Kingsford v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

• Decision Date: 24 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-4204,DEFENDANT-APPELLANT,PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,99-4204
• Parties: (10th Cir. 2001) THOMAS E. KINGSFORD,, v. SALT LAKE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, DEFENDANT, CHARLES J. SHACKETT,
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 1123

247 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2001)

THOMAS E. KINGSFORD, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. SALT LAKE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, DEFENDANT, CHARLES J. SHACKETT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

No. 99-4204

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

April 24, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Utah (D.C. No. 97-CV-358) [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Brent A. Burnett, Assistant Attorney General, (Jan Graham, Utah Attorney General, with him on the briefs), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Appellant.

Stanley J. Preston, (Max D. Wheeler and Judith D. Wolferts with him on the brief), Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Appellee.

Before Tacha, Chief Judge, McWILLIAMS and Murphy, Circuit Judges.

Murphy, Circuit Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Thomas Kingsford brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. One of his claims asserted that he was deprived of property without due process of law in his termination as head football coach at Highland High School ("Highland"). Named as defendants were the Salt Lake City School District ("SLCSD") and Charles Shackett, who was principal of Highland at the time Kingsford was terminated as head football coach. Defendants moved for summary judgment on Kingsford's property interest due process claim, asserting that Kingsford did not have a constitutionally-protected property interest in his position as football coach. Defendant Shackett also claimed he was entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Kingsford then filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on his property interest due process claim.

The district court granted Kingsford's motion for summary judgment on his property interest due process claim and denied Shackett's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Defendant Shackett has appealed the denial of his motion for summary judgment, claiming either that Kingsford does not have a constitutionally-protected property interest in his position as football coach or that he is entitled to qualified immunity because the law on which Kingsford relies was not clearly established at the time of the events underlying this suit. Jurisdiction to consider Shackett's appeal arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 915 (1997) ("[A] Federal District Court order rejecting a qualified immunity defense on the ground that the defendant's actions-if proved-would have violated clearly established law may be appealed immediately as a `final decision' within the meaning of the general federal appellate jurisdiction statute."). Because there is a factual question as to whether Kingsford had a property interest in his position as football coach, this court remands this question to the district court. Because the law on which Kingsford relies for his property interest due process claim was clearly established at the time of the events underlying this suit, this court affirms the district court's denial of Shackett's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 21, 1981, Kingsford submitted an application to the SLCSD. Under the portion of the application labeled "Position Desired," Kingsford checked "Classroom Teacher" and listed "Coaching responsibilities" in the space marked "Other." On July 22, 1981, the SLCSD accepted Kingsford's application and extended him a written contract offer for the position of "Teacher" at Highland. The contract did not mention any coaching responsibilities. Kingsford signed this contract on July 31, 1981. This contract is the only written contract signed by Kingsford with Highland or the SLCSD.

In addition to teaching math and physical education classes at Highland, Kingsford has throughout his employment been involved in coaching many sports, including football, basketball, track, and baseball. Between 1981 and 1985, Kingsford served as an assistant football coach. In 1985, Kingsford became head football coach.

As the head football coach, Kingsford was the instructor for the "Athletics Football" course. Students on the football team were given one-fourth of a credit hour for each year of participation on the football team, which counted toward fulfilling "Lifetime Activities PE" graduation requirements. Students were awarded grades for their participation in the "Athletics Football" course, and Kingsford, as instructor, was apparently responsible for making those grade determinations.

Kingsford remained head football coach until March 22, 1996, when he received a letter from the Assistant Superintendent of Personnel of the SLCSD. The letter informed Kingsford that he was suspended from his coaching position assignment until June 6, 1996, at which time he would be terminated from his coaching position. Despite being terminated as a coach, Kingsford has been allowed to continue teaching at Highland.

Kingsford filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah against the SLCSD and Highland principal Charles Shackett, claiming, in part, that he was deprived of his property interest as head football coach without due process of law. Defendants moved for summary judgment on Kingsford's property interest due process claim, arguing that Kingsford did not possess a property interest in his position as head football coach. Defendant Shackett also claimed that even if such a right existed it was not clearly established at the time of the events underlying this suit, thus entitling him to qualified immunity. Kingsford responded by filing a cross-motion for summary judgment on his property interest due process claim.

After oral argument, the district court awarded Kingsford summary judgment on his property interest due process claim and denied Shackett's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court determined that Kingsford had obtained a property interest in his position as head football coach and, because Defendants had not disputed that the dismissal procedures were lacking if a property interest was found, granted Kingsford's motion for summary judgment on the claim. The district court also determined that Shackett was not entitled to qualified immunity on Kingsford's property interest due process claim because the rights violated by Shackett were clearly established at the time of the events underlying this litigation. Although the parties raised and the district court addressed many additional issues in the proceedings below, the only issue appealed and argued to this court is Defendant Shackett's assertion that he is entitled to qualified immunity either because Kingsford does not have a valid property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment or because such a right was not clearly established at the time of the events underlying this litigation.¹

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court reviews the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard employed by the district court pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Cent. Kan. Credit Union v. Mut. Guar. Corp., 102 F.3d 1097, 1102 (10th Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). This court construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Cent. Kan. Credit Union, 102 F.3d at 1102.

B. Property Interest

A property interest in continued public employment is not created by the Constitution. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Rather, a property interest in continued public employment must "stem from an independent source such as state law." Id.; see also Lancaster v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 5, 149 F.3d 1228, 1234 (10th Cir. 1998). State law sources for property interests can include statutes, municipal charters or ordinances, and express or implied contracts. See Carnes v. Parker, 922 F.2d 1506, 1509 (10th Cir. 1991). A public employee such as Kingsford must have a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to continued public employment for a property interest to arise; a "unilateral expectation" of continued public employment is not sufficient to create a property interest. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. While a property right can only be created by state law, once a property right is established, the determination of what process is due before that right can be deprived is a question answered by the federal Constitution. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541-45 (1985). Kingsford claims a property interest in his continued employment as head football coach was created by the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act ("Orderly Termination Act"), the contract between the SLCSD and the Salt Lake Teachers Association which governs SLCSD teachers ("Written Agreement"), and an implied agreement with the SLCSD that he would only be removed for cause. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 53A-8-101 to -107 (1997) (amended 1999).

The analysis begins with the Orderly Termination Act.² Shackett argues that the Orderly Termination Act did not create a reasonable expectation by Kingsford that he would continue to be employed as head football coach. In support of his argument, Shackett relies on the unpublished Utah state case of Parker v. Board of Education., Civil No. 96-03-06050CV (Summit County, Utah D.C. Aug. 12, 1996). In Parker, a Utah district court ruled that a teacher who had been dismissed from his coaching duties had no expectation of continued employment in his duties as coach. In reaching this decision, the court made a conclusion of law stating that "the Orderly Termination Act provides an expectation of continued employment only to those granted such rights under a collectively...