King v. Sturge
| Decision Date | 23 June 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 59-8,59-8 |
| Citation | 113 So.2d 257 |
| Parties | Arthur KING, Appellant, v. Raymond Wilson STURGE, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Perlman, Litman & Sponder, Miami Beach, for appellant.
Hill, Welsh, Cornell, Ross & Pyszka, Miami, for appellee.
The appellant, a jewelry salesman, obtained an all risk policy of insurance through the appellee to cover certain jewelry owned by him. The policy of insurance indicated that the appellant was to be insured against loss during travel from Miami to Chicago, Philadelphia, New York and return. An endorsement and cover note attached to and made a part of the policy contained warranties providing as follows:
'1. It is warranted that at private show at the Ambassador East Hotel in Chicago, Illinois armed guard will be in attendance.
While en route from New York to Chicago by train, during the time when the policy and cover note were in force and effect, the appellant was the victim of an armed robbery. The robbery occurred at approximately 2:00 a. m., while the train was between Harrisburg and Altoona, Pennsylvania. Admittedly, the loss occurred in the nighttime and when the jewelry was not locked in a hotel vault.
A motion to dismiss the appellant's complaint, containing substantially the above facts, was denied. After answer, the appellee moved for a judgment on the pleadings which likewise was denied. Thereafter, the appellant filed a motion for summary judgment, relying upon the complaint and depositions filed in the cause. The appellee also filed a motion for summary judgment, relying upon the pleadings, depositions and the affidavit of one Alan D. Fulton. After hearing upon the respective motions for summary judgment, the court entered a summary final judgment in favor of the appellee, and found that the controversy concerned the wording of the insurance cover note which has been quoted hereinabove; that such wording was clear and definite, and that the appellee was entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law. This appeal is from the summary judgment.
The appellant's sole point is that the court was in error in determining that the language of the contract was clear and definite, and concluding as a matter of law that the appellee was entitled to a summary judgment.
It is apparent from the contract sued upon, and the pleadings of the...
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...and to each of its various provisions. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Kincaid, 1939, 136 Fla.App., 120, 186 So. 675; King v. Sturge, Fla.App.,App.1959, 113 So.2d 257. If the language used is clear and unambiguous, it will be accorded its natural meaning. Pafford v. Standard Life Ins. Co. of Indi......
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...reflects the intent of the parties. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Kincaid, 136 Fla. 120, 186 So. 675, 677 (Fla.1939); King v. Sturge, 113 So.2d 257, 258 (Fla.App.1969). When the language of a policy is unclear or confusing, the language should be construed against the insurer. Fireman's Fu......
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Excelsior Ins. Co. v. Pomona Park Bar & Package Store
...bar operators from coverage. Rather, the provisions of paragraph (h) should be construed together. See generally King v. Sturge, 113 So.2d 257 (Fla.3d DCA 1959); New Amsterdam Casualty Company v. Addison, 169 So.2d 877 (Fla.2d DCA 1964); Government Employees Insurance Company v. Sweet, 186 ......
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Miller Elec. Co. of Fla. v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., F-399
...after entry of the decree which is the subject of this review. Reversed. STURGIS, Chief Judge, and RAWLS, J., concur. 1 King v. Sturge (Fla.App.1959) 113 So.2d 257; New York Life Ins . Co. v. Kincaid, 136 Fla. 120, 186 So. 675.2 Pafford v. Standard Life Ins. Co. of Indiana (Fla.1951) 52 So.......