King v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 74-2005
| Decision Date | 07 October 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 74-2005,74-2005 |
| Citation | 523 F.2d 879 |
| Parties | 11 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 867, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,411 Andrew W. KING, Appellant, v. YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC., Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Edward L. Welch, Edwardsville, Ill., for appellant.
John William Buechner, Miller & Buechner, St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.
Before LAY, WEBSTER and HENLEY, Circuit Judges.
In a case tried to the court, plaintiff Andrew W. King claimed that he was discharged from employment by defendant Yellow Freight System, Inc. ("Yellow") on account of his race, in violation of Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e Et seq., and of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. The District Court 1 entered a judgment in favor of the defendant, and this appeal followed.
King, a Black, began work as a truck driver for the St. Louis Terminal of Yellow on September 28, 1968. 2 That day, King knocked down a post when the trailer his truck was pulling failed to clear a curve and struck the post. On May 24, 1969, while King was driving at 55 miles per hour, the rear pup trailer of the unit he was hauling became uncoupled and turned over. King was not given a "warning letter" from his employer in connection with either of these accidents. 3
King had another accident on June 27, 1969, when he had to apply the brakes of his unit suddenly after following another vehicle too closely. No one was injured in this accident, but some damage was done to the unit he was driving. Yellow investigated this occurrence and concluded that it was preventable. King was given a warning letter that informed him that his involvement in another preventable accident would be grounds for his discharge. 4
On July 11, 1969, King drove his unit through a curve at an excessive rate of speed, and the rear pup trailer he was hauling turned over. King was discharged following this preventable accident and thereafter brought this action.
At the trial, King introduced evidence tending to show that some Caucasian drivers had been given more lenient treatment by Yellow, even though their traffic records were as bad as or worse than King's record. 5 He also introduced statistical evidence as to the racial composition of Yellow's staff of drivers. 6 Yellow chose to rely primarily on King's poor driving record as a legitimate reason for discharge.
In ruling in favor of Yellow, the District Court held that King had failed to prove that he had been discriminated against because of his race. In this appeal, King contends that the District Court (1) required him to meet an improper burden of proof, (2) operated under an erroneous view of the law, and (3) committed clear error with respect to its findings of fact and conclusions of law. We deal with King's contentions together.
Among its findings of fact, the District Court found that:
13. Plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof which requires plaintiff to produce a preponderance of the evidence establishing a pattern or practice of racial discrimination in defendant's discharge policies.
We agree with appellant that this is not a correct statement of the applicable law. This was an individual discrimination case, not a claim of class discrimination based upon a pattern and practice. In Marquez v. Omaha District Sales Office, 440 F.2d 1157, 1161 (8th Cir. 1971), we held that although evidence of "pattern discrimination" may serve to support an individual's claim, "(a)llegation of class injury is not necessary to show violation of the statute." See also Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970). Nevertheless, in an individual employment discrimination case, "the burden is on (the plaintiff) to affirmatively prove racial discrimination . . . ." Naraine v. Western Electric Co., 507 F.2d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1974).
The significant finding of the District Court was that King's discharge was "proper, and based upon the reasonable inference that (King) was a habitually negligent driver." Even though we might have found that King did present some evidence of racial discrimination had we been the trier of fact, we cannot say that the District Court's conclusions that King failed to show any viable example of discrimination against him on account of his race and that Yellow was justified in discharging King because of his poor driving record are based upon clearly erroneous findings. 7 See Naraine v. Western Electric Co., supra; Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a).
Appellant argues that the circumstances of his discharge served to shift the burden of proof to his employer to show nondiscrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). 8 That case has doubtful application in a discharge situation, and it is in any event of no value to appellant in this case since a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason King's poor driving record has been found to be the true reason for the discharge. See Naraine v. Western Electric Co., supra, 507 F.2d at 594. See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971).
Nor does appellant's use of statistics 9 to support his case compel a different result. Statistics may be used to prove a claim of racial discrimination in a class action, See Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721, 723 (8th Cir.), Cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854, 94 S.Ct. 153, 38 L.Ed.2d 103 (1973); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., supra, 433 F.2d at 426, but this case involves no class claim.
Although statistical evidence of a pattern or practice of discrimination is of probative value in an individual discrimination case for the purpose of showing motive, intent, or purpose, Cf. Marquez v. Omaha District Sales Office, Ford Division of Ford Motor Co., 8 Cir. 1971, 440 F.2d 1157, it is not determinative of an employer's reason for the action taken against the individual grievant.
Terrell v. Feldstein Co., 468 F.2d 910, 911 (5th Cir. 1972). Here, as in Terrell, the record contains ample evidence to support the conclusion that King was discharged for nondiscriminatory reasons.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
1 The Honorable H. Kenneth Wangelin, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
2 King was hired as a "casual"...
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