King v. Ramirez
| Decision Date | 11 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:18-cv-00769-LJO-SKO |
| Parties | DAVID KING, Plaintiff, v. LORRAINE RAMIREZ, SHIRLEY BEERS, TINA PHETPHOUVONG, MARY DALOS, and FRESNO DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
(Doc. 1)
On June 6, 2018, Plaintiff David King, proceeding pro se, filed a civil complaint against Defendants Lorraine Ramirez, in her "official capacity" as a "Social Worker Emergency Response Unit Specialist"; Shirley Beers, in her "official capacity" as a "Social Worker III Court Specialist"; Tina Phetphouvong, in her "official capacity" as a "Social Worker Reunification Specilist [sic]"; Mary Dolas1, in her "official capacity" as a "Magistrat [sic] Juvenile Dependency Judge"; and "Fresno Department of Social Services." (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff purports to allege causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") for violations of his rights to due process and equal protection of the laws and for negligence under California law. (Id. at 3, 5, 8-9.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $333,333.00. (Id. at 6, 8.)
Plaintiff's complaint is now before the Court for screening. The Court finds Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim, but may be able to correct the deficiencies in his pleading. Thus, Plaintiff is provided the pleading and legal standards for his claims and is granted leave to file a first amended complaint.
In cases where the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to screen each case, and shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue, or the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
The Court's screening of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) is governed by the following standards. A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a claim for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff must allege a minimum factual and legal basis for each claim that is sufficient to give each defendant fair notice of what plaintiff's claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See, e.g., Brazil v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995); McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint must contain "a short and plainstatement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). Moreover, since plaintiff is appearing pro se, the Court must construe the allegations of the Complaint liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). "[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).
Further, See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ) (internal citations omitted)
Plaintiff's complaint is not a model of clarity. However, it appears that the gist of the allegations is that his Plaintiff's due process and equal protection rights were violated by the failureto "summon[]" him, a non-resident of California, to "appear before the Team Decision Making Meeting Staffing" on October 9, 2014, after which a "Detention Hearing and Proceeding" was held on October 14, 2014, that resulted in a "decision" by the "lower court judge" not to place Plaintiff's son in his custody. (See Doc. 1.) Plaintiff appears to allege that on February 2, 2017, a juvenile dependency hearing occurred before Defendant Dolas that resulted the termination of Plaintiff's parental rights. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that these acts violated his rights of due process and equal protection of the laws and amounted to negligence. He claims "pain and suffering" and seeks $333,333.00.
None of the claims alleged relate to any specific defendant, nor are the claims alleged against all Defendants. Several of the defendants named are not identified in Plaintiff's allegations, and it is unclear what claims Plaintiffs are seeking to assert against those Defendants. It is therefore impossible to discern what claims are being made against which defendants and what facts support those claims. Plaintiff fails to clearly set forth the specific facts that support the specific claims against the specific Defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requiring a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Plaintiff, however, is provided the pleading requirements, the standards for claims for the rights he asserts have been violated, and leave to file a first amended complaint.
Plaintiff names as a defendant Mary Dolas, a judicial officer who presides over juvenile dependency proceedings in the Fresno County Superior Court. State court judges are "absolutely immune from liability for acts 'done by them in the exercise of their judicial functions.'" Miller v. Davis, 521 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 2008) ); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978). "[J]udicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Whether an act by a judge is a judicial one relates to (1) the nature and function of the act and not the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to (2) theexpectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). Factors that bear on whether a particular act is judicial include whether (1) the precise act is a normal judicial function, (2) the events occurred in the judge's chambers, (3) the controversy centered on a case then pending before the judge, and (4) the events arose directly and immediately out of a confrontation with the judge in his or her official capacity. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001). "A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction.'" Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57.
Although the complaint is vague, it appears Plaintiff is attempting to state a claim against Defendant Dolas in her "official capacity," based solely on that judge's participation in juvenile dependency proceedings as a judicial officer. (See Doc. 1 at 3, 5.) That sort of claim is barred, and the Court discerns no allegation of specific conduct that falls outside the scope of judicial immunity. Thus, there is no cognizable claim stated against Defendant Dolas.
Plaintiff purports to allege claims against Defendants Ramirez, Beers, and Phetphouvong in their "official capacities" as social workers with the Fresno County Department of Social Services. (See Doc. 1 at 2-3.)
Social workers are absolutely immune from civil liability for claims concerning their "discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial decisions to institute court dependency proceedings to take custody away from parents." Beltran v. Santa Clara Cty., 514 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) ); see also Meyers v. Contra Costa Cty. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987). The immunity "covers the official activities of social workers only when they perform quasi-prosecutorial or quasi-judicial functions in juvenile dependency court." Hardwick v. Cty. of Orange, 844 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2017). Social workers may have absolute...
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