King v. Texas County

• Decision Date: 15 November 1898
• Citation: 146 Mo. 60,47 S.W. 920
• Parties: KING, County Clerk, v. TEXAS COUNTY.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

47 S.W. 920

146 Mo. 60

KING, County Clerk, v. TEXAS COUNTY.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

November 15, 1898.

CLERK OF COUNTY COURT — DETERMINATION OF SALARY — APPEAL — REVIEW.

1. Section 31 of the Acts of 1891, relating to the fees of county clerks and other county officers, classifies the counties according to population, and fixes according to the classification the amount that clerks of the county court shall retain from fees for their compensation, and provides that the population of a county shall be determined by multiplying by five the total number of votes cast in the county at the last presidential election prior to such determination. Section 30 requires the clerk to make quarterly returns to the county court. Held, that the salary of a clerk for the year 1896 was fixed at time of his return at the first quarter of each year by the votes cast in his county at the presidential election of 1892, regardless of the presidential election which occurred in November of that year.

2. A ruling by the court below favorable to plaintiff, which did not affect the judgment in favor of defendant, will not be considered on plaintiff's appeal.

Appeal from circuit court, Texas county; L. B. Woodside, Judge.

J. S. King, clerk of the county court of Texas county, presented his accounts to the court for settlement; and he was ordered to pay to the county a balance found to be due, and thereupon he appealed to the circuit court. The judgment was affirmed, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Young & Lyles, for appellant. Edward C. Crow, Atty. Gen., for respondent.

ROBINSON, J.

The essential facts presented by the record in this case are as follows: At the general election in November, 1894, the plaintiff was elected clerk of the county court of Texas county for the term of four years, commencing January 1, 1895, and duly qualified as such. At the presidential election held in said county in November, 1892, the number of votes cast for president and other officers voted for thereat was less than 4,000; but at the next succeeding presidential election in November, 1896, the total number of votes cast in such county was 4,400. The plaintiff duly presented and filed in the county court his quarterly statement and abstract of fees collected for the quarters ending March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31, 1896. No determination, however, of the fees or salary of the plaintiff, was made by the county court at the May, August, or November terms of said court; but at the ensuing February term, 1897, the plaintiff presented to the county court his annual settlement, showing amounts collected and paid out by him for necessary deputy hire for the year commencing January 1, 1896, and ending December 31, 1896, showing the total amount collected during such period to be $2,224.83; total amount paid for deputy hire, $900; amount retained by plaintiff and applied on his salary, $1,324.83. After examining said statement the county court held that the plaintiff was only entitled to retain $1,250 on account of his salary, leaving a balance of $74.83 in his hands, which amount the county court ordered the plaintiff to pay into the county treasury within 15 days thereafter. Thereupon the plaintiff appealed to the circuit court of Texas county. In that court, a jury having been waived, the case was submitted to the court for trial, which again resulted in a judgment against the plaintiff for $74.83; being the amount in his hands in excess of $1,250. After an ineffectual motion for a new trial, plaintiff brings the case here by appeal.

Appellant contends that by reason of the increased vote at the presidential election in November, 1896, he was entitled, under the provisions of the Acts of 1891, to an increase of his salary for the year 1896 from $1,250 to $1,600, on the theory that the total number of votes of Texas county cast at the presidential election in 1896, multiplied by 5, would show that the population of Texas county for that year was more than 20,000 and less than 25,000, whereas the vote in such county at the presidential election in November, 1892, when ascertained by this method, would show that the population was more than 15,000 and less than 20,000, making a difference of $350 in the amount of the plaintiff's salary. At the trial the circuit court, of its own motion, gave the following declaration of law: "First. The court declares the law to be that it was intended by section 8 of article 14 of the constitution of the state of Missouri to prevent the passage of laws to increase the salary and fees of officers, and that it was intended by section 12 of article 9 that the legislature, by a law uniform in its operations, might classify the counties in the state by the population, and regulate the fees and salaries of the county officers by classes, and that when any county passes from one class to another the fees and salaries of the officers in said county would be changed by the change of the class of said county, and such change would take effect regardless of the time of the expiration of office of any such officer; and such increase of fees and salaries would not be in contravention of said section 8 of article 14 of the constitution." No fault is found by the plaintiff with this instruction. The court further instructed: "Second. That section 30, p. 152, Acts 1891, requires clerks of courts to make quarterly returns to the county court of all fees received by them during such quarter, and at each regular session of the county court it is the duty of the court to examine said statements, and to allow all necessary deputy hire, not exceeding the amount allowed by section 31, and to determine whether said clerk had received the full amount of the salary allowed him by section 31, and, if he has received more than the salary allowed him by law, to order him to pay the excess into the county treasury. It was the duty of the county court of Texas county, Missouri, at the May term, 1896, to examine the quarterly statement for the quarter ending March 31, 1896 (January, February, and March), made by the plaintiff, J. S. King, clerk of the county court, and to determine whether he had during such quarter received the full amount of his salary for the year; and in order to do this the court was required at said May term, 1896, to determine the salary of said King for the year of 1896. Under the provision of section 31 the amount of the salary of the county clerk is based upon the population of the county,...