Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States

• Decision Date: 21 June 1943
• Docket Number: No. 870,870
• Citation: 63 S.Ct. 1375,320 U.S. 81,87 L.Ed. 1774
• Parties: KIYOSHI HIRABAYASHI v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

320 U.S. 81

63 S.Ct. 1375

87 L.Ed. 1774

KIYOSHI HIRABAYASHI

v UNITED STATES.

No. 870.

Argued May 10, 11, 1943.

Decided June 21, 1943.

Messrs. Frank L. Walters, of Seattle, Wash., and Harold Evans, of Philadelphia, Pa., for Hirabayashi.

Mr. Charles Fahy, Sol.Gen., of Washington, D.C., for the United States.

[Argument of Counsel from page 82 intentionally omitted] Mr. Chief Justice STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant, an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, was convicted in the district court of violating the Act of Congress of March 21, 1942, 56 Stat. 173,18 U.S.C.A. § 97a, which makes it a misdemeanor knowingly to disregard restrictions made applicable by a military commander to persons in a military area prescribed by him as such, all as authorized by an Executive Order of the President.

The questions for our decision are whether the particular restriction violated, namely that all persons of Japanese ancestry residing in such an area be within their place of residence daily between the hours of 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., was adopted by the military commander in the exercise of an unconstitutional delegation by Congress of its legislative power, and whether the restriction unconstitutionally discriminated between citizens of Japanese ancestry and those of other ancestries in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

The indictment is in two counts.The second charges that appellant, being a person of Japanese ancestr , had on a specified date, contrary to a restriction promulgated by the military commander of the Western Defense Command, Fourth Army, failed to remain in his place of resi- dence in the designated military area between the hours of 8:00 o'clock p.m. and 6:00 a.m.The first count charges that appellant, on May 11 and 12, 1942, had, contrary to a Civilian Exclusion Order issued by the military commander, failed to report to the Civil Control Station within the designated area, it appearing that appellant's required presence there was a preliminary step to the exclusion from that area of persons of Japanese ancestry.

By demurrer and plea in abatement, which the court overruled (C.C., 46 F.Supp. 657), appellant asserted that the indictment should be dismissed because he was an American citizen who had never been a subject of and had never borne allegiance to the Empire of Japan, and also because the Act of March 21, 1942, was an unconstitutional delegation of Congressional power.On the trial to a jury it appeared that appellant was born in Seattle in 1918, of Japanese parents who had come from Japan to the United States, and who had never afterward returned to Japan; that he was educated in the Washington public schools and at the time of his arrest was a senior in the University of Washington; that he had never been in Japan or had any association with Japanese residing there.

The evidence showed that appellant had failed to report to the Civil Control Station on May 11 or May 12, 1942, as directed, to register for evacuation from the military area.He admitted failure to do so, and stated it had at all times been his belief that he would be waiving his rights as an American citizen by so doing.The evidence also showed that for like reason he was away from his place of residence after 8:00 p.m. on May 9, 1942.The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts and appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three months on each, the sentences to run concurrently.

On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified to us questions of law upon which it desired in- structions for the decision of the case.See§ 239 of the Judicial Codeas amended, 28 U.S.C. § 346,28 U.S.C.A. § 346.Acting under the authority conferred upon us by that sectionwe ordered that the entire record be certified to this Court so that we might proceed to a decision of the matter in controversy in the same manner as if it had been brought here by appeal.63 S.Ct. 860, 87 L.Ed —-.Since the sentences of three months each imposed by the district court on the two counts were ordered to run concurrently, it will be unnecessary to consider questions raised with respect to the first count if we find that the conviction on the second count, for violation of the curfew order, must be sustained.Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 441, 45 S.Ct. 345, 347, 69 L.Ed. 699, 37 A.L.R. 1407;Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 33, 61 S.Ct. 429, 436, 85 L.Ed. 488.

The curfew order which appellant violated, and to which the sanction prescribed by the Act of Congress has been deemed to attach, purported to be issued pursuant to an Executive Order of the President.In passing upon the authority of the military commander to make and execute the order, it becomes necessary to consider in some detail the official action which preceded or accompanied the order and from which it derives its purported authority.

On December 8, 1941, one day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor by a Japanese air force, Congress declared war against Japan.55 Stat. 795, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, preceding section 1 note.On February 19, 1942, the President promulgated Executive Order No. 9066. 7 Federal Register 1407.The Order recited that 'the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities as defined in Section 4, Act of April 20, 1918, 40 Stat. 533, as amended by the Act of November 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 1220, and the Act of August21, 1941, 55 Stat. 655 (50 U.S.C.A. § 104)'.By virtue of the authority vested in him as President and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, the President purported to 'authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion.'

On February 20, 1942, the Secretary of War designated Lt. General J. L. DeWitt as Military Commander of the Western Defense Command, comprising the Pacific Coast states and some others, to carry out there the duties prescribed by Executive Order No. 9066.On March 2, 1942, General DeWitt promulgated Public ProclamationNo. 1. 7 Federal Register 2320.The proclamation recited that the entire Pacific Coast 'by its geographical location is particularly subject to attack, to attempted invasion by the armed forces of nations with which the United States is now at war, and, in connection therewith, is subject to espionage and acts of sabotage, thereby requiring the adoption of military measures necessary to establish safeguards against such enemy operations'.It stated that 'the present situation requires as matter of military necessity the establishment in the territory embraced by the Western Defense Command of Military Areas and Zones thereof'; it specified and designated as military areas certain areas within the Western Defense Command; and it declared that 'such persons or classes of persons as the situation may require' would, by subsequent proclamation, be excluded from certain of these areas, but might be permitted to enter or remain in certain others, under regulations and restrictions to be later prescribed.Among the military areas so designated by Public ProclamationNo. 1 was Military AreaNo. 1, which embraced, besides the southern part of Arizona, all the coastal region of the three Pacific Coast states, including the City of Seattle, Washington, where appellant resided.Military AreaNo. 2. designated by the same proclamation, included those parts of the coastal states and of Arizona not placed within Military AreaNo. 1.

Public ProclamationNo. 2 of March 16, 1942, issued by General DeWitt, made like recitals and designated further military areas and zones.It contained like provisions concerning the exclusion, by subsequent proclamation, of certain persons or classes of persons from these areas, and the future promulgation of regulations and restrictions applicable to persons remaining within them.7 Federal Register 2405.

An Executive Order of the President, No. 9102, of March 18, 1942, established the War Relocation Authority, in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President; it authorized the Director of War Relocation Authority to formulate and effectuate a program for the removal, relocation, maintenance and supervision of persons designated under Executive Order No. 9066, already referred to; and it conferred on the Director authority to prescribe regulations necessary or desirable to promote the effective execution of the program.7 Federal Register 2165.

Congress, by the Act of March 21, 1942, 18 U.S.C.A. § 97a, provided: 'That whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an Executive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or by any military commander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military commander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that his act was in violation thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be liable' to fine or imprisonment, or both.

Three days later, on March 24, 1942, General DeWitt issued Public ProclamationNo. 3. 7 Federal Register 2543.After referring to the previous designation of military areas by Public...