Kitchen v. Upshaw

• Decision Date: 09 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. 99-2458.,99-2458.
• Parties: Ronnell Gray KITCHEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Douglas L. UPSHAW, Sargeant; Janulyn Y. Lennon, Captain; Darnley R. Hodges, Sr., Col.; Riverside Regional Jail Authority, Defendants-Appellees, and The City of Colonial Heights, Virginia, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

286 F.3d 179

Ronnell Gray KITCHEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Douglas L. UPSHAW, Sargeant; Janulyn Y. Lennon, Captain; Darnley R. Hodges, Sr., Col.; Riverside Regional Jail Authority, Defendants-Appellees, and The City of Colonial Heights, Virginia, Defendant.

No. 99-2458.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued September 26, 2000.

Decided April 9, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

ARGUED: Philip Steward Marstiller, Philip S. Marstiller, P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Fred R. Kozak, Beale, Balfour, Davidson, Etherington & Parker, Richmond, Virginia, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WIDENER wrote the opinion, in which Judge WILLIAMS and Judge MICHAEL concurred.

OPINION

WIDENER, Circuit Judge.

Ronnell Kitchen brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he had a constitutionally protected interest in work release and that officials of the Riverside Regional Jail intentionally violated that interest, causing Kitchen to lose his job. The district court found that the individual defendants enjoyed qualified immunity as individuals and granted summary judgment in their favor on that account. It also granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on the merits and in their official capacities. Kitchen appeals. We affirm, finding that Kitchen enjoyed no constitutionally protected liberty interest in his work-release determination under Virginia law.

I.

We review de novo a district court's order granting summary judgment and view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Once the moving party discharges its burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. F.R.C.P. 56(c); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Summary judgment will be granted unless a jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the evidence presented. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

II.

The undisputed facts of this case follow. On July 15, 1997, in the circuit court of Colonial Heights, Virginia, Ronnell Kitchen (Kitchen) pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor charges of driving under the influence of intoxicants and driving on a suspended license. Kitchen was fined and sentenced to a jail term. The sentencing judge's order also contained the following:

The Court authorizes that the defendant may participate in a work release program if he is eligible. The defendant must further pay court costs on this charge of $128.00.

Kitchen's brother-in-law, David Resnick, paid in full Kitchen's fines and court costs that same day. Also that same day, Kitchen was committed to the Riverside Regional Jail (Jail).

Sergeant Douglas Upshaw (Upshaw), a defendant in this action, was the work-release coordinator for the Jail. On July 16, Upshaw interviewed Kitchen, and Kitchen signed a "Work and Education Release Program Rules" form. Kitchen also submitted a handwritten statement, explaining that he had a strong desire to participate in the work-release program because he had worked for Allied Signal for twenty-four years, because he had four more years to go until retirement, and because he would be fired if he missed five days of work. On the same day as the interview, Upshaw sent by facsimile to Allied Signal a copy of the "Employer's Community Work Agreement," a form requiring the employer's signature and imposing certain conditions on employers participating in work release.¹ The fax to Allied Signal was marked "Urgent" and "Reply ASAP."

Allied Signal did not respond to Upshaw's fax. On July 17th, Upshaw then telephoned Allied Signal to discuss the company's willingness to participate in the program. Officials at Allied Signal, however, expressed reservations about participating in Kitchen's work release. Allied Signal did not want, for example, law enforcement officials to come onto the work site to monitor Kitchen. Upshaw responded that he would not need to speak with Kitchen at the work site but would only need to see him there, perhaps through a window. Allied officials told Upshaw that they wanted more time to consider the matter and that they would contact him on July 18th with their decision.

Not having heard back from Allied Signal, Upshaw again telephoned the company on Monday, July 21. That call apparently went unreturned. Instead, on July 23, Upshaw received a letter from an official at Allied Signal who said that company policy was not to participate in work-release programs. The letter went on to say that Kitchen was welcome to return to work under the previous conditions of his employment — if he could do so by July 24 — but that, in effect, the company would not cooperate with the Jail in supervising Kitchen.

On July 23, pursuant to the Jail's Standard Operating Procedures, known as SOPs, Upshaw sent a letter to the sentencing judge explaining Allied Signal's refusal to participate and reporting that Kitchen was therefore denied work-release privileges. In the letter, Upshaw also asked the sentencing judge whether Kitchen should be granted work release despite Allied Signal's refusal to participate and also apparently enclosed a copy of Allied Signal's letter of July 23. There is no evidence in the record that the judge ever responded to Upshaw's letter. Kitchen did not report for work on July 24.

Finally, following a telephone call from Kitchen's union representative to Superintendent Hodges on July 29, the Jail agreed to waive the requirement that Allied Signal agree to participate in Kitchen's work release. Kitchen was thus granted work-release privileges effective July 30. However, by that time, Allied Signal had discharged Kitchen. On July 30, Captain Janulyn Lennon, Upshaw's supervisor, wrote to Allied Signal saying that in light of Kitchen's long term of employment with the company and short time to go until retirement, the Jail was willing to waive the visitation requirement and the requirement that the employer agree to the terms of the Employer's Community Work Agreement. Captain Lennon's letter also expressed hope Allied Signal would reinstate Kitchen. Allied Signal wrote back on August 1, saying the company had reviewed Kitchen's discharge and had decided not to reinstate him.

III.

At the outset, we should dispose of the Eleventh Amendment defense urged by the Regional Jail Authority.

The Authority argues that it is an arm of the State for purposes of immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Although the district court expressed no opinion on the question, because the defense may be raised at any time, see Suarez Corp. Industries v. McGraw, 125 F.3d 222 (4th Cir.1997), we address the question. The Eleventh Amendment² limits the Article III jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear cases against States and state officers acting in their official capacities. Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to mere political subdivisions of a State such as counties or municipalities. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) (citing Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530, 10 S.Ct. 363, 33 L.Ed. 766 (1890)). However, the amendment does confer sovereign immunity on an arm of the State. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280, 97 S.Ct. 568. There is no clear line separating those state instrumentalities that are entitled to sovereign immunity from those that are not, and we follow the Supreme Court's admonition that courts should seek guidance in the twin purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, namely: 1) "the State's fears that `federal courts would force them to pay their Revolutionary War debts, leading to their financial ruin,'" and 2) "the integrity retained by each State in our federal system." Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39, 115 S.Ct. 394, 130 L.Ed.2d 245 (1994). Accordingly, the principal factor to be considered is "whether a judgment against the government entity would have to be paid from the State's treasury." Cash v. Granville County Bd. of Education, 242 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir.2001) (citations omitted). This is often the end of the inquiry, for if the "State treasury will be called upon to pay a judgment against a governmental entity ... consideration of any other factor becomes unnecessary," and the entity will be immune. Cash, 242 F.3d at 223. A finding to the contrary weighs against immunity. However, even if the state's treasury will not be used to satisfy a judgment, we still must determine if the relationship of the entity with the state is close enough to implicate the "dignity of the State as a sovereign." 242 F.3d at 224. We apply three additional factors in this determination: 1) the degree of control that the State exercises over the entity; 2) whether the entity deals with local rather than statewide concerns; and 3) "the manner in which State law treats the entity." 242 F.3d at 224 (citations omitted).

We are of opinion that the Regional Jail Authority is not an arm of the State for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. First, and foremost, Virginia's treasury is not implicated here. The statutory scheme that enables municipalities and other political subdivisions to create these regional authorities also confers on the entity the power to sue and be sued in its own name. See Va.Code Ann. § 53.1-95.7(11). There is nothing in this section that indicates that a regional authority acts on behalf of the State when it sues or is sued and...