Kissic v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 15 April 1994 |
Citation | 641 So.2d 250 |
Parties | Judi KISSIC v. LIBERTY NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al. 1930272. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
G. Gregory White, Birmingham, for Judi Kissic.
R. Blake Lazenby of Wooten, Thorton, Carpenter, O'Brien, Lazenby & Lawrence, Talladega, for Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., Inc. and Robert Daniel Bice, Jr.
G. Rod Giddens of Ghee & Giddens, Anniston, and J. Stanton Glasscox, Oneonta, for Onnie Leon Kissic.
On June 9, 1989, Ronnie Kissic and his wife, Judi Kissic, sued Liberty National Life Insurance Company, Inc. ("Liberty National"); one of its agents, Robert Daniel Bice, Jr.; and Ronnie Kissic's father, Onnie Leon Kissic, seeking damages based on allegations that the defendants had fraudulently induced Ronnie Kissic to change the designated beneficiary under his life insurance policy from Judi Kissic to Leon Kissic. The record indicates that Ronnie Kissic and Judi Kissic were represented by the same attorney and that Ronnie Kissic died sometime after September 6, 1990, but before February 25, 1991. On February 25, 1991, Liberty National and Bice filed a crossclaim against Leon Kissic which in the second paragraph referred to "the death of plaintiff Ronnie Kissic." The crossclaim, which was served on Leon Kissic and Judi Kissic's attorney, stated a claim against Leon Kissic for the amount of life insurance proceeds paid to him under the policy, in the event that it was determined that the payment of those proceeds was improper. On May 3, 1993, Judi Kissic filed a "motion for joinder" to add her two minor children as plaintiffs in the action. This motion was served on the three defendants. In the second paragraph of that motion, Ronnie Kissic was referred to as "now deceased," and in the fourth paragraph reference was made to "the death of Ronnie Kissic." On October 13, 1993, 31 months and 18 days after the crossclaim was filed and 5 months and 10 days after the motion for joinder was filed, and after a hearing on August 11, 1993, during which the parties stipulated that Ronnie Kissic was, in fact, deceased, the trial court dismissed Ronnie Kissic's claims for noncompliance with Rule 25, A.R.Civ.P. It is undisputed that a proper party was never substituted for Ronnie Kissic following his death.
The dispositive issue is whether either the crossclaim filed by Liberty National and Bice against Leon Kissic or the motion for joinder filed by Judi Kissic was sufficient to constitute a suggestion of death on the record, so as to commence the running of the six-month period for substituting a proper party under Rule 25.
Rule 25(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"Unless the motion for substitution is made not later than six months after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of the death [on the parties as provided in Rule 5, Ala.R.Civ.P., and on nonparty successors or representatives as provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons], the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party."
(Emphasis added.) Our research has disclosed little Alabama caselaw interpreting the emphasized language above. In Big Red Elephant v. Bryant, 477 So.2d 342 (Ala.1985), this Court held that a statement suggesting death does not have to include the date of the party's death, and in Winter v. Cox, 553 So.2d 60 (Ala.1989), we held that a notation on a case action summary sheet as to a party's death is not a sufficient statement to initiate the running of the period for filing a motion for substitution under Rule 25(a)(1), at least where there is no evidence that a copy of the case action summary sheet was served in accordance with the rule. Although Winter v. Cox is not determinative of the issue presented in the present case, it does suggest that Rule 25(a)(1) requires that a statement suggesting the death of a party, in addition to being properly served, must provide sufficient notice that the time period has begun for substituting a proper party for a deceased party.
We note that that part of Rule 25 requiring service of a "statement of the fact of death" is identical to its federal counterpart, and, as we have stated many times, we look to the federal courts' interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when those rules are similar to our own. Our research indicates that the federal courts require a formal statement suggesting death on the record in order to initiate the running of the time period for substituting the proper party. See 3B Moore's Federal Practice, § 25.06(3) (2d ed. 1991); 7C C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1955 (1986); Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835 (10th Cir.1990) ( ); United States v. Miller Brothers Construction Co., 505 F.2d 1031 (10th Cir.1974) ( ); Kaldawy v. Gold Service Movers, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 475 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (court's order noting the plaintiff's death and placing the case on the suspended calendar, which was mailed to the attorneys for all of the parties, including the decedent's attorney, was insufficient to start the running of the 90-day limitations period); Blair v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 104 F.R.D. 21 (W.D.Pa.1984), affirmed, 787 F.2d 580 (3rd Cir.1986) ( ); ACRI v. International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 595 F.Supp. 326 (N.D.Cal.1983), affirmed, 781 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816, 107 S.Ct. 73, 93 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986) ( ); National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Whitecraft Unlimited, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 507 (E.D.N.Y.1977) ( ); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Lefkowitz, 454 F.Supp. 59 (D.C.N.Y.1977) ( ); Dolgow v. Anderson, 45 F.R.D. 470 (E.D.N.Y.1968) ( ). See, also, Official Form 30, Fed.R.Civ.P., entitled "Suggestion of Death Upon the Record Under Rule 25(a)(1)." All of these cases make it very clear that the federal courts place great emphasis on formality when reviewing cases of this kind and that they do not consider an incidental or passing reference in a pleading or during discovery to be the equivalent of a "statement of...
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