Kleespies v. State

Citation7 N.E. 186,106 Ind. 383
PartiesKleespies v. State.
Decision Date22 May 1886
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

106 Ind. 383
7 N.E. 186

Kleespies
v.
State.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

May 22, 1886.


Appeal from Clark circuit court.


J. B. Merriwether, for appellant.

The Attorney General and F. B. Burke, for the State.


Howk, J.

In this case the appellant, George Kleespies, and one Louis Kleespies were jointly indicted at the October term, 1885, of the court below, to-wit, on the twenty-sixth day of October, 1885. The indictment contained two counts. The first count charged that at Clark county, “on the first day of July, 1885, and continuously from that day to the day of making this presentment, Louis Kleespies and George Kleespies did then and there, and during all of said time, unlawfully suffer and knowingly permit their building and room, then and there situated, to be used for gaming, and did then and there, and during all of said time, unlawfully suffer and knowingly permit” six named persons, whose names we omit, “and divers other persons to the grand jurors unknown, to play at a certain game called faro, for money and

[7 N.E. 187]

other articles of value.” The second count charged “that at said county, on the first day of July, 1885, and from that day to the day of making this presentment, Louis Kleespies and George Kleespies did then and there, and during all of said time, unlawfully rent their building and room, then and there situated, to be used for gaming.” Upon their joint arraignment and plea of not guilty, the appellant and Louis Kleespies were jointly tried by a jury; and a verdict was returned into court finding Louis Kleespies not guilty, and finding appellant guilty as charged in the indictment, and assessing his fine at $250. Over his motion for a new trial, the court rendered judgment against the appellant, on the verdict, for the fine assessed, and costs. Errors are here assigned by appellant upon the overruling of his motions to quash each count of the indictment, and his motion for a new trial.

Appellant's counsel first insists that each count of the indictment is insufficient because the description of the building and room therein was too general and vague, and did not inform the defendants what room or building was permitted by them to be used, or rented by them to be used, for gaming purposes. We do not think that this objection is well taken as to either count of the indictment. In each count the premises are described as the defendant's building and room, at Clark county. This follows substantially the language of the statute defining the...

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