Klages' Estate, In re

• Decision Date: 03 July 1973
• Docket Number: No. 55333,55333
• Citation: 209 N.W.2d 110
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE of John L. KLAGES, Deceased. Karl H. KLAGES and Ralph J. Klages, Appellants, v. Dorothy WEAVER et al., Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 110

209 N.W.2d 110

64 A.L.R.3d 254

In the Matter of the ESTATE of John L. KLAGES, Deceased.

Karl H. KLAGES and Ralph J. Klages, Appellants, v. Dorothy WEAVER et al., Appellees.

No. 55333.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 3, 1973.

William Pappas, Mason City, for appellants.

Alfred A. Beardmore and T. A. Beardmore, Charles City, for appellees.

Heard before MOORE, C.J., and MASON, REES, UHLENHOPP and McCORMICK, JJ.

UHLENHOPP, Justice.

This appeal involves the effect of a prior adjudication that certain provisions of a will are void because of undue influence.

Testator John L. Klages had three children, Karl, Ralph, and Dorothy. He owned considerable real and personal property. on October 1, 1965, he sold and conveyed his farm of 153.25 acres to Karl and Ralph for $49,500. On December 19, 1967, he made a will, the main provisions of which were these. First, he revoked prior wills. Second, he ordered payment of his debts. Third, he directed that any beneficiary who contested the will should receive only $100. Fourth, he established a trust of $8,000 for Dorothy and her children--Dorothy to receive the income and also such amounts of the corpus as needed in case of misfortune or ill health, and her children to receive $1,000 of the corpus at age 25 or marriage and the balance of the corpus at Dorothy's death. Fifth, testator gave the rest of his property to Karl and Ralph. And sixth, he appointed Karl and Ralph as executors.

On March 13, 1968, testator made a second will, the main provisions of which were these. First, he again revoked prior wills, second, he again ordered payment of his debts, and third, he again directed that any beneficiary contesting the will should receive only $100. Fourth, he stated that he had previously advanced to Dorothy 210 shares of Iowa Public Service Company stock and some insurance, government bonds, and cash, that he therefore bequeathed her $1,800, but that $800 should be deducted from the bequest as 'the approximate expense of the last Guardianship she promoted me into.' (In a pleading in later litigation Dorothy stated she received only 123 shares of the stock and no insurance, and she denied she promoted him 'into the last guardianship.') Fifth, testator bequeathed Dorothy's children $2,000. Sixth, he again gave the rest of his property to Karl and Ralph, and he confirmed his conveyance of his farm to them. And seventh, he again appointed Karl and Ralph as executors.

On December 15, 1968, testator died. On January 10, 1969, the later will of March 13, 1968, was admitted to probate.

On January 27, 1969, Dorothy brought suit in equity against Karl and Ralph to set aside the sale and conveyance of the farm to them. On the same day, she also commenced an action in the probate proceeding to have the probated will adjudged void on two grounds: unsoundness of testator's mind and undue influence by Karl and Ralph.

After pretrial discovery, the will contest came on for trial on November 23, 1970. That day Dorothy filed an amendment to her petition contesting the will by withdrawing her claim that testator was of unsound mind and by limiting her contest based on undue influence to the parts of the probated will which we have called third (only $100 to a will contestant), fourth ($1,800 less $800 to Dorothy), sixth (residue to Karl and Ralph and confirmation of the conveyance), and seventh (appointment of Karl and Ralph as executors). Thus she left unchallenged the parts of the probated will we have called first (revocation of prior wills), second (payment of debts), and fifth (bequest of $2,000 to her children). Neither did she challenge testator's earlier will of December 19, 1967.

The issue of the alleged invalidity of the challenged third, fourth, sixth, and seventh parts of the later will was submitted to the jury, which found those parts invalid because of undue influence. The court entered judgment that those parts are void.

On May 4, 1971, Karl and Ralph filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the probate proceeding, dealing in essence with the effect of the judgment in the will contest, reciting the facts as to the earlier will, the probated will, and the contest of the probated will, and asking the court to adjudge the earlier will to be testator's last will. Dorothy moved to dismiss the petition, and the trial court sustained the motion. Karl and Ralph appealed.

After Karl and Ralph perfected their appeal, Dorothy's equity suit to set aside the sale and conveyance of the farm came on for trial in district court. During trial the parties settled the suit. They agreed to have the farm and its interim rental value appraised, and Karl and Ralph promised to pay Dorothy one-third of the appraised amount and secured their promise by an assignment of their interest in testator's estate.

In this appeal in the declaratory judgment case, Karl and Ralph make two basic claims: the doctrine of partial invalidity is inapplicable under the facts, and the doctrine of dependant relative revocation is applicable. On the other hand, Dorothy contends the doctrine of partial invalidity is applicable, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation is inapplicable, this declaratory judgment proceeding is barred because it is an untimely will contest, and Karl and Ralph waived the present appeal by settling the equity suit involving the sale and conveyance of the farm.

We find consideration of three of these issues to be necessary. Is the doctrine of partial invalidity applicable under the facts? Is the present declaratory judgment proceeding barred by the statute of limitations? Did Karl and Ralph waive this appeal by settling the equity suit?

Under a motion to dismiss, the question is whether 'it appears to a certainty a plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claims asserted by him.' Bindel v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 197 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Iowa).

I. Partial Invalidity. When two wills exist and a contestant challenges only the later one and does so successfully, the earlier will stands as the testator's will. White v. Flood, 258 Iowa 402, 138 N.W.2d 863 (later will purportedly expressly revoked earlier will); Kostelecky v. Scherhart, 99 Iowa 120, 68 N.W. 591; In re Yahn's Estate, 258 Wis. 280, 45 N.W.2d 702; 57 Am.Jur. Wills § 472 at 329; 95 C.J.S. Wills § 274d(1) at 50. Until the earlier will itself is successfully contested, it is presumed to be valid. In re Will of Crissick, 174 Iowa 397, 417, 156 N.W. 415, 422 ('it is presumed to be a lawful will'). Moreover, a successful contest of the later will is not res judicata in a subsequent contest of the earlier will. Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 657.

Here, however, Dorothy did not attack the whole of the later will. She pinpointed her attack to specific parts. She did not challenge the express revocation clause or the bequest of $2,000 to her children in the later will. She contends those parts remain operative, and that the revocation clause in the later will nullifies the earlier will. To reach that result, she calls upon the doctrine of partial invalidity of wills. 57 Am.Jur. Wills § 38 at 64; 94 C.J.S. Wills § 151 at 937, § 236 at 1084--1085. On the other hand, Karl and Ralph claim that the partial invalidity doctrine is inapplicable here and that Dorothy's successful will contest invalidated the later will in all material respects.

We turn to the two wills. They are alike except in two principal respects--a change in the parts for Dorothy and her children, and, as a result of change in those parts, a change in the residuum for Karl and Ralph. In the earlier will Dorothy and her children were provided for by a trust with a corpus of $8,000. In the later will the trust was eliminated, and Dorothy was given $1,000 and her children were given $2,000. They were thus cut down by $5,000 of principal. This affected the residuum--the residuary clause would carry $5,000 more to Karl and Ralph.

In the later will, the two parts contested by Dorothy which are of materiality to the present problem are the gift of $1,000 to her and the residuary gift to Karl and Ralph. The jury found those parts resulted from undue influence. But the undue influence could not be isolated to those parts. It also necessarily affected the revocation clause in the second will, the very purpose of which was to nullify the clauses for Dorothy and her children and the residuary clause in the earlier will to make way for the substitutionary clauses in the later will. Thus in the later will, the revocation clause, the lesser gifts to Dorothy and her children, and the larger residuary gift to Karl and Ralph are all linked together.

Under these facts and the applicable rules of law, Dorothy cannot successfully invoke the doctrine of partial invalidity to keep alive the revocation clause and the gift to her children in the later will. A successful contest of a will, of course, ordinarily invalidates the will. But a successful contest of particular parts of a will invalidtes only those parts if the four requirements are met which are set forth in In re Ankeny's Estate, 238 Iowa 754, 765, 28...