Kitsap Cnty. Consol. Hous. Auth. v. Henry-Levingston
| Decision Date | 15 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 47696–7–II,47696–7–II |
| Citation | 385 P.3d 188,196 Wash.App. 688 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | KITSAP COUNTY CONSOLIDATED HOUSING AUTHORITY dba Housing Kitsap, Respondent, v. Kimbra HENRY–LEVINGSTON, Appellant. |
Stephen John Parsons, Northwest Justice Project, 715 Tacoma Ave. S., Tacoma, WA, 98402–2206, for Appellant.
David P. Horton, Templeton Horton Weibel PLLC, 3212 N.W. Byron St., Ste. 104, Silverdale, WA, 98383–9154, for Respondent.
Maxa, A.C.J.¶1 Kimbra Henry–Levingston appeals the trial court's ruling that she was in unlawful detainer of her federally subsidized apartment. Kimbra1 rented her apartment from Kitsap County Consolidated Housing Authority (known as "Housing Kitsap"), a public housing authority (PHA) that owns and manages subsidized housing. Housing Kitsap lawfully terminated Kimbra's lease effective at the end of the lease term because she violated certain lease provisions. Housing Kitsap then brought this unlawful detainer action under RCW 59.12.030(1), which allows a landlord to file an unlawful detainer action without providing an opportunity to cure against a "holdover" tenant who remains in leased premises after the lease term ends.
¶2 Kimbra argues that a combination of federal public housing law and Washington unlawful detainer law required Housing Kitsap to give her an opportunity to cure her lease violations before filing an unlawful detainer action. She relies on 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l )(1), which requires a PHA lease to automatically renew at the end of its term with one inapplicable exception. She claims that under this provision, her lease still renewed automatically even after Housing Kitsap terminated it. If Kimbra's lease renewed, RCW 59.12.030(4) would require Housing Kitsap to give Kimbra an opportunity to cure the lease violations before bringing an unlawful detainer during the lease term.¶3 We hold that under 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l ), a lawfully terminated lease does not automatically renew at the end of its term. Therefore, because Housing Kitsap lawfully terminated Kimbra's lease, it could file an unlawful detainer action under RCW 59.12.030(1) once the lease term ended and was not required to give Kimbra an opportunity to cure her lease violations. We also hold that (1) federal law did not prevent Housing Kitsap from bringing its unlawful detainer action without additional notice, (2) Kimbra's eviction did not violate her due process and equal protection rights, and (3) Kimbra failed to challenge the timeliness of Housing Kitsap's unlawful detainer action in the trial court and cannot raise it for the first time on appeal.
¶4 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling that Kimbra was in unlawful detainer.
FACTS
Signing the Lease
¶5 On January 10, 2014, Kimbra signed a lease with Housing Kitsap to rent a federally subsidized apartment. Under the lease's provisions, Kimbra's tenancy began on January 10 and the initial term of the lease was 12 months. But the lease provided that "[t]he first month of the lease shall be the calendar month during which [the] initial tenancy commences." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 327. Therefore, December 31, 2014 was listed as the end date. The lease further stated that the lease "shall automatically be renewed for successive terms of 12 months" unless modified or terminated in accordance with certain lease provisions or not renewed for noncompliance with statutorily required community service. CP at 327.
¶6 On the day of signing, Kimbra met with Megan Hastings, a Housing Kitsap employee, to review the lease terms. At that meeting, Kimbra was accompanied by the father of her three children, Gregory Levingston. Hastings asked Kimbra if Levingston would be living in the apartment, and Kimbra said that he would not be part of the household. Hastings told Kimbra that under the lease terms, Kimbra was required to inform Housing Kitsap of any changes to the household's income or composition.
Breach and Termination
¶7 In October, Hastings discovered that Kimbra and Levingston had married. The couple's marriage license listed Kimbra's subsidized apartment as Levingston's residence and a Housing Kitsap on-site employee told Hastings that he saw Levingston continuously at Kimbra's apartment complex.
¶8 Hastings requested that Levingston attend Kimbra's standard recertification meeting. At the meeting, Hastings asked Levingston to confirm that he had not been living at the Housing Kitsap apartment. While Levingston was pulling papers out of his wallet, Hastings saw a form indicating that Levingston was a registered sex offender. Housing Kitsap confirmed that Levingston was a registered sex offender and also discovered that Levingston had previously listed Kimbra's apartment as his address in his sex offender registration.
¶9 Shortly after the recertification meeting, Housing Kitsap gave Kimbra a 30–day notice that her lease was being terminated effective December 31, 2014. The notice stated that if Kimbra did not vacate the apartment by December 31, Housing Kitsap would bring an unlawful detainer action. The notice cited Levingston's residence at the apartment and Kimbra's failure to stay current on her utility bills and subsequent decision to transfer her utility account to Levingston as reasons for termination.2 The notice did not offer Kimbra a chance to cure the alleged violations, but it informed her of her right under federal law to request a grievance hearing.
Grievance Hearings
¶10 Kimbra requested an informal grievance hearing on her termination notice and submitted letters from herself and other witnesses. A Housing Kitsap housing manager upheld the decision to terminate Kimbra's tenancy.
¶11 Kimbra then requested a formal grievance hearing, which was scheduled for December 16 before a hearing officer. The hearing officer considered documentation from Housing Kitsap and heard testimony from several witnesses. The hearing officer upheld the termination decision, concluding after reviewing all required policies and procedures in both the lease and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations that Housing Kitsap could proceed with the termination of Kimbra's tenancy.
Unlawful Detainer Lawsuit
¶12 On January 9, 2015, Housing Kitsap filed a summons and complaint for unlawful detainer. The complaint alleged that Kimbra had remained unlawfully on the premises after her lease ended on December 31, 2014. Housing Kitsap obtained a show cause order requiring Kimbra to vacate the apartment.
¶13 Kimbra filed an answer in which she asserted affirmative defenses and moved to dismiss the complaint. She acknowledged that the initial term of the lease was from January 10 to December 31, 2014. But her affirmative defense stated that the lease terms and federal law required that her lease automatically renew. Kimbra also moved to dismiss on the ground that Housing Kitsap failed to allow her to cure her alleged lease violations as required by RCW 59.12.030(4). The trial court denied this motion and a subsequent motion for reconsideration.
¶14 After an expedited bench trial, the trial court ruled that Kimbra had in fact violated the terms of her lease. The trial court entering findings of fact that (1) Kimbra's lease expired on December 31, 2014 and would have automatically renewed if it had not been terminated for material breaches of the lease; (2) Kimbra violated the lease terms by improperly allowing Levingston to stay with her and failing to pay her utilities; (3) Housing Kitsap terminated Kimbra's lease under federal law by giving notice and an opportunity for a hearing; (4) because of the termination the lease did not renew and the lease and tenancy expired on December 31, 2014; and (5) on January 1, 2015 Kimbra was in unlawful detainer of the property. The trial court concluded that Housing Kitsap was entitled to possession and an award of reasonable attorney fees.
¶15 Kimbra appeals the trial court's decision.
ANALYSIS
¶16 Kimbra argues that under 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l )(1), her lease renewed automatically even after Housing Kitsap terminated the lease. Therefore, she claims that Housing Kitsap had to file its unlawful detainer action under RCW 59.12.030(4), which requires that she be given an opportunity to cure. Housing Kitsap argues that because it lawfully terminated Kimbra's lease effective December 31, 2014, the lease ended on that date and it could file an unlawful detainer action under RCW 59.12.030(1) without giving Kimbra an opportunity to cure.
¶17 We hold that 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l )(1)'s automatic renewal provision does not apply after a public housing lease has been lawfully terminated. Therefore, we hold that once a lease has been lawfully terminated for cause, a PHA may bring an unlawful detainer action under RCW 59.12.030(1) after the lease term ends without giving the tenant an opportunity to cure.
¶18 The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law following a bench trial. Kimbra does not assign error to the trial court's factual findings. Therefore, they are verities on appeal. State v. Westvang , 184 Wash.App. 1, 5, 335 P.3d 1024 (2014). But included in the trial court's findings of fact were "findings" that Housing Kitsap's termination of Kimbra's lease prevented it from automatically renewing. That determination was a legal conclusion that required the trial court to interpret the lease provisions and federal law. We review legal conclusions de novo, even if denominated as findings of fact. Robel v. Roundup Corp. , 148 Wash.2d 35, 43, 59 P.3d 611 (2002).
¶19 The terms of PHA lease agreements are dictated by federal statute, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1437d, as well as HUD regulations. Relevant here, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l )(1) states that PHAs "shall utilize" public housing leases that "have a term of 12 months and shall be automatically renewed for all purposes except for noncompliance with the requirements [relating to community service]."3
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