King v. State
| Decision Date | 13 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-6 |
| Citation | 153 N.E.3d 324 |
| Parties | Tyson Daishan KING, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorney for Appellant: Alexander L. Hoover, Law Office of Christopher G. Walter, P.C., Nappanee, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Myriam Serrano, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] Tyson Daishan King appeals his conviction of Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended.1 He presents two issues on appeal which we consolidate and restate as whether the State presented sufficient evidence that King committed Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended. We reverse.
[2] At approximately 11:30 a.m. on October 24, 2018, Indiana State Police Trooper Jonathan Hart pulled King over for driving seventy miles per hour in a fifty mile per hour speed zone. When Trooper Hart ran King's driver's license through the Indiana State Police Region 6 dispatch database, he received a report that indicated King's license was suspended for failure to pay child support. King claimed he had no knowledge of the suspension, but Trooper Hart issued a summons for King to appear in court.
[3] On November 15, 2018, the State charged King with Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended and Class C infraction speeding,2 and the case proceeded to a bench trial on October 30, 2019. The State presented evidence that the BMV sent a Notice of Suspension to King's last known address on July 31, 2018. In addition, the State presented a certified copy of King's driving record from the BMV, which outlined that King was suspended effective "8/30/2018" with an expiration date of "10/24/2018." (State's Exhibit 2 & 3.) During trial Trooper Hart testified that when he ran King's driver's license on the day of the traffic stop, the BMV report he received from Region 6 indicated that King was "suspended effective 2018/08/30 indefinite, for child support." (Tr. Vol. II at 13.)
[4] On December 3, 2019, the trial court issued its order entering convictions on both counts for King, but it amended that order on December 5, 2019, to correct the amount of court costs. In its amended order, the trial court referenced the BMV manual, which defines the meaning of expiration as "the date the suspension ends." (App. Vol. II. at 63.) During King's trial, the trial court also recognized that the certified BMV record was the "best evidence" of King's driving privileges. (Tr. Vol. II. at 30.) As such, the trial court ruled that King was still suspended through October 24, 2018, because the expiration date listed on the certified BMV record was the last day of the suspension. The trial court imposed a fine of $20 for the infraction and a driver's license suspension of ninety days, a fine of $25 dollars, and court costs of $185.50 for the Class A misdemeanor.
[5] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the trial court's decision. Drane v. State , 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). It is solely the initial fact-finder's role to evaluate witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction, and thus we consider conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Jones v. State , 783 N.E.2d 1132, 1139 (Ind. 2003). We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt, id. , and we reverse only "when the record contains no facts to support [it] either directly or by inference." Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996).
[6] In order to convict King of driving while suspended, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that King "operate[d] a motor vehicle upon a highway," while knowing that his "driving privileges, driver's license, or permit [was] suspended or revoked," and that the operation of the vehicle was within "ten years after the date on which judgment was entered against [him] for a prior unrelated violation." Ind. Code § 9-24-19-2. King argues his license was not suspended on the day of the traffic stop based on the expiration date of his suspension.3
[7] King argues that when he was pulled over for a speeding violation on October 24, 2018, his suspension had already ended that day and, therefore, he cannot be found guilty of driving while suspended.4
King takes issue with the trial court's reasoning because, if affirmed, it would establish that "the expiration date would not be the ending date of the suspension ... and that the suspension would run through the suspension date and would expire at 12:00 a.m. on the date immediately after the expiration date." (Br. of Appellant at 7.) The State conversely argues that King's suspension expired at the end of the day on October 24, 2018, thus King's driver's license was not valid until beginning of the day on October 25, 2018. Consequently, the primary issue in this appeal is when "expiration" occurs – whether the listed expiration date is the last full day that the suspension runs through, thereby ending at 11:59 p.m. that day, or whether the suspension ends at 12:00 a.m. on the listed date and is no longer in effect from the beginning of that day.
[8] King's certified BMV driving record includes all of the information that we know about his suspension.5 Specifically, the suspension at issue in this case, suspension ID 31 shows: (1) that King was suspended per BMV record; (2) that the reason King was suspended was due to delinquent child support; (3) the mail date of the suspension notice was July 31, 2018; (4) the effective date of the suspension was August 30, 2018; and (5) the expiration date of the suspension was October 24, 2018. As a guide, the "How to Read an Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicle (BMV) Official Driver Record" manual further explains that "the definition of the expiration date is defined as ‘the date the suspension ends.’ " See "How to Read an Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicle (BMV) Official Driver Record," https://perma.cc/7B6J-6PPA (Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, published December 8, 2014, effective legend for driver records printed on or after December 4, 2014).
[9] We first note that neither King, the State, nor the trial court, provided any relevant case law or legal reasoning for their preferred time of expiration of the suspension. In fact, the primary resource referenced by all was the BMV manual, which does not clarify when on the date listed the BMV considers a suspension to have ended. We further note that there is no Indiana case on point that clarifies when a suspension of a driver's license ends if there is an absence of guiding language included in the certified BMV driving record apart from the word "expiration" and when there is no reference to an administrative order outlining the specific length of a suspension period. Thus, this question is an issue of first impression for this court and we begin our analysis by looking to rules and caselaw regarding expiration of other time periods.
[10] A broader overview of case law and statutory authority pertaining to computation of time generally reveals that the common law rule, which was also adopted in Indiana statutes and Rules of Procedure, is that in computing a period of time, Indiana Trial Rule 6(A).6 This method of computation is also adopted by the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 25, Indiana Code section 4-21.5-3-2 which governs administrative procedures and orders, and Indiana Code Section 34-7-5-1 which governs civil law and procedure. Such rules and statutes exemplify that the general rule in Indiana is that "when computing the time for performance of an act which must take place within a certain number of days of some triggering event, the day of the triggering even is not included." Dobeski v. State , 64 N.E.3d 1257, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). See, e.g. , Mockford v. Iles , 217 Ind. 137, 26 N.E.2d 42 (1940) (); Local Union No. 403 v. Demetrakopoulos , 215 Ind. 452, 19 N.E.2d 466 (1939) (interlocutory orders); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Alsop , 191 Ind. 638, 134 N.E. 290 (1922) (); Bowen v. Julius, 141 Ind. 310, 40 N.E. 700 (1895) (acceptance of payment); Brown v. Buzan , 24 Ind. 194 (1865) (breach of contract); Tucker v. White , 19 Ind. 253 (1862) (stay of judgment); T.C. v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dept. of Workforce Development , 930 N.E.2d 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (filing of appeal); Jenkins v. Yoder, 163 Ind.App. 377, 324 N.E.2d 520 (1975) (statute of limitations); Liberty Service, Inc. v. McKim , 129 Ind.App. 464, 157 N.E.2d 582 (1959) (termination of lease); Keeling v. Board of Zoning Appeals of City of Indianapolis , 117 Ind. App. 314, 69 N.E.2d 613, 618 (1946) (notice of hearing); Davidson v. Lemontree , 71 Ind. App. 215, 123 N.E. 177 (1919) (); Mathews Farmers' Mut. Live Stock Ins. Co. v. Moore , 58 Ind. App. 240, 108 N.E. 155 (1915) (); Cheek v. Preston, 34 Ind. App. 343, 72 N.E. 1048 (1905) (payment of rent); and In Re Estate of Dunnick , 855 N.E.2d 1087 (Ind. T.C. 2006) (petition for rehearing).
[11] For questions of contract law, the courts may deviate from the uniform, aforementioned rule if the parties' clear intent within the language of the contract was to include the first day. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 134 N.E. 290, 291 (...
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