Kingston Trap Rock Co. v. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 825, 825-A and 825-B

• Decision Date: 25 April 1941
• Docket Number: No. 213.,213.
• Citation: 129 N.J.Eq. 570,19 A.2d 661
• Parties: KINGSTON TRAP ROCK CO. et al. v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL NO. 825, 825-A AND 825-B et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

19 A.2d 661

129 N.J.Eq. 570

KINGSTON TRAP ROCK CO. et al.

v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL NO. 825, 825-A AND 825-B et al.

No. 213.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

April 25, 1941.

Appeal from Court of Chancery.

Suit by the Kingston Trap Rock Company and others against the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 825, 825-A, and 825-B, and others for injunctive relief. From an order imposing on defendants restraints pendente lite, defendants appeal.

Reversed.

John E. Toolan, of Perth Amboy, for appellants.

Samuel Koestler and Melvin J. Koestler, both of Elizabeth, for respondents.

HEHER, Justice.

The judicial action challenged is an order imposing upon the appellant labor unions and certain of their agents restraints pendente lite in these particulars:

"(a) From inducing or attempting to induce Anthony P. Miller, Inc., Harry T. Campbell Sons Co. and other customers of the complainant, Kingston Trap Rock Co. to cease dealing with said complainant by threat of violence, strike or boycott as against them or any of them;

"(b) From refusing to furnish Union workers who are members of said Unions or any of them to the said Anthony P. Miller, Inc. or Harry T. Campbell Sons Co. or other customers of the complainant, Kingston Trap Rock Co. unless they or any of them shall purchase their supplies and materials from sources other than Kingston Trap Rock Co.;

"(c) From entering into any agreement or conspiracy to withhold the furnishing of Union workers who are members of said Unions, or either of them, or any other Union to any person, firm or corporation who may purchase or receive its supplies or materials from the complainant, Kingston Trap Rock Co.;

"(d) From inducing or attempting to induce or agreeing or conspiring with any labor union or other organization of laborers or employees for the purpose and with the intent of having their members refrain from or refuse to work for persons, firms or corporations who may buy their supplies or materials from the Kingston Trap Rock Co. or use materials or supplies furnished by said Kingston Trap Rock Co."

Two bills of complaint were filed herein. Under the original bill, the appellant unions and certain of their representatives were enjoined from the employment of "force, violence, threats, or intimidation" in the prosecution of a strike of respondents' employees. There was no appeal from the order thus made. Subsequently, respondents filed a supplemental bill alleging, inter alia, that on or about March 27, 1940, the Kingston Trap Rock Co. entered into a contract with Anthony P. Miller, Inc., to furnish stone ballast required by the latter for the performance of a contract with the Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines for certain construction needed to eliminate grade crossings at Absecon; that Anthony P. Miller, Inc., had "subcontracted to Harry T. Campbell Sons Co., a corporation, the work of unloading and placing said ballast, and said Campbell for the performance of its subcontract requires the services of union engineers and union laborers"; that a representative of the last-named corporation had "endeavored to arrange with * * * the business agent of International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 825 and 825-A for the furnishing of an engineer and an apprentice for operating a steam locomotive in connection with the unloading of said stone ballast and was informed" by the agent "that if said stone ballast was obtained from Kingston Trap Rock Co., the Lambertville Quarry or the Pennington Quarry, all of which" it was "claimed were under one management, his men would not go to work for the reason that there was a strike at the Kingston Trap Rock Co. plant"; that the last mentioned union "did induce one Daniel del Grande (an appellant herein), the state organizer of the International Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers Union of America, to refuse to permit the laborers and members of his said union to unload, place or handle the crushed stone rock ballast coming from the Kingston Trap Rock Co.," and "to withhold the supply of labor from said job, for so long a time as the said Anthony P. Miller, Inc. should purchase or attempt to purchase stone from the complainant, Kingston Trap Rock Co."; and that, as a result of the refusal of the last named union "to furnish any laborers or to permit its members to work in and about the unloading, placing or handling of any crushed stone ballast purchased by Anthony P. Miller, Inc., from Kingston Trap Rock Co. claiming that said stone originated in a yard or plant which was unfair to organized labor," the respondent Trap Rock Co. "fears" that Anthony P. Miller, Inc., will "cancel its aforesaid contract" with it, and thereby it will "lose large sums of money and said valuable contract as well as business with other prospective customers."

Upon the filing of the supplemental bill, the learned vice chancellor allowed a rule to show cause embodying the restraints outlined supra; and, upon the return day, these limitations were "continued in full force and effect until final hearing." The appeal is from this order.

The vice chancellor concluded that the things thus alleged constituted "a secondary boycott against complainants' customers," and that the averments were sustained by the proofs. He cited the following cases as furnishing authority for that view Fink & Son v. Butchers' Union, etc., 84 N.J.Eq. 638, 95 A. 182; Perfect Laundry Co. v. Marsh, 120 N.J.Eq. 508, 186 A. 470; Kitty Kelly Shoe Corp. v. United Retail Employees, etc., 125 N.J.Eq. 250, 5 A.2d 682; Evening Times Printing, etc., Co. v. American Newspaper Guild, 124 N.J.Eq. 71, 199 A. 598.

First: At the outset, the inquiry is whether the objects of the "primary strike" are lawful. The vice chancellor proceeded on the hypothesis that they take that classification. But it is the insistence of respondents that the strike "had these objects, or one of these objects: (a) to compel the employer to recognize disputed claims of the employees; (b) to compel non-Union men presently employed to join the Union or forfeit their jobs." And it is said that the first of these "was unlawful because in violation of the written agreement of the Unions to submit all such disputes to arbitration and to refrain from striking pending such arbitration"; and that the second "is unlawful because in violation of the rights of these non-Union men and their employer, and because contrary to public policy." Neither of these points is well taken.

As to the first, there is persuasive evidence that, prior to the declaration of the strike, the signatory employer had deliberately violated the agreement in substantial particulars, and had thereby manifested a determination to renounce its provisions, particularly those prescribing wage standards; and, in its original bill, this employer declared that, for "misrepresentations made to it by said Unions through their several agents, servants and representatives" (i. e. that "a majority of the employees" of the Trap Rock Co. "were members" of the union "and had authorized" it "to act as their sole bargaining agent relative to their employment"), and also for "the breach and violation of said contracts * * * by said Unions (i.e. the declaration of a strike without resort to arbitration) * * *, it is entitled to be relieved from the terms and obligations of said contracts, and it hereby elects the right to rescind said contracts and to have the same forthwith cancelled and terminated," and prayed, inter alia, for a decree that the contracts "are null and void and of no force and effect." And an affidavit made by one of their counsel reveals that respondents would not "forgo their right to rescind the contracts," but would undertake only "to recognize the unions as a bargaining representative of their respective members," and "to arbitrate all questions of wage shortages."

The proofs are convincing that the genesis of the strike lay in the employers' refusal to comply with the wage provisions of the contracts, and that its objects were reimbursement of the "wage shortages" and the maintenance of the wage scale laid down in the contracts; and these considerations constituted ample justification for the exercise by the workmen of their fundamental right to strike for the betterment of their condition.

And, by the same token, the second ground is devoid of substance. But, if the prime purpose were a "closed shop" at the employers' plant, the strike would not thereby be rendered illegal. Mayer v. Journeymen Stone-Cutters' Ass'n, 47 N.J. Eq. 519, 20 A. 492; Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N.J.Eq. 759, 53 A. 230; Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Federation of Silk Workers, 116 N.J.Eq. 146, 172 A. 551, 92 A.L.R. 1450; Hudson Bus, etc., Ass'n, v. Hill Bus Co., 121 N.J.Eq. 582, 191 A. 763; Four Plating Co., Inc. v. Mako, 122 N.J.Eq. 298, 194 A. 53; Heyl v. Culinary Alliance, 126 N.J.Eq. 320, 8 A.2d 809; McPherson Hotel Co. v. Smith, 127 N.J.Eq. 167, 12 A.2d 136. The weight of authority in this country is that a primary strike for a closed shop is not per se unlawful. E.g. Parkinson v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 P. 1027, 21 L.R.A.,N.S., 550, 16 Ann.Cas. 1165; Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v. Bricklayers' Union, 92 Conn. 161, 101 A. 659, 6 A.L.R. 887; Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255 Ill. 213, 99 N.E. 389, Ann.Cas.1913D, 347; Shaughnessey v. Jordan, 184 Ind. 499, 111 N.E. 622; Bricklayers' Union v. Ruff & Sons, 160 Md. 483, 154 A. 52, 83 A.L.R. 448; National Protective Ass'n v. dimming, 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369, 58 L.R.A. 135, 88 Am.St.Rep. 648; Rhodes Brothers Co. v. Musicians' Protective Union, 37 R. I. 281, 92 A. 641, L.R.A.1915E, 1037. For collation of cases see 95 A.L.R. 18. Of this, more hereafter.

Thus we are brought to the secondary question of the validity of the prohibitions laid upon the unions and their members.

Second: Appellants maintain that it is the "absolute...