Kinney v. Anchorlock Corp., 89 C 5348.
| Decision Date | 21 March 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89 C 5348.,89 C 5348. |
| Citation | 736 F. Supp. 818 |
| Parties | Lawrence KINNEY, Plaintiff, v. ANCHORLOCK CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
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Thomas R. Cirignani & Assoc., Thomas R. Cirignani, Daniel Slijepcivich, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.
Michael R. Kos, Law Offices of John M. Barnes, Chicago, Ill., for Transp. Ins. Co.
Brian W. Bell, Lawrence D. Mishkin, Wildman Harrold Allen & Dixon, Chicago, Ill., for defendant.
This is a diversity action in which the plaintiff, Lawrence Kinney ("Kinney"), alleges that he was injured as the result of the defective manufacture of a semi tractor-trailer driver's seat by the defendant, Anchorlock Corporation ("Anchorlock"). The plaintiff filed this suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, and Anchorlock subsequently removed the suit to this Court. Pending before the Court is Anchorlock's motion for change of venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Anchorlock's motion and transfers the case to the Southern District of Iowa.
For purposes of the pending motion to transfer, the Court has assumed the allegations contained in Kinney's complaint to be true.
Kinney is a resident of Burlington, Iowa. In July of 1987, Kinney was employed as a truck driver by Fruehauf Corporation ("Fruehauf"). On July 27, 1987, he was driving a semi tractor-trailer on Interstate 280 near Rock Island, Illinois when he became involved in a traffic accident.
The truck which Kinney was driving at the time of the accident was equipped with a driver's seat known as a "smart seat," manufactured by the defendant, Anchorlock. Anchorlock is a Delaware corporation which maintains its principal place of business in California. Kinney alleges that when the accident occurred, the seat malfunctioned, causing him to sustain certain unspecified injuries.
In Count One of the Complaint, Kinney alleges that the seat was "unreasonably dangerous and defective"; in Count Two, he alleges that Anchorlock "carelessly and negligently designed and manufactured" the seat. Kinney seeks damages in excess of $15,000.1
Anchorlock has moved to transfer this suit to the Southern District of Iowa, where the plaintiffs resides, or, in the alternative, to the Central District of Illinois, where the accident in question took place and where Kinney's cause of action consequently arose. Anchorlock brings its motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which provides as follows:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.
Section 1404(a) presumes that venue properly lies in the judicial district in which the suit was filed. Thus, the first question posed by a motion to transfer under § 1404(a) is whether venue is in fact appropriate both in this district and the proposed transferee district. Only if the Court answers this question in the affirmative does it proceed to consider the convenience of the parties and their witnesses and the interest of justice. See Waller v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 650 F.Supp. 988, 989-90 (N.D.Ill.1987) (Bua, J.); Centaur Ins. Co. v. Mission Ins. Group, Inc., 620 F.Supp. 1492, 1494 (N.D.Ill.1985) (Bua, J.).
In this case, it is apparent at the outset that venue is not proper in this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) identifies the districts in which a diversity suit may be maintained:
A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.
Neither Kinney nor Anchorlock is a resident of the Northern District of Illinois. Further, although the accident giving rise to Kinney's injuries occurred within the boundaries of Illinois, that accident did not occur within this district, but within the Central District of Illinois, where Rock Island is located. Because venue does not properly lie in this district, the Court cannot proceed further under § 1404(a).
Nonetheless, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) supplies the Court with the authority to address the defect in venue:
The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.
In this case, it would be inappropriate to consider dismissing the case when Kinney filed suit not in this Court but in the Circuit Court of Cook County, and it was the defendant who removed the action to federal court. Moreover, although it is evident that Cook County has no tie to either the parties or the cause of action in this case, Illinois law expressly permits the plaintiff to file suit in any county in the State when, as in this case, the defendant is a nonresident. See Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 110, ¶ 2-101 (Smith-Hurd Supp.1989). Thus, the plaintiff took no plainly improper action which would merit dismissal.2Compare Cote v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 985 (7th Cir.1986) (). Accord Saylor v. Dyniewski, 836 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir.1988). Accordingly, the Court will proceed to determine where this case should be transferred.
Although the Court has concluded that § 1404(a) does not govern Anchorlock's motion to transfer, given the fact that Anchorlock has proposed two alternative transferee forums, the analysis which courts customarily apply to § 1404(a) motions is helpful in determining which of these forums is the more appropriate destination for this case. The parties disagree on this question: Anchorlock argues that the Southern District of Iowa is the preferable forum; Kinney prefers the Central District of Illinois. Applying § 1404(a) principles to this issue, the Court must first determine whether venue and personal jurisdiction properly lie in each of the proposed transferee districts, and then evaluate the extent to which each district serves the convenience of the parties and the witnesses and the interest of justice.3
As set forth above, venue in a diversity case properly lies in a district in which all plaintiffs or all defendants reside or in which the cause of action arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Because the plaintiff resides in the Southern District of Iowa, venue properly lies in that judicial district. Because Kinney's cause of action arose in the Central District of Illinois, venue properly lies in that district as well.
The Court must also consider whether both the district courts in both the Southern District of Iowa and the Central District of Illinois would be able to properly assert personal jurisdiction over Anchorlock.4 Both parties contend that Anchorlock would be subject to service of process and personal jurisdiction in either district, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with their contention.
Anchorlock does not reside within the boundaries of either the Central District of Illinois or the Southern District of Iowa. Therefore, service of process upon Anchorlock is governed by Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes service of process upon a defendant which is not found within the forum state. In relevant part, this rule provides:
Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is held provides (1) for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state, ... service may in either case be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e). Pursuant to Rule 4(e), the Court must therefore inquire whether the long-arm statute of the state in which the proposed transferee court sits would supply personal jurisdiction. If the Court answers this question in the affirmative, it must next determine whether the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the proposed forum state such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with due process. See, e.g., Young v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 790 F.2d 567, 569 (7th Cir.1986).
The due process inquiry requires the Court to consider whether the defendant has engaged in purposeful contact with the forum state, such that it could reasonably expect the courts of that state to assert personal jurisdiction over it. A passage from the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County amplifies upon this inquiry:
"The constitutional touchstone" of the determination whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process "remains whether the defendant purposefully established `minimum contacts' in the forum State." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). Most recently we have reaffirmed the oft-quoted reasoning of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), that minimum contacts must have a basis in "some acts by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Burger King, 471 U.S., at 475, 105 S.Ct., at 2183. "Jurisdiction is proper ... where the contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a `substantial connection' with the forum State." Ibid., quoting McGee v. International Life...
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