Klanseck v. Anderson Sales & Service, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 September 1986
• Docket Number: Docket No. 74713
• Citation: 426 Mich. 78,393 N.W.2d 356
• Parties: Stephen KLANSECK and Karen Klanseck, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ANDERSON SALES & SERVICE, INC., a Michigan corporation, and American Honda Motor Co., Inc., a foreign corporation, jointly and severally, Defendants- Appellees. 426 Mich. 78, 393 N.W.2d 356, Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P. 11,161
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 356

393 N.W.2d 356

Stephen KLANSECK and Karen Klanseck, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ANDERSON SALES & SERVICE, INC., a Michigan corporation, and American Honda Motor Co., Inc., a foreign corporation, jointly and severally Defendants- Appellees.

Docket No. 74713.

426 Mich. 78, 393 N.W.2d 356, Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P. 11,161

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Jan. 15, 1986.

Decided Sept. 17, 1986.

Vandeveer, Garzia, Tonkin, Kerr, Heaphy, Moore, Sills & Poling, P.C. by Robert D. Brignall, James M. Prahler, Detroit, for Stephen and Karen Klanseck.

Kohl, Secrest, Wardle, Lynch, Clark and Hampton by Michael L. Updike, Farmington Hills, for defendant-appellee Anderson Sales & Service, Inc.

Dice, Sweeney, Sullivan, Feikens, Hurbis & Foster, P.C. by Jon Feikens, Dennis J. Mendis, Detroit, for defendants-appellees.

WILLIAMS, Chief Justice.

This motorcycle accident case presents two issues involving jury instructions. The first question is whether it was error for the trial judge to instruct the jury that it could infer negligence from plaintiff's failure to obtain a motorcycle endorsement as required by M.C.L. Secs. 257.312a, 257.312b; M.S.A. Secs. 9.2012(1), 9.2012(2). We hold that where evidence is presented which raises an issue regarding a driver's incompetence or inexperience as a causal factor in an accident, the jury may be instructed that it may draw an inference of negligence from the violation of a licensing statute. It is then for the jury to decide whether such negligence was in fact a proximate cause of the accident. The court's instruction in this case was therefore proper.

The second question is whether it was error for the court to instruct the jury regarding the plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages. Since evidence was presented that the plaintiff did not follow the course of action recommended by his physician, we find the court's instruction was warranted.

We therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

I. FACTS

Plaintiff, Stephen Klanseck, brought this action, seeking damages for injuries suffered in a motorcycle accident which occurred May 27, 1976. Mr. Klanseck had that day purchased a Honda GL 1000 motorcycle from defendant Anderson Sales & Service, Inc., and was heading for home with his new cycle when the machine began to "fishtail." Plaintiff applied the brakes and the motorcycle slid sideways and went down, resulting in plaintiff's injuries.

Following the accident, plaintiff received sutures in his left arm, was x-rayed and released. Twelve days later, a fracture of plaintiff's right wrist was diagnosed and treated. Plaintiff, who was employed as an auto mechanic, claimed that his injuries resulted in chronic pain and numbness in his left arm and hand, which interfered with his work and eventually resulted in a serious mental disorder.

After the accident, it was found that the front tire had deflated. A small hole was later discovered on the portion of the tube that contacted the wheel rim. Plaintiff's expert witness testified that the puncture resulted from the improper placement of a rubber strip, allowing contact between the tube and the metal heads, or nipples, of the spokes on the front rim.

Plaintiff had not previously owned a motorcycle. He had had approximately ten hours of experience riding a small "dirt bike," and three hours of experience riding a friend's Honda GL 1000. He admitted on cross-examination that, although he was aware that he was required by law to obtain a motorcycle endorsement on his driver's license, he had not done so. He also stated that he knew at the time of the accident that the proper response to a blowout was to allow the motorcycle to coast to a stop without applying the brakes. He explained that he did not follow that procedure because he did not realize that the tire was losing air pressure. "A brand new bike, I didn't know whether something was left loose or what the problem was." [Trial transcript, April 21, 1981, p. 115]

The defendants presented as witnesses experienced motorcycle riders who testified that a front tire blowout would not cause a fall if the machine were handled properly. The trial court instructed the jury that it might infer negligence if it found that plaintiff violated a statute, and must then decide if such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. The court also gave an instruction on plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages. Plaintiff objected to instructions on comparative negligence and to the mitigation instruction.

The jury found that both defendants were negligent and had breached implied warranties to the plaintiff. Damages were assessed in the amount of $40,000, reduced to $16,000 by the jury's finding of sixty percent comparative negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 136 Mich.App. 75, 356 N.W.2d 275 (1984). This Court granted leave to appeal June 26, 1985, 422 Mich. 936 (1985).

II. VIOLATION OF A LICENSING STATUTE AS EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE

The trial court instructed the jury as follows:

"Now, there are some statutes that will apply in this case. In this situation we have one statute I will read as follows, and it states: A person, before operating a motorcycle upon a public street or highway in this State, shall procure a motorcycle endorsement on the operator or chauffeur's license.

"A second part of that same statute reads on as follows: Before a person is issued a motorcycle endorsement on an operator's or chauffeur's license, the person shall pass an examination as provided in section 309, and the rules of the Department of State.

"Each written examination given an applicant for a motorcycle endorsement on an operator's or chauffeur's license, as provided in section 309, shall also include subjects designed to cover a motorcycle.

"The person shall pass an examination which shall include a driving test designed to test the competency of the applicant for the first motorcycle endorsement on the operator or chauffeur's license, to operate a motorcycle upon the highways of this state with safety to himself and other persons and property.

* * *

"Now, ladies and gentlemen, if you find that the Plaintiff violated [this statute] before or at the time of the occurrence, you may infer that the Plaintiff was negligent.

"You must then decide whether such negligence was a proximate cause of this occurrence." [Trial Transcript, April 24, 1981, pp. 550-551]

Plaintiff argues that the instruction regarding the licensing statute was erroneous because his failure to obtain a motorcycle endorsement could not be found to have caused the accident. He contends that his negligence, if any, must be judged according to what he did or did not do when confronted by the sudden emergency caused by the rapid deflation of the front tire and that the licensing statute is therefore irrelevant on the issue of negligence.

A

In upholding the instruction, the Court of Appeals relied on Turri v. Bozek, 79 Mich.App. 212, 261 N.W.2d 264 (1977), rev'd on other grounds 406 Mich. 900, 276 N.W.2d 457 (1979), and Parks v. Pere Marquette R. Co, 315 Mich. 38, 23 N.W.2d 196 (1946). Turri involved a collision between a motorcycle and a camper in which there was evidence of negligence on the part of both drivers. The trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiff's failure to obtain a motorcycle endorsement constituted negligence per se, and the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, finding that the fact of plaintiff's violation of the licensing statute met the criteria of relevance established by the Michigan Standard Jury Instructions. ¹ Because this Court had recently adopted comparative negligence in Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979), the Turri case was reversed and remanded for a new trial pursuant to that opinion.

In Parks, plaintiff's decedent was killed while a passenger in his own automobile which was being driven by a friend. The question in that case was whether the trial court erred in instructing that the negligence of the driver, if found by the jury, should be imputed to plaintiff's decedent, and in refusing to instruct the jury that the driver's lack of an operator's license had no bearing on the question of negligence. This Court upheld the trial court's actions, noting with regard to the licensing issue:

"As bearing upon the question of contributory negligence it was competent to disclose to the jury that the driver of decedent's automobile did not have a license, since an unlicensed driver operating an automobile upon the highways of this State does so in direct violation of the statute." (Citation omitted.) Id., 315 Mich. 48, 23 N.W.2d 196.

Perhaps because it would have made no difference in the result, the Parks court did not indicate whether the violation of the licensing statute was evidence bearing on the negligence of the driver, which could be imputed to plaintiff's decedent, or whether the lack of an operator's license was evidence bearing directly on the negligence of the decedent in entrusting his automobile to an unlicensed driver. Therefore, although Parks is instructive, we do not view it as dispositive in the present case.

B

The fact that a person has violated a safety statute may be admitted as evidence bearing on the question of negligence. In some instances, it may be said that the Legislature, in enacting a statute prescribing a certain course of conduct, has fixed a standard of reasonableness which may be viewed as a settled rule, removing from the jury the task of making its own determination of reasonable behavior in a negligence case. ² Thus, for example, in a case involving a child who suffocated in an abandoned refrigerator, the existence of a state statute prohibiting the abandonment of a refrigerator without removing its door would relieve the jury of a decision whether the person who abandoned the appliance was negligent to have done so. In...