King v. Phelps Dunbar, LLP
| Decision Date | 04 June 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-C-1805.,98-C-1805. |
| Citation | 743 So.2d 181 |
| Parties | Danatus Norman KING v. PHELPS DUNBAR, L.L.P., Danny Shaw, Harry Rosenberg and Roy Cheatwood. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Danatus Norman King, Ike Spears, Sonja Melina Spears, Spears & Spears, New Orleans, Counsel for Applicant.
Ellis Baker Murov, Robert Emmett Kerrigan, Jr., Charles Frederick Seeman, II, Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, New Orleans, Harry Alston Johnson, III, Counsel for Respondent.
We granted certiorari in this case to review the Court of Appeal's decision dismissing Plaintiffs claims for racial discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of earning capacity, and damage to reputation. Plaintiff contends the Court of Appeal erred in dismissing his claims against the individual defendants, Roy Cheatwood, Harry Rosenberg, and Danny Shaw, on summary judgment; and in dismissing his claims for racial discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Phelps Dunbar, L.L.P. and the individual defendants on an exception of prescription. Because we conclude the exception of prescription should have been referred to the merits, we vacate that portion of the Court of Appeal's decision and remand the matter for trial on the merits. The summary judgment dismissal of the claims against the individual defendants is affirmed.
Plaintiff, Danatus Norman King is an African-American attorney who was employed by Defendant, Phelps Dunbar, L.L.P., as an associate in the commercial litigation section from 1990 to 1995. While in the commercial litigation section, he was supervised by the individual defendants, Roy Cheatwood, Harry Rosenberg, and Danny Shaw. Mr. King alleges that he was assigned to work on the files of Defendant's African-American clients and that he was asked to transfer to the tort and insurance section of the firm because of his race. According to Mr. King's pleadings, most cases in the tort and insurance section were tried before predominately African-American jurors in the Civil District Court for Orleans Parish and Defendant wanted him to be the firm's black face in that venue. He also alleges that the transfer request was prompted by pressure on the Defendant from the New Orleans Aviation Board's general counsel to hire African-American attorneys for the tort and insurance section and have those attorneys work Aviation Board files. Mr. King claims that his refusal to be transferred led to a hostile work environment and retaliatory tactics such as unwarranted criticism of his work, refusal to grant work assignments to him, and accusations of his being too sensitive to racial matters. Mr. King alleges that the refusal to grant work assignments caused him to beg for assignments from other associates, even junior associates, and had an adverse effect upon his income because he was unable to bill hours. On January 20, 1995, Mr. King underwent an associate evaluation with two of the three individual defendants, Roy Cheatwood and Harry Rosenberg. During this evaluation, he was informed that his chances of becoming a partner were nonexistent and that he should consider a career change. Mr. King was not terminated following this evaluation. He remained employed as an associate by the Defendant, and he alleges that the hostility of his work environment increased. He contends that the allegedly hostile work environment became unbearable to him and on March 10, 1995 he tendered his resignation to be effective March 24, 1995. The firm accepted and confirmed his resignation in a letter signed by Roy Cheatwood, a general partner and one of the individual defendants.
Mr. King filed the instant action on March 11, 1996 claiming racial discrimination under La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 23:1006 and La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 51:2231 et seq., intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"), and loss of earning capacity and damage to reputation. Mr. King named as defendants, Phelps Dunbar, L.L.P. ("Phelps"), and the three partners, Roy Cheatwood, Harry Rosenberg, and Danny Shaw. The trial court rendered summary judgment dismissing Mr. King's claims against the individual defendants and granted the exception of prescription dismissing his claims against Phelps and the individual defendants.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit found no error in the summary judgment dismissal of the claims against the individual defendants. The Court determined that the individual defendants were not employers as that term is used in Louisiana employment discrimination law and that as a matter of law the plaintiff had failed to allege facts to support a claim for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. On the issue of prescription, the Court found that since Mr. King acknowledged he was constructively discharged January 20, 1995, prescription commenced on that date.2 The Court went on to conclude that the delictual nature of plaintiff's claims subjected them to a one year prescriptive period. Therefore, Mr. King's claims were prescribed when the suit was filed and the trial court was correct in granting defendants' exception of prescription. King v. Phelps Dunbar, 97-2519 (La.App. 4th Cir. 6/3/98), 716 So.2d 104. We granted Mr. King's writ application to review the correctness of these determinations. King v. Phelps Dunbar, 98-1805 (La.11/25/98), 729 So.2d 579.
Summary judgment procedure is favored in Louisiana. La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 966(A)(1). A motion for summary judgment which shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law shall be granted. La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 966(C)(1). An issue is genuine if reasonable persons could disagree. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, 93-2512 (La.7/15/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751. "If on the state of the evidence, reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for a trial on that issue." Id.
The individual defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether or not they are employers as that term is defined for the purpose of employment discrimination law under the provisions of former La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 23:1006. Employment discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, disability or national origin is presently governed by La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 23:331 to 23:334, and appellate courts are bound to adjudge a case before it in accordance with the law existing at the time of its decision. Segura v. Frank, 93-1271 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 714, 725, citing Dripps v. Dripps, 366 So.2d 544 (La.1978). Where the law has changed during the pendency of a suit and retroactive application of the new law is permissible, the new law applies on appeal. Id. The determination of whether a new law is given retroactive application is governed by La. Civ.Code Ann. art. 6, which provides:
In the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only. Procedural and interpretive laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the contrary.3
The application of La. Civ.Code Ann. art. 6 involves a two-part inquiry. First, we determine whether the legislature expressed its intent regarding retrospective or prospective application in the enactment. If the legislature did express its intent, our inquiry is complete. If not, we must determine whether the enactment is substantive, procedural, or interpretive. Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So.2d 1058, 1063 (La. 1992). La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 23:1006 to 23:1008, which governed discrimination in employment on account of race, color, religion, sex, disability, or national origin, were repealed in their entirety by Section 4 of Acts 1997, No. 1409. Section 1 of Acts 1997, No. 1409 enacted Chapter 3-A of Title 23 relative to employment discrimination and consolidated the provisions of law governing employment discrimination into one chapter. The provisions of Chapter 3-A of Title 23 create and define the rights and duties of employers and employees relative to discrimination in the workplace. Therefore, the enactment of these provisions by Acts 1997, No. 1409 is substantive and cannot be retroactively applied. Since plaintiff's suit was filed March 11, 1996, prior to the August 1, 1997 effective date of Acts 1997, No. 1409, the provisions of former La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 23:1006 govern the adjudication of this appeal.
For the purpose of employment discrimination law, La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 23:1006 utilized the definition of employer given in La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 51:2232(4) which provides: "`[e]mployer' means ... any person employing eight or more persons within the state, or any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly." Mr. King does not allege that the individual defendants are his employers, conversely, he states that Phelps Dunbar, L.L.P. is an employer within the meaning of La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 23:1006 and 51:2231 et seq. and that he was employed by Phelps. Further, the individual defendants submitted affidavits that they do not employ anyone. Based on this evidence, reasonable persons could only conclude that the individual defendants are not employers within the meaning of La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 51:2232(4). Therefore, the Court of Appeal was correct in affirming the summary judgment dismissal of the individual defendants on the issue of whether they were employers under the provisions of former La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 23:1006.
In White v. Monsanto, 585 So.2d 1205 (La.1991), we recognized a cause of action for emotional distress intentionally caused by extreme and outrageous conduct. A plaintiff seeking to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress must establish:
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