King v. Williams Industries, Inc., Civ. A. No. 82-0026-F.

• Decision Date: 30 March 1983
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 82-0026-F.
• Citation: 565 F. Supp. 321
• Parties: Linda Jean KING, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Jay Alan King, Katherine Eades, Michael King and Theresa King, by their mother and next friend Linda Jean King, Plaintiffs, v. WILLIAMS INDUSTRIES, INC., and Ethyl Corporation, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

565 F. Supp. 321

Linda Jean KING, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Jay Alan King, Katherine Eades, Michael King and Theresa King, by their mother and next friend Linda Jean King, Plaintiffs, v. WILLIAMS INDUSTRIES, INC., and Ethyl Corporation, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 82-0026-F.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

March 30, 1983.

Richard M. Howland, Amherst, Mass., for plaintiffs.

Philip A. Brooks, H. Gregory Williams, Springfield, Mass., for Ethyl Corp.

Charles K. Bergin, Jr., Robinson, Donovan, Madden & Barry, Springfield, Mass., for Williams Industries.

MEMORANDUM

FREEDMAN, District Judge.

This case is before the Court following a hearing on the motion of the defendant Williams Industries, Inc. ("Williams") to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

I.

This case presents a narrow choice of law issue in the context of a tragic set of facts. The decedent Jay Alan King was alive when this case was first filed in January 1982 but expired shortly thereafter survived by his widow Linda Jean King, his step-daughter Katherine Eades, and his children Michael and Theresa King. The initial complaint alleged twelve counts: Counts I through III alleged claims by Jay Alan King for negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability in tort against defendant Ethyl Corporation ("Ethyl") arising out of Ethyl's purported sale of Polyvinyl Chloride to King's former employer Williams; Count VIII averred that the negligence of Williams injured King; and Counts IV through VII against Ethyl and IX through XII against Williams set forth the individual claims of King's spouse, stepdaughter, and children for mental anguish and loss of consortium, companionship, and services resulting from each of the respective defendants' alleged injury of King. After King's death, his Estate was substituted as party plaintiff and leave was granted to amend the complaint to set forth claims for wrongful death against Ethyl (Count XIII) and Williams (Count XIV).

Williams has moved for dismissal of all of the plaintiffs' claims against it. Williams contends that Massachusetts choice of law rules require that Indiana law govern the rights and liabilities of the parties in this action, and that properly applied, Indiana law bars plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs in opposing Williams' motion essentially concede that "Indiana law would normally govern under traditional conflicts of laws rules since the injury occurred in Indiana...." Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, at 5. However, plaintiffs argue that strict application of Indiana law to the facts of this case would violate established public policies of the forum state, and assert that a federal court sitting in diversity ought not apply a foreign state's law where to do so would be repugnant to the laws of the forum.

Before turning to discussion of the arguments advanced by the parties, the Court must first address issues raised by the procedural posture of this case and the factual bases upon which Williams' motion is predicated. Generally, a court reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion limits its inquiry, accepting as true all material allegations of the complaint, O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 545 (1st Cir.1975), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914, 97 S.Ct. 2173, 53 L.Ed.2d 223 (1977), and determining whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved in support of the claims alleged. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). In the instant case, the allegations of the initial and amended complaints are sparse — albeit sufficient under the liberal requirements of notice pleading, F.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Williams in moving for dismissal relies on several facts not appearing on the face of the pleadings. On the one hand, its motion could be denied on this basis. On the other hand, plaintiffs do not dispute the facts set forth by Williams.

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b) provides that a court may treat a 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment, F.R.Civ.P. 56, "if matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court." F.R.Civ.P. 12(b). While the rule requires that "all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all materials made pertinent ..." to a summary judgment motion if a 12(b)(6) is so treated, neither party in memoranda filed or at oral argument suggested a need to submit further materials. Problematically, however, although the material facts appear plainly to be undisputed, nonetheless such facts have been submitted to the Court by way of summaries appearing in the parties' memoranda, which presentation would of course be insufficient either to establish a fact or to create a genuine issue of fact were this a factually contested summary judgment motion. See generally 6 Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 56.11 1.-8 (2nd ed. 1982). Yet, in the interests of judicial economy, and in light of the absence of any genuine dispute as to the facts material to the instant motion, the Court will treat Williams' motion as one for summary judgment and accept the factual summaries as established for the limited purpose of ruling on this motion as though the factual summaries presented were stipulations or "concessions of counsel." See id. The material facts being accepted as undisputed, the Court will indulge every inference favorable to the plaintiffs in determining whether Williams is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 1495, 47 L.Ed.2d 754 (1976).

In their memoranda, plaintiffs set forth the following factual summary:

The decedent Jay Alan King worked as a foreman for Williams of Shelbyville, Indiana from March 1977 through September 1979. Williams is a plastic extrusion company. The decedent's job at Williams obliged him to work on a particular machine extruding Polyvinyl Chloride prepared and sold by Ethyl to Williams. This process placed the Polyvinyl Chloride Polymer under high pressure at high temperatures. The plaintiffs contend that this process released or produced the monomer Vinyl Chloride, which is a known virulent carcinogen, and thereby intensely exposed Jay Alan King to its deadly effects.

Williams obliged Jay Alan King to inhale Polyvinyl Chloride in an unventilated chamber. As a result of these conditions, Jay Alan King became ill with Bile Duct Cancer in July 1981 at which time he returned to his family home in Massachusetts with his wife Linda King, his children Michael and Theresa King and his stepdaughter Katherine Eades. Jay Alan King died in February 1982 at the age of 34 of Bile Duct Cancer.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, at 1-2. Plaintiffs do not dispute Williams' assertions that: first, Jay Alan King was a resident of Indiana at the time he was hired by Williams, and the contract of hire took place in Indiana; second, any injury to Jay Alan King due to Williams' alleged negligence was the result of conduct which occurred in Indiana; third, Jay Alan King's cancer was first diagnosed in Indiana; and fourth, that Williams was at all times insured under the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act. See Defendant Williams Industries, Inc.'s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss, at 6.

Taking these facts as established for purposes of addressing Williams' motion, the Court now turns to the legal arguments advanced by the parties.

II.

A federal court sitting in diversity must apply the substantive law of the forum including its choice of law rules. Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941); Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier, Ltd., 605 F.2d 1, 19 (1st Cir.1979), on petition for rehearing, 615 F.2d 575, cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983, 100 S.Ct. 2964, 64 L.Ed.2d 839, rehearing denied, 449 U.S. 893, 101 S.Ct. 248, 66 L.Ed.2d 116 (1980). In Re Aircrash Disaster at Boston, Massachusetts, July 31, 1983, 399 F.Supp. 1106, 1108 (D.Ma.1975). Historically, Massachusetts adhered to the traditional doctrine of lex loci delecti, relying on determination of the place of the injury to ascertain what law should be applied in tort cases. See, e.g., Pevoski v. Pevoski, 371 Mass. 358, 358 N.E.2d 416, 417 (Mass.1976), citing Brogie v. Vogel, 348 Mass. 619, 205 N.E.2d 234 (1965); Goodale v. Morrison, 343 Mass. 607, 180 N.E.2d 67 (1962); Murphy v. Smith, 307 Mass. 64, 29 N.E.2d 726 (1940). In Pevoski, the Supreme Judicial Court indicated that the lex loci delecti rule "has provided, and will continue to provide, a rational and just procedure for selecting the law governing the vast majority of issues in multistate tort suits," 358 N.E.2d at 417, yet "recognized that there also may be particular issues on which the interests of lex loci delecti are not so strong. Indeed on the particular facts of a case another jurisdiction may sometimes be more concerned and more involved with certain issues than the State in which the conduct occurred." Id. Thus, in Pevoski, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the lex loci delecti, that of New York, would obtain in determining standards of conduct relating to an automobile accident occurring there, but the issue of spousal immunity would be governed by Massachusetts law. Id. at 418. Sub silentio, the Supreme Judicial Court adopted the approach set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws, §§ 145, 146 (1971). Subsequently, in Saharceski v. Marcure, 373 Mass. 304, 366 N.E.2d 1245 (Mass.1977), the Supreme Judicial Court expressly cited the Restatement (Second) in applying Massachusetts law to determine the rights and liabilities of two fellow employees involved in an automobile accident while driving through Connecticut. Id. at 1248, 1249 n. 6, and 1250. The Saharceski case is discussed in more detail, infra.

Application of the principles set forth in Pevoski and Saharceski to the case at bar...