]....) However, this deferential standard is inapplicable ' "in cases involving 'suspect classifications' or touching on 'fundamental interests'...." ' (Ibid.) In such cases, 'the state bears the burden of establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law but that distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose.' (Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 784-785 [87 Cal.Rptr. 839, 471 P.2d 487]....)" (Darces v. Woods (1984) 35...