Kitchens v. Tordsen
| Decision Date | 19 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:12-cv-00105-AWI-MJS (PC) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | LANARD KITCHENS, Plaintiff, v. TORDSEN, et al., Defendants. |
Telephonic Trial Confirmation Hearing: September 8, 2015, at 3:00 p.m. in Courtroom 2 (AWI)
Jury Trial: October 27, 2015, at 8:30 a.m. in Courtroom 2 (AWI)
Plaintiff Lanard Kitchens ("Plaintiff"), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on January 24, 2012. The matter proceeds against Defendant Tordsen for retaliating against Plaintiff by placing him twice in a feces-covered cell and refusing to give him a grievance form; and against Defendants Tordsen, Coker, Leach and Day for subjecting him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by placing him in the filthy cell and directing him to clean it with inadequate supplies, to wit, glass cleaner and toilet paper. (ECF Nos. 26, 28, 30, & 32.)
The events giving rise to Plaintiff's federal constitutional claims occurred on December 29-31, 2010 in the Segregated Housing Unit of the Kings County Jail in Hanford, California. Atthe time of the events, Defendant Coker was a detentions sergeant and Defendants Tordsen, Leach, and Day were detentions deputies with the Kings County Sheriff's Office. (ECF No. 38.)
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this federal civil rights action. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is proper because the conduct allegedly occurred in this judicial district.
Plaintiff and Defendants demand a trial by jury; therefore, this action shall be tried by jury. Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b), 39(a).
1. Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee incarcerated at the Kings County Jail at all times material to the claims at issue.
2. Defendants Tordsen, Day, Coker, and Leach were employed at the Kings County Jail at all times material to the claims at issue.
3. Following the discovery of makeshift tools and a hole in the wall of Plaintiff's cell on December 29, 2010, Plaintiff was handcuffed and placed in a holding cell while the infraction was being investigated.
4. Plaintiff was subsequently moved to cell B-86.
5. While in B-86, Plaintiff threatened suicide and was put on suicide watch overnight. The following day, Plaintiff was taken back to cell B-86.
6. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff injured himself, apparently after falling in cell B-86, and medical staff were called to the cell front to evaluate him.
1. Defendants
1. Whether Defendant Tordsen denied Plaintiff's requests for grievance forms.
2. Whether Plaintiff was ever placed in a cell contaminated with feces.
3. Whether Plaintiff was directed to clean the cell.
4. Whether Defendant Tordsen retaliated against Plaintiff by placing him in a feces-covered cell or by any other means.
6. Whether Plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of falling in the cell, and if so, their nature and extent.
2. Plaintiff1
1. Whether Defendant Tordsen placed Plaintiff in cell B-86, knowing it was covered in feces, in retaliation for Plaintiff's grievance request.
2. Whether, in responding to Plaintiff's threat of suicide, Defendants did not obey proper protocol.
3. Whether Defendants knew Plaintiff was merely threatening suicide in order to be removed from the dirty cell.
3. Whether Defendants gave Plaintiff the option of being placed on suicide watch or cleaning his cell.
4. Whether Defendants intentionally returned Plaintiff to the feces-covered cell after his stay on suicide watch.
5. Whether Defendants subjected Plaintiff to unconstitutional conditions of confinement by housing him in the feces-contaminated cell and providing him with inadequate cleaning supplies.
6. Whether Defendants gave Plaintiff glass cleaner and toilet paper to clean the cell.
7. Whether Plaintiff slipped in glass cleaner while cleaning the cell and hit his head.
19. Whether Defendants were aware that Plaintiff had slipped and fallen.
20. Whether Plaintiff has suffered permanent facial paralysis and back pain as a result of the fall.
1. Defendants
Defendants anticipate objecting to the introduction of the following:
Defendants reserve the right to raise further objections upon the presentation of specific testimony or exhibits.
2. Plaintiff
Plaintiff anticipates objecting to the introduction of the following:
None.
In Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, he requested $1.9 million in compensatory damages and $1.9 million in punitive damages against Defendants Tordsen, Coker, Leach, and Day. In his pretrial statement, Plaintiff seeks to amend his damages request to $5 million in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages.3
Plaintiff also seeks a declaratory judgment. However, "'[a] case or controversy exists justifying declaratory relief only when the challenged government activity is not contingent, hasnot evaporated or disappeared, and, by its continuing and brooding presence, casts what may well be a substantial adverse effect on the interests of the petitioning parties.'" Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. U.S., 648 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Management, Medford Dist., 893 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1989). In this case, Plaintiff's claims arise from past events at a prison where he is no longer housed. Furthermore, because Plaintiff's claims for damages necessarily entail a determination whether his rights were violated, any separate request for declaratory relief was subsumed by those claims, and the request was dismissed from the action on May 31, 2013, on that ground. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 565-66 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). (ECF No. 32.)
Defendants seek judgment in their favor and an award of costs and attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:
Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Under § 1983, Plaintiff must link each defendant to the participation in the violation at issue. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1948-49 (2009); Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Liability may not be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior; some causal connection must exist between the conduct of each defendant and the violation at issue. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Lemire v. California Dep't of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 711 F.3d 941, 967-68 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012).
In the prison context, a First Amendment retaliation claim has five elements: first, that the plaintiff engaged in conduct protected by the First Amendment; second, that the defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff; third, that there is a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action; fourth, that the adverse action either chilled the plaintiff's protected conduct or "would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities;" and fifth, that the defendant's retaliatory action did not advance legitimate correctional goals. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-1115 (9th Cir. 2012); accord Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-568 (9th Cir. 2005).
The first element can be satisfied by various activities. Filing a grievance, for instance, is a protected action under the First Amendment. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114; Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989). More broadly, an inmate's opinions, voiced outside the context of legal or administrative proceedings, are also entitled to First Amendment protection. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1995)(interview with television station was First Amendment activity for retaliation purposes).
The adverse action necessary to satisfy the second element need not be so serious as to amount to a constitutional violation. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114; Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997). However, "insignificant retaliatory acts" are generally not actionable. Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 685 (5th Cir. 2006); accord...
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