King v. Sermonis
| Decision Date | 09 June 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. F--301--71,No. S--14--71,No. W--80--72,S--14--71,F--301--71,W--80--72 |
| Citation | 481 S.W.2d 652 |
| Parties | B. E. KING, Commissioner of Highways, and the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Department of Highways (), Appellants, v. Albert D. SERMONIS, Appellee. DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES (), Appellant, v. Homer HALL, Appellee. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS of Kentucky et al. (), Appellants, v. Truby CORNETT et al., Appellees. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Carl T. Miller, Jr., Department of Highways, Frankfort, Charles Speed Gray, Louisville, Phillip K. Wicker, Somerset, for B. E. King and Com. of Ky. Dept. of Highways.
William A. Young, Young & Williams, Frankfort, for Albert D. Sermonis.
James E. Boyd and James F. Perkins, Dept. of Natural Resources, Frankfort, Judith S. Boggs, Department of Mental Health, Frankfort, for Dept. of Natural Resources.
Edward F. Prichard, Jr., and James C. Hudson, Frankfort, for Homer Hall.
Bernard B. Davis, Louisville, for Dept. of Highways of Ky. and others.
Edward F. Prichard, Jr., and James C. Hudson, Frankfort, for Truby Cornett and others.
CULLEN, Commissioner.
In separate actions, three merit-system employes of departments of the state government of Kentucky, who had been discharged, obtained judgments directing their reinstatement with back pay. Each of the three judgments was appealed by the employing department, and the three appeals have been consolidated for consideration and disposition.
In each of the three cases the employe, holding a classified position, was discharged pursuant to a written statement accusing him of engaging in specified political activities in violation of KRS 18.310(3), (4) and he appealed to the Personnel Board. The board found that the discharge was without cause, in that there was a complete failure of proof of guilt of the charges, but the board found that the discharge action was not taken for any political, religious or ethnic reason. The board recommended reinstatement of the employe, but the employing department refused reinstatement. The employe then brought suit in the circuit court, against the employing department, seeking reinstatement with back pay. Being of the opinion that the requested relief was warranted on the basis of the personnel board's finding that the discharge was without cause, the circuit court granted the relief.
The primary issue on these appeals is one of statute construction. The problem arises out of an apparent conflict between KRS 18.210(17) and KRS 18.270. The former statute directs that the rules prescribed by the Commissioner of Personnel for the classified service shall provide for discharge only for cause. The latter statute, providing for appeals to the Personnel Board, states that if the board finds 'that the action complained of was taken by the appointing authority for any political, religious, or ethnic reason, the employe shall be reinstated to his former position or a position of like status and pay, without loss of pay' but 'In all other cases' the board simply may make recommendations, which the appointing authority is not required to follow. The obvious conflict between the two statutes is that KRS 18.210(17) says that a classified employe can be discharged only for cause, while KRS 18.270 appears to say that an employe in practical effect can be discharged without cause so long as the discharge is not for a political, religious or ethnic reason.
The appealing departments would have us resolve the conflict by giving precedence to KRS 18.270; they say that the part of KRS 18.270 dealing with recommendations by the Personnel Board would be completely nullified by construing KRS 18.210(17) as meaning that an employe discharged without cause is entitled to reinstatement. The trouble with that argument is, that by the same token, the provision of KRS 18.210(17) prohibiting a discharge without cause would be completely unllified by so construing KRS 18.270 as to permit an employe effectively to be discharged without cause.
The purpose of the merit-system statutes is stated in KRS 18.120 to be 'to establish for the state a system of personnel administration based on merit principles and scientific methods governing the * * * removal * * * of its civil employes * * *.' The provision of KRS 18.210(17) that employes may be discharged only for cause is fully consistent with the stated purpose of the law. If KRS 18.270 is construed to mean that employes can in practical effect be discharged without cause, it flatly violates the purpose of the law. In that situation, the construction that will accomplish the purpose of the law should be adopted. See Chilton...
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Yanero v. Davis, 1999-SC-0871-DG.
...the plain, unmistakable meaning of the statute is a partial waiver of governmental immunity." Id. at 222.); see also King v. Sermonis, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 652, 655 (1972); Carter v. Pfannenschmidt, Ky., 467 S.W.2d 777, 778 (1971); Cullinan v. Jefferson County, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 407, 410 (1967). I......
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...have also found that statutory schemes conferring rights to citizens imply a waiver of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., King v. Sermonis, 481 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Ky.App.1972) (statute requiring Department of Highways to reinstate employee with back pay implicitly waives sovereign immunity to tha......
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McMaster v. Cabinet for Human Resources
...opinions interpreting the statute make it clear that the words are synonyms. See Goss v. Personnel Board, supra; see also King v. Sermonis, 481 S.W.2d 652 (Ky.1972). Thus, the sometime use of the word "charges" in the regulations does not convert the dismissal letter of the appointing autho......