Kirsch v. Harker, 17880

Citation120 Ind.App. 66,89 N.E.2d 924
Decision Date06 February 1950
Docket NumberNo. 17880,17880
PartiesKIRSCH v. HARKER.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Indiana

Charles Davis, Mishawaka, for appellant.

Leo Van Tilbury, Mishawaka, George Sands, South Bend, for appellee.

BOWEN, Judge.

Appellant filed an action in the lower court for personal injuries allegedly suffered by her while she was riding in appellee's automobile as his guest. Appellee filed a demurrer to appellant's amended complaint which the court sustained, appellant refused to plead further, and the court entered judgment for appellee and against appellant.

The sole error assigned for reversal is the action of the court in sustaining appellee's demurrer to appellant's amended complaint.

Appellant's amended complaint, in substance, alleged the existence of an ordinance of the City of Mishawaka, Indiana, requiring motorists to stop before entering a street intersection marked with a 'Stop' sign; that a stop sign in accordance with said ordinance had been erected on the south side of Broadway Street where the same intersects Division Street in said city; that said Broadway Street runs east and west where the same intersects said Division Street; and that said Division Street runs north and south where the same intersects said Broadway Street; that there is a slight jog in Broadway at said intersection, so that the south line of the same, where it continues eastwardly from the east side of Division Street, is approximately thirty feet north of the place where such south line intersects the west line of Division Street, and that it is necessary for one going east through said intersection to go in a northeasterly direction; that immediately in front of the traffic approaching Division Street from the west on Broadway and on the east side of Division Street, approximately forty-two feet from the west curb line of Division Street, is located a large tree, and immediately to the west and not more than fifteen feet distance therefrom is a two-story dwelling house; that said tree and house was in plain view of all persons approaching Division Street on Broadway from the west, and that if one entered Division Street from the west and continued due eastwardly, he would run into said tree, and should he drive to one side of the tree he would run into said dwelling house; that on the day in question the appellee was operating his automobile east on said Broadway Street, and that appellant was riding in appellee's automobile as his guest; that appellee was guilty of wanton and wilful misconduct in this; that he disregarded and failed to observe said ordinance and such stop sign, and failed to slow down or bring his automobile to a stop before entering said intersection, and he failed to operate and drive his automobile in a northeastwardly direction through said intersection, and although said tree on the east side of Division Street was plainly visible to him, the appellee with a conscious indifference to the consequences, drove and operated his said automobile into and against said tree on the east side of Division Street, and thereby caused plaintiff to suffer the injuries complained of, as a direct result of the alleged wanton and wilful misconduct to her damage.

The grounds set forth in appellee's demurrer are that the facts averred in appellant's amended complaint are insufficient in law to constitute a cause of action. In the memorandum attached to the demurrer, the appellee claims that the facts alleged do not amount to or constitute 'wanton or wilful misconduct' within the meaning of the so-called 'guest' statute, § 47-1021, Burns' Stat.1940 Repl., and that the facts averred simply charge defendant with negligence in failing to obey the stop sign and in failing to...

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8 cases
  • Slusher v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 30 Junio 1982
    ...of "conscious and intentional ... omission of a duty with reckless indifference to the consequences ...." See, Kirsch v. Harker (1950), 120 Ind.App. 66, 71, 89 N.E.2d 924, 926; Swinney v. Roler (1943), 113 Ind.App. 367, 371, 47 N.E.2d 846, 847. Assuming arguendo that Olsen was entitled only......
  • Eikenberry v. Neher
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 5 Junio 1956
    ...a necessary element. Bernier v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 1921, 296 Ill. 464, 129 N.E. 747, affirming 215 Ill.App. 454." Kirsch v. Harker, 1950, 120 Ind.App. 66, 89 N.E.2d 924; Lee Brothers v. Jones, 1944, 114 Ind.App. 688, 54 N.E.2d With these definitions in mind, we proceed to view the prese......
  • Walker v. Ellis
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 3 Octubre 1955
    ...the facts stated entitle appellant to any relief, it is sufficient as against appellee's demurrer for want of facts. Kirsch v. Harker, 1950, 120 Ind.App. 66, 89 N.E.2d 924. Appellee says the complaint shows appellant to be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. With this we a......
  • Desch v. Reeves
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
    • 25 Junio 1958
    ...C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 399 (4) c, page 1001. The following definition of the term "wanton or wilful" appears in Kirsch v. Harker, 1950, 120 Ind.App. 66, 89 N.E.2d 924, 926: "Our courts have laid down the rule that wilful or wanton misconduct consists of conscious and intentional doing of a......
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