Kinzer v. Stephens

• Decision Date: 16 October 1903
• Parties: HENRY KINZER ASSINGED TO A. F. BRIDGES, Trustee, Appellee, v. WM. W. STEPHENS, Defendant, OLIVER PUGH, AND FRANK PUGH, Garnishees, Appellants
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

96 N.W. 858

121 Iowa 347

HENRY KINZER ASSINGED TO A. F. BRIDGES, Trustee, Appellee, v. WM. W. STEPHENS, Defendant, OLIVER PUGH, AND FRANK PUGH, Garnishees, Appellants

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

October 16, 1903

Appeal from Keokuk District Court.--HON. W. G. CLEMENTS, Judge.

GARNISHMENT proceedings to subject the purchase price of a homestead owned by George W. Stephens and Hannah Stephens, his wife now deceased, to the payment of a judgment obtained by one Kinzer against William W. Stephens, a son of George W. and Hannah Stephens. The trial court held the garnishees liable and they appeal.

Affirmed.

C. H Mackey for appellants.

Stockman & Hamilton for appellee.

OPINION

DEEMER, J.

The case involves a construction of section 2985 of the Code, which reads as follows: "Upon the death of either husband or wife the survivor may continue to possess and occupy the whole homestead until it is otherwise disposed of according to law * * * but if there be no survivor, the homestead descends to the issue of either husband or wife according to the rules of descent, * * * and it is to be held by such issue exempt from any antecedent debts of their parents or their own, except those of the owner thereof contracted prior to the acquisition." Under this section we have held that the legal title of the homestead upon the death of the owner descends to the heirs of such owner, subject to a right of occupancy in the surviving husband or wife (Burns v. Keas, 21 Iowa 257), and that the heirs hold the homestead free from the debts of their ancestor, and also hold it exempt from their own debts contracted before the death of their ancestor, even though they do not take possession of and occupy the homestead (Kite v. Kite, 79 Iowa 491, 44 N.W. 716.) The exemption is not because of any right the heirs have in the property, but because of the homestead right of their ancestor; hence occupancy by the heirs is not essential to the exemption. Johnson v. Gaylord, 41 Iowa 362; Baker v. Jamison, 73 Iowa 698, 36 N.W. 647. From this it follows that even a nonresident heir is entitled to hold his share exempt from his debts. Maguire v. Kennedy, 91 Iowa 272, 59 N.W. 36.

Geo. W. Stephens owned a homestead at the time of his death, which occurred May 10, 1884. He left surviving his widow, Hannah, and six children, one of whom is defendant W. W. Stephens. The widow continued to occupy the homestead until her death on June 16, 1901. Both George W. and Hannah Stephens died intestate. Kinzer recovered his judgment against W. W. Stephens October 1, 1888, but it does not appear when the debt on which judgment was obtained was contracted. On the 23d of November, 1901, the surviving heirs of George W. and Hannah Stephens sold the homestead to garnishee Frank Pugh, and the money sought to be sequestered in this case is that part of the purchase price belonging to defendant Wm. W. Stephens. The trial court rendered judgment against the garnishee, holding that the proceeds from the sale of the homestead were not exempt in the hands of the heirs or their vendees. Defendant Wm. W. Stephens has never occupied the premises, and makes no claim to the proceeds thereof because the property was his homestead. Nor does it appear that this defendant was intending to change homesteads by investing the proceeds of the one inherited from his ancestor in another. The sole question in the case, then, is, are the proceeds of such a homestead as we have described exempt from the debts of an heir?

It is fundamental that, in the absence of statute, proceeds of exempt property, resulting from a voluntary sale thereof, are not exempt. And is just as well settled that such proceeds from an involuntary sale, damages to the property growing out of a tort, or the resultant of other involuntary substitution of non-exempt for exempt property, is exempt, at least for a reasonable length of time. Friedlander v. Mahoney 31 Iowa 311; Harrier v. Fassett, 56 Iowa 264, 9 N.W. 217; Thompson on Homesteads & Exemptions, sections 745, 746; Kaiser v. Seaton, 62 Iowa 463, 17 N.W. 664; Mudge v. Lanning, 68 Iowa 641, 27 N.W. 793; Blum v. Light, 81 Tex. 414 (16 S.W. 1090); Reynolds v. Haines, 83 Iowa 342, 49 N.W. 851; First Nat. Bank of What Cheer v. Willie, 115 Iowa 77, 87 N.W. 734; Huskins v. Hanlon, 72 Iowa 37, 33 N.W. 352; Kirby v. Giddings, 75 Tex. 679 (13 S.W. 27). To meet this situation, several states have provided for the exemption of the proceeds of a voluntary sale of exempt property. See statute cited in Watson v. Saxer, 102 Ill. 585; Hewitt v. Campbell 54 Wis. 583 (12 N.W. 45). We have no such statute; hence the general rule obtains, and, as the sale in this case was voluntary, the proceeds are not exempt. With the policy of the law we have nothing to do. It may be that under this construction the homestead acquired by descent from an ancestor is of no great value to an heir who is so unfortunate as to be in debt when he acquires his right thereto, and that the legislature should provide for an exemption of the proceeds for a reasonable length of time, or for certain purposes; but it is not our province to cure hardships, real or apparent, in the law as it is written. Appellants' counsel rely on Reynolds v. Haines, 83 Iowa 342, 49 N.W. 851; Kaiser v. Seaton, 62 Iowa 463, 17 N.W. 664; First Nat. Bank of What Cheer v. Willie, 115 Iowa 77, 87 N.W. 734. None of these cases are in point. In Reynolds' Case the question involved was the right to the avails of insurance upon exempt personal property. There was no voluntary disposition of the property in that case. The money due on the policy stood in place of the property destroyed and was acquired in invitum. In the Kaiser Case, the money was the proceeds of a...