King v. State
| Decision Date | 16 October 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 58359,58359 |
| Citation | 261 S.E.2d 485,151 Ga.App. 762 |
| Parties | KING v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
L. Paul Cobb, Jr., Atlanta, for appellant.
Louis F. Ricciuti, Atlanta, Richard E. Hicks, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
The appellant was indicted for murder and convicted of voluntary manslaughter. He appeals the denial of his motion for new trial. Held :
1. The appellant contends that it was error to admit a certified copy of the victim's death certificate, where the date of registration of the certificate did not appear clearly thereon as required by Code Ann. 88-1724(a) (). Assuming arguendo that this contention would otherwise have any merit, it cannot be considered since it was not made at trial. Laney v. Barr, 61 Ga.App. 145(1), 6 S.E.2d 99 (1939).
2. The appellant also contends that it was error to admit the death certificate because it contained conclusionary statements by the medical examiner to the effect that the victim was "shot by another" and that the immediate cause of death was "gunshot wound of side and back." The latter statement provided the only direct evidence that the victim died from gunshot wounds.
The law regarding the evidentiary value to be given the recitals in a death certificate is currently less than crystal clear. Ga.L.1964, pp. 499, 595 (Code Ann. § 88-1724(c)) provides that a properly certified copy of a death certificate "shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated . . .," provided that the certificate is filed within a year of the death and has not been amended. In Branton v. Indept. Life &c. Ins. Co., 136 Ga.App. 414, 416(4), 221 S.E.2d 217 (1975), this court held that a conclusion appearing in a death certificate to the effect that the decedent's death by overdose of drugs was caused "by accidental means" was entitled to be considered evidence under the statute. The Supreme Court vacated this holding in Indept. Life &c. Ins. Co. v. Branton, 236 Ga. 514, 224 S.E.2d 380 (1976), and remanded the case for "further consideration and clarification . . . on this issue." On remand, however, the issue was determined to be irrelevant to the appeal, and no such clarification was forthcoming. See Branton v. Indept. Life &c. Ins. Co., 138 Ga.App. 365, 226 S.E.2d 161 (1976).
The issue was finally confronted in State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullens, 147 Ga.App. 59(2)(b), 248 S.E.2d 18 (1978) (cert. den.). The death certificate involved there specified that the immediate cause of death was "drowning, due to bilateral subdural hemorrhage due to blow to head (or blows)." The court held the conclusion that drowning was the immediate cause of death to be entitled to acceptance as evidence but ruled that the conclusion that the drowning resulted from blows to the head had no probative value. Thus, the rule appears to have emerged that a death certificate serves as prima facie evidence only of (1) the death itself and (2) the immediate agency of the death. Other conclusions, such as those regarding the events leading up to the death or whether the cause of death was intentional or accidental, are not admissible. Applying this rule to the case before us, we hold that the death certificate was properly admitted as evidence that the victim died of gunshot wounds, but that the statement contained therein that the victim was shot "by another" should have been excluded upon objection. However, as discussed in Division 3, infra, this latter conclusion was merely cumulative of other, properly admitted evidence showing that the appellant did the shooting, and thus no grounds for reversal resulted from its admission via the death certificate.
3. It was not error to deny the...
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Conklin v. State, 41665
...death certificate, as amended, to have been properly admitted. Dunn v. State, 251 Ga. 731(2), 309 S.E.2d 370 (1983); King v. State, 151 Ga.App. 762(2), 261 S.E.2d 485 (1979). 4. The trial court did not err by denying Conklin's non-specific requests for expert assistance in the absence of a ......
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Johnson v. State, A98A0745.
...Edwards, 228 Ga. 470, 473(4), 186 S.E.2d 109 (1971), quoting from Andrews v. State, 118 Ga. 1, 3, 43 S.E. 852 (1903); King v. State, 151 Ga.App. 762, 261 S.E.2d 485 (1979). The record demonstrates that in the context in which it was made, the trial court clearly understood the basis for the......
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Dunn v. State, 39851
...the events leading up to death or whether the cause of death was intentional or accidental, are not admissible." King v. State, 151 Ga.App. 762, 763, 261 S.E.2d 485 (1979). The word "Homicide" was nothing more than an indication of the immediate agency of death. We find no merit in this enu......
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Carswell v. State, 67997
...the events leading up to the death or whether the cause of death was intentional or accidental, are not admissible." King v. State, 151 Ga.App. 762(2), 261 S.E.2d 485 (1979). Accord Security Life Ins. Co. v. Blitch, 155 Ga.App. 167(2), 270 S.E.2d 349 (1980). In our view, the statements that......