Kiser v. State
| Decision Date | 07 May 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 44520,44520 |
| Parties | Duane Ferrell KISER, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. An accused is presumed sane for the purpose of standing trial in the absence of a finding to the contrary pursuant to G.S.1949, 62-1531 (now K.S.A. 62-1531).
2. In a criminal action a defendant is deemed sane and able to stand trial if he is found to be capable of comprehending his position and making his defense.
3. The question of the accused's mental responsibility for the commission of a crime must be presented and determined during the trial; it cannot be raised in a 60-1507 proceeding, inasmuch as the guilt or innocence of one convicted of a crime is not properly justiciable therein.
4. The record in a proceeding commenced pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507 is examined, and for the reasons set forth in the opinion, it is held, that the district court did not err in overruling the petitioner's motion to vacate and set aside the judgment and sentence.
Ted M. Templar, Arkansas City, argued the cause, and was on the brief for appellant.
J. Michael Smith, County Atty., argued the cause, and Robert C. Londerholm, Atty. Gen., and Tom Pringle, Deputy County Atty., were with him on the brief for appellee.
This is an appeal from an order of the district court of Coweley county denying appellant's motion, filed pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507, to vacate and set aside a judgment and sentence. Hereinafter appellant will be referred to as petitioner or Kiser.
The events giving rise to this appeal began on October 20, 1961, when a complaint was filed against Kiser charging him with burglary in the second degree (G.S.1959 Supp., 21-520). On the same date Kiser waived preliminary hearing and was bound over to the district court for trial. An information was subsequently filed, and the district court appointed Mr. Lyle W. Loomis as counsel for Kiser. Mr. Loomis filed an application for the appointment of a commission to determine the petitioner's ability 'to comprehend his position and make his defense' to the charge set forth in the information. A commission, consisting of three duly licensed physicians, was appointed by the court. The commission held a hearing on December 13, 1961, at which the county attorney, Kiser and his court-appointed counsel were present. The commission filed its report in which it found Kiser was able to comprehend his position and make his defense in the case; however, it recommended that Kiser receive psychiatric treatment for the reasons he had approximately fifty scars on his body from self-inflicted wounds, and his behavior for the last ten years had been very antisocial.
On December 19, 1961, Kiser appeared with his court-appointed counsel before the district court. The court noted the commission's findings and queried Kiser concerning whether he had discussed with his counsel his rights pertaining to his defense in the matter and whether he understood the nature of the offense with which he was charged. Kiser answered affirmatively and thereafter entered a plea of guilty to the charge of burglary in the second degree (G.S.1959 Supp., 21-520). At that time the state gave notice that it intended to present evidence upon which sentence pursuant to the habitual criminal act (G.S.1949, 21-107a) could be imposed against Kiser. The court continued the hearing to December 26 for the purpose of sentencing. On the latter date evidence was introduced showing that Kiser had been convicted of two prior felonies, and he was snetenced to not less than fifteen years in the Kansas State Penitentiary. No appeal was taken from these proceedings.
On August 4, 1965, the petitioner filed his motion, pro se, under K.S.A. 60-1507, setting forth, in rather ambiguous and inarticulate form, several grounds which we believe to be encompassed within the points raised on appeal. On September 15 the court considered Kiser's motion and, without holding a plenary hearing, made extensive findings of fact and concluded that the motion, files and records conclusively showed that he was not entitled to any relief, and overruled petitioner's motion. Appeal has been duly perfected from such order, and Kiser is now represented by Ted M. Templar, court-appointed counsel.
Petitioner first contends that the commission was not properly instructed concerning the issues involved nor the findings to be made. His contention petains to statements made by the county attorney during the commission hearing to the effect that it was the commission's duty to inquire into the mental condition of the petitioner for the sole purpose of determining whether or not he was able to comprehend his position and make his defense. Kiser also complains that not only did the commission fail to consider all of the issues but also failed to make proper findings at the conclusion of the hearing. The thrust of Kiser's argument centers on the fact that the report did not contain specific findings that he was sane, not an idiot nor an imbecile.
The pertinent portion of G.S.1949, 62-1531 (now K.S.A. 62-1531) is as follows:
'Whenever any person under indictment or information, and before or during the trial thereon, and before verdict is rendered, shall be found by the court in which such indictment or information is filed, or by a commission or another jury empaneled for the purpose of trying such question, to be insane, an idiot or an imbecile and unable to comprehend his position, and to make his defense, the court shall forthwith commit him to the state hospital for the dangerous insane for safekeeping and treatment; * * *.'
Petitioner's argument on his first point is without merit. The record reveals that a lengthy hearing was conducted by the commission at which the petitioner and his counsel was present and participated. Full inquiry was made by the commission members concerning the petitioner's mental competency and ability to stand trial. An examination of the hearing transcript discloses no evidence suggesting the petitioner was an idiot or an imbecile; on the other hand, there was ample evidence to sustain the commission's finding that he was able to comprehend his position and make his defense. In view of such finding, the petitioner was deemed sane for the purpose of being tried. (State v. Severns, 184 Kan. 213, 336 P.2d 447; State v. Kelly, 192 Kan. 641, 391 P.2d 123; State v. Cox, 193 Kan. 571, 396 P.2d 326, cert. den. 380 U.S. 982, 85 S.Ct. 1350, 14 L.Ed.2d 276.) The fact that a specific finding was not made that petitioner was sane is...
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Allen v. State, 44822
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...This being the case, the sentence is not void; the journal entry is merely incomplete and subject to correction. (Kiser v. State, 196 Kan. 736, 413 P.2d 1002; State v. Moses, 190 Kan. 485, 376 P.2d 804, cert. den. Moses v. Hand, 368 U.S. 863, 82 S.Ct. 110, 7 L.Ed.2d 61; Converse v. Hand, 18......
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