King v. State
| Decision Date | 28 July 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 5D99-2666.,5D99-2666. |
| Citation | 763 So.2d 546 |
| Parties | Carlos K. KING, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Rebecca M. Becker, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, and Joseph W. DuRocher, Public Defender, and Don Waggoner, Assistant Public Defender, Kissimmee, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
This is an appeal from convictions for battery on a law enforcement officer, resisting an officer with violence and resisting an officer without violence.
We write in order to discuss a sentencing issue raised by appellant. He asserts, implicitly, that it was a violation of his constitutional double jeopardy rights for the judge to have enhanced his sentence for battery on a law enforcement officer. The enhancement was imposed because appellant is an habitual felony offender. § 775.084, Fla. Stat. (1997). Appellant cites Oliveira v. State, 751 So.2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) as authority for his claim of error and he is correct in his assertion that it is directly on point. We disagree with the rationale in Oliveira and certify conflict with the decision.
Oliveira holds that because the crime of Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer is an enhancement of the crime of Battery that it is wrong to impose an enhancement again by increasing the sentence because he is a repeat offender. The case cites Merritt v. State, 712 So.2d 384 (Fla.1998), where our supreme court did say "Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1995) is an enhancement statute rather than a statute creating and defining any criminal offense." This statement by the supreme court should be adhered to by the lower courts. There is a logical argument to be made that battery on a law enforcement officer is a separate crime from battery but that argument will be better made by others in another day.
Where we depart from the Oliveira decision is in considering section 775.084. That statute was enacted to cause persons who are repeat offenders to be treated differently from those who are not. The statute defines who should be sentenced as an habitual felony offender, an habitual violent felony offender, or a violent career criminal and allows the court to "impose an extended term of imprisonment." Without question this statute seems to use "enhancement" language but the statute also can be interpreted as defining the status of the defendant not at all unlike the felony petit theft defendant. In Gayman v. State, 616 So.2d 17 (Fla.1993),1 our supreme court recognized that one who is found guilty by a jury of petit theft, and is also found to have been at least twice before convicted of petit theft, is guilty of a felony and the punishment may be further enhanced by a habitual felony offender statute where appropriate. It is our determination to analogize the felony petit theft statute, section 812.014(3)(c), with section 775.084 because a similar procedure is used in classifying and sentencing...
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Mills v. State
...underlying offense; the single offense was charged, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. King v. State, 763 So.2d 546 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (observing that, although there "is a logical argument to be made that battery on a law enforcement officer is a separate crime......
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Fussell v. State, 2D01-5350.
...So.2d 730 (Fla.1985). We similarly conclude here that the legislature intended that both enhancements be imposed. See King v. State, 763 So.2d 546, 547 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). The two enhancement statutes at issue serve wholly different purposes. Section 784.07 provides for the reclassificatio......
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Mills v. State, 1D99-2159.
...address the issue now before this court. We, therefore, reject the argument that Merritt is controlling. See also King v. State, 763 So.2d 546 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (certifying conflict with While appellant's status as a habitual felony offender is simply a tool to enhance the offender's sent......
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Darst v. State, No. 5D00-2262
...banc); Mills v. State, 773 So.2d 650, 651-52 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (Browning, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); King v. State, 763 So.2d 546, 547 (Fla. 5th DCA),rev. denied,779 So.2d 271 (Fla.2000); Light v. State, 667 So.2d 437, 438 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Clearly, a person who commit......