Kirkpatrick v. Brownfield

• Decision Date: 23 May 1895
• Citation: 97 Ky. 558
• Parties: Kirkpatrick v. Brownfield.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

Page 558

97 Ky. 558

Kirkpatrick v. Brownfield.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

May 23, 1895.

APPEAL FROM LARUE CIRCUIT COURT.

HOBSON & O'MEARA FOR APPELLANT.

I. W. TWYMAN AND D. H. SMITH FOR APPELLEE.

JUDGE HAZELRIGG DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

The appellant and appellee were rival candidates for the office of county court clerk, of Larue county, at the November election, 1894. Appellant received a majority of the votes cast, and was awarded a certificate of election by the canvassing board. Appellee contested his election upon the ground that he had not, at the time of his election, procured from the proper officer a certificate of his qualification as required by law.

It was agreed that the appellant, on the 8th day of September, 1894, had obtained from the clerk of the Larue Circuit Court, a certificate showing his qualification, and that on the 10th day of November, 1894, he had procured from his circuit judge, a certificate stating that he had been examined by the clerk of the Metcalfe Circuit Court, under the supervision of the judge, and that the applicant was qualified for the office of county court clerk; the first certificate being issued before and the second after the election. The contesting board held the appellant to have been ineligible at the time of his election and hence not qualified to hold the office, which was, therefore, declared vacant. On appeal to the circuit court that finding was approved, and from that judgment Kirkpatrick prosecutes this appeal.

It is not contended that the certificate of September, 1894, has any efficacy, but it is insisted by the appellant that the requirements of the constitution were met upon the procurement of the certificate of the circuit judge after the election, and before the term began for which he was elected. The controlling provision of the Constitution reads as follows: "No person shall be eligible to the offices mentioned in sections ninety-seven and ninety-nine, who is not, at the time of his election, twenty-four years of age (except clerks of county and circuit courts, who shall be twenty-one years of age), a citizen of Kentucky and who has not resided in the State two years, and one year next preceding his election in the county and district in which he is a candidate. No person shall be eligible to the office of Commonwealth's attorney unless he shall have been a licensed practicing lawyer four years. No person shall be eligible to the office of clerk unless he shall have procured from a judge of the court of appeals or a judge of a circuit court, a certificate that he has been examined by the clerk of his court under his supervision, and that he is qualified for the office for which he is a candidate." (Section 100.)

For the appellant it is said that so much of this section as refers to the age and residence of the candidate, relates to the time of the election, because it is so expressed; but that the rest of the section relates, not to the time of election, but to the time of holding the office. That the words, "eligible for the office," and "eligible to election," or "eligible when elected," are purposely used to convey different meanings. On the other hand, the appellee contends that the word "eligible" has a well-defined, legal signification, and the expression "eligible to the office," is but a brief and concise form of stating "capable of being legally chosen or elected to the office."

Each party appeals to his favorite lexicographer to support his contention in the use of the word "eligible," and it is evident that the construction of the section can not be made to depend on the definition given by these learned compilers. The word is variously defined, as "proper to be chosen;" "legally qualified, as eligible to office," and we are thus left to ascertain in some other way the sense to be attached to the word as used in the section. Primarily, the word "eligible," from the latin, eligere, to elect, means capable of being elected, or if we may temporarily coin a word, eligible means "electible;" but the use of the word is not at all confined to this primary meaning, and if we attempt to substitute this meaning in the various sections of the Constitution where the word is used, we reach quite absurd results, whereas, if we substitute the definition "legally qualified," as insisted on by the appellant, we obtain a consistent and natural construction of all the sections. In section 114 we read: "No person shall be eligible to election as judge of the court of appeals," etc. In section 130 we read: "No person shall be eligible as judge of the circuit court who is less than thirty-five years of age when elected," etc. Manifestly, the word does not import in these sections more than that the person shall be "legally qualified," and because that legal qualification is required to exist at the time of the election other words were added to so indicate the purpose in view by the framers of the constitution. By section 93 certain officers are made ineligible to re-election, and by section 165 a notary public and officers of the militia are declared not ineligible to hold or exercise any office, etc. The framers of the constitution, in these sections, used the word in the sense of legally "qualified" for office or qualified to hold office. Thus "No person shall be qualified for election as judge of the court of appeals, etc., or qualified as judge of the circuit court, who is less than thirty-five years of age when elected," etc. And so in numerous instances it is apparent that where eligibility is...